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Abstract 
In the European Union, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive1 adopted in 2014 
sets out rules and procedures to ensure depositor protection and is a key step 
towards harmonisation of deposit insurance in the European Union. It contains 22 
national options and discretions (NODs) which Member States may apply to reflect 
specific national circumstances. 
The purpose of this study is to assess the respective national implementations of the 
NODs, including their practical impact on depositor protection, and to propose policy 
recommendations regarding their possible treatment under the European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme, under the assumption that the latter would take the form of a full 
insurance scheme.  
The analysis of the NODs is based on extensive surveys and interviews with 
representatives of national deposit guarantee schemes and authorities, including 
national competent authorities, central banks, Ministries of Finance, and banks. 
Based on the above analysis of the NODs, this study proposes alternative approaches 
for 12 NODs and full harmonisation for 3 NODs. It also recommends that 2 NODs 
could be retained in their current form while 5 NODs could be eliminated. 
 
Résumé 
Au sein de l’Union Européenne, la directive relative aux systèmes de garantie des 
dépôts (SGD) 2 adoptée en 2014 définit les règles et procédures visant à garantir la 
protection des déposants et constitue une étape essentielle vers l’harmonisation de 
la garantie des dépôts dans l’Union Européenne. La directive contient vingt-deux 
options et facultés nationales (OPTION) que les États membres peuvent appliquer 
pour refléter des situations nationales spécifiques. 
Le but de cette étude est d’évaluer ces options et facultés nationales, y compris leur 
impact pratique sur la protection des déposants. Cette étude vise également à 
formuler des recommandations de politique générale sur leur traitement éventuel 
dans le cadre de la mise en place d’un système européen de garantie des dépôts, en 
supposant toutefois que ce dernier prenne la forme un système de garantie complet. 
L’analyse des options et facultés prévues par le droit de l’Union repose sur des 
enquêtes et des entretiens approfondis avec des représentants des systèmes de 
garantie des dépôts nationaux, des autorités nationales compétentes, des banques 
centrales, des ministères des finances et des banques. Sur la base de cette analyse, 
cette étude propose des approches alternatives pour douze OPTIONS ainsi qu’une 
harmonisation complète pour trois OPTIONS. Elle recommande également de 
conserver deux OPTIONS sous leur forme actuelle, tandis que cinq OPTIONS 
pourraient être éliminées. 
 
                                           
1 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit 
guarantee schemes. 
2 Directive 2014/49/UE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 16 avril 2014 relative aux systèmes de 
garantie des dépôts  
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1 Introduction 
The first Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD) was adopted in 1994. 
Targeted amendments were introduced in 2009 in order to ensure a uniform coverage 
level of EUR 100 000. A recast DGSD adopted in 2014 significantly strengthened 
depositor protection by requiring faster pay-outs, more robust funding and increased 
information disclosure. The recast DGSD also contains a transitional provision 
whereby the European Commission should ‘submit a report, and, if appropriate, a 
legislative proposal to the European Parliament and the Council setting out how DGSs 
operating in the Union may cooperate through a European scheme to prevent risks 
arising from cross-border activities and protect deposits from such risks’.  
Common deposit insurance constitutes one of three pillars of the Banking Union. 
While the first two pillars, i.e. the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)3 and the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)4 are operational, the Commission proposal for a 
Regulation to establish deposit insurance for the Banking Union5 of November 2015 
did not gain sufficient support in the Council and the European Parliament to progress 
further than the technical level, revealing differences of opinion about how to 
implement the longer-term Banking Union vision6.  
A European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) would be an essential basis for trust 
in the single currency as every depositor should have full confidence that deposits 
enjoy the same level of protection, regardless of where the account is held. In the 
absence of EDIS, depositor protection remains national, delivered by national deposit 
guarantee schemes (DGSs) and funds.  
In practice, DGSs can perform three functions. First, they protect depositors. Second, 
DGSs are meant to limit the possibility of systemic bank runs and thus increase 
banking stability. Third, they can allow a bank to be resolved and, hence, minimise 
the costs for taxpayers. In the EU, the first and second functions have been at the 
core of the DGS system. 
The rationale for the DGSD was that national DGSs, which are the essential 
counterpart to the prudential supervision of banks operating in the same financial 
market in the event that one of them fails, exhibit a minimum degree of 
harmonisation. Under the DGSD, each Member State is required to introduce laws to 
ensure i) that one or more DGSs are set up on their territory and that all banks are 
required to join them and, ii) a harmonised level of protection of EUR 100 000 per 
depositor per bank. The harmonised protection of depositors is built around 4 criteria: 
coverage, identification of beneficiaries, swift repayment and funding of the scheme. 
According to the DGSD: 
 The limit of EUR 100 000 per depositor per bank applies to the aggregated 
accounts of one depositor at the same bank. For joint accounts (e.g. belonging 
to a couple), the limit applies to each depositor.  
 DGSs protect deposits of individuals and companies irrespective of their size.  
                                           
3 Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013. 
4 Under the Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014, the European Central Bank assumes the role of a single 
supervisor of the significant banks in the Banking Union. National supervisory authorities still play a role 
for less significant banks. The Single Resolution Board manages the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and it 
is tasked to ensure a smooth resolution of financially distressed banks, with the minimum possible impact 
on taxpayers’ money and the overall European economy. 
5 Proposal of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 
806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), COM (2015) 586 final, 
24.11.2015. 
6 European Commission (2017), Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
Completing the Banking Union. 
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 Repayment deadlines are gradually reduced from the current 20 working days 
to 7 in 3 phases: i) 15 working days from 2019, ii) 10 working days from 2021 
and, iii) 7 working days from 2024. Member States are free to introduce faster 
pay-outs more quickly.  
 To ensure more robust financing, DGSs are required to raise ex ante 
contributions from banks, reflecting individual banks’ risk profiles, i.e. riskier 
banks must pay more. By 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS 
must reach a target level of at least 0.8 % of the amount of the covered 
deposits of its members. Combining the fire power of all EU DGSs, this 
corresponds to about EUR 65 billion based on the total covered deposits in the 
EU at the end of 2018. The majority of the funds (EUR 48.5 billion) belongs 
to national DGSs in the Banking Union. 
The DGSD has been a key step in reducing the differences between Member States. 
Nevertheless, it still leaves some room for discretion at national level. In addition, 
the DGSD contains several national options and discretions (NODs) and Member 
States may choose to apply some or all of them if they deem it appropriate to reflect 
their respective national circumstances. In the context of this study, in total 22 NODs 
have been identified and analysed as to how they are applied and/or used, and in 
terms of their practical impact.  
These NODs can be categorised into three groups: NODs relevant for (i) the coverage 
and the pay-out procedure, (ii) contributions and the available financial means and 
(iii) transitional provisions (see Table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1 Overview of NODs in the DGSD 
NOD National option and discretion DGSD 
 Coverage level and pay-out procedure Article 
1 Coverage of pension schemes 5(2)(a) 
2 Deposits held by small local authorities 5(2)(b) 
3 Exclusion of deposits to pay off a loan on private 
immovable property 
5(3) 
4 Temporary high balances relating to certain 
transactions 
6(2) 
5 Old-age provision products and pensions 6(3) 
6 Treated as single depositor 7(2) 
7 Set-off of depositor liabilities 7(5) 
8 Exclusion of deposits fulfilling a social purpose 7(8) 
9 Longer repayment period for certain deposits 8(3) 
10 Deadline on validity of repayment claims 9(3) 
 Contributions and available financial means  
11 Payment commitments  10(3), para. 1 
12 Contributions into existing mandatory schemes 10(4), para. 1,2 
13 Financing of failure prevention measures 11(3) 
14 Financing of measures to preserve access of covered 
deposits 
11(6) 
15 Voluntary lending between DGSs 12(1) 
16 Lower contributions for low-risk sectors 13(1) 2nd 
subpara 
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NOD National option and discretion DGSD 
17 Lower contributions for members of IPSs 13(1) 3rd 
subpara  
18 Use of a uniform risk-weights for banks affiliated to 
central bodies 
13(1) 4th 
subpara 
19 Minimum contribution 13(1) 5th 
subpara 
20 Participation by branches from outside the EU 15(1) 2nd 
subpara 
 Transitional provisions  
21 Repayment periods longer than 7 working days 8(2) 
22 Coverage of deposits until the maturity date 19(1) 
Source: European Commission 
 
In practice, the NODs should address the specificities of each individual Member 
State. However, specific discretions can impair the proper functioning of the Single 
Market, pose risks to the financial stability of the EU and lead to distortion in the 
scope and level of depositor confidence, as well as impact the level of funds available 
for pay-outs. Therefore, they must be adequately justified and, some of them, 
potentially redesigned. 
 
The remainder of the study first provides a brief overview of the different forms of a 
possible EDIS in Chapter 2 and of the methodology used for the assessment of the 
NODs in Chapter 3.  
The core of the study is the analysis of the NODs set out in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, 
which focuses on (i) the application of each individual NOD in practice, (ii) its impact 
in different Member States on the risk profile of the national DGS, the level playing 
field, depositor confidence and relevance of the NOD in each Member State, and (iii) 
the assessment of a reasonable way forward for each option in the context of an EDIS 
that takes the form of a full insurance scheme.  
Finally, Chapter 7 draws the main conclusions from the assessment of all the NODs 
and provides an overview of the recommended policy mix in the context of EDIS. 
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2 A European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
The overarching goal of the three pillars of the Banking Union (common supervision, 
resolution and deposit insurance) is to break the ‘doom loop’ link between the banks 
and domestic governments, whereby failing banks lead to a failing state and 
unsustainable public debt leads to insolvent banks, as exposed in the European 
sovereign debt crisis in 2009. 
The Banking Union project is not yet completed. As DGSs remain national, domestic 
government budgets also remain exposed to risks in case domestic banks fail, as 
ultimate guarantors of the national DGSs.  
A European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) is key to breaking this loop between the 
banks and their sovereigns. The experience of the US where the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), responsible for both deposit insurance and resolution, 
proved to be a powerful and effective tool in dealing with bank failures, confirms this 
logic.  
However, in the EU, the political consensus is far from being reached. One of the main 
arguments against a common insurance fund is the need to reduce risk in the banking 
system before designing mechanisms for risk sharing. Some of these risks are seen as 
associated with differences in the insolvency frameworks, in the legal and tax systems7, 
but also in the structure of the national banking sectors. In particular, differences in the 
level of concentration of the sector, the existence of stakeholder banks (cooperatives, 
savings and public banks), and the presence of third country branches and subsidiaries 
can lead to different probabilities of pay-out and losses in case of a pay-out across 
Member States. 
To address the divergent concerns, various forms of a common deposit insurance 
scheme for the Banking Union members have been explored and proposed. They can 
be categorised as four options: 
 Full insurance scheme; 
 Co-insurance scheme;  
 Re-insurance scheme; 
 Mandatory lending scheme. 
  
                                           
7 See for instance A. De Aldisio, G. Aloia, A. Bentivegna, A. Gagliano, E. Giorgiantonio, C. Lanfranchi and M. 
Maltese (2019), Towards a framework for orderly liquidation of banks in the EU, Notes on Financial Stability 
and Supervision, Banca D’Italia. 
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2.1 Full insurance scheme  
A full insurance scheme provides a full funding of the liquidity needs of the DGSs and 
covers all losses arising from a pay-out event or a request to contribute to resolution.8 
Under this scheme, the funds of the DGSs are merged into EDIS, but the national 
schemes still exist for the actual collection of funds and pay-out procedures. Pooled 
funds would be collected directly from the member institutions by the national DGSs. A 
common fund would manage such funds to ensure uniform and rapid governance in the 
event of a crisis.  
The contribution to the common fund is calculated based on the risk of the domestic 
(not Banking Union) banking system that contributes via the national DGS.  
 
Figure 2.1 Graphic illustration of full insurance scheme 
 
Note: The figure above shows the (simplified) financial relations of EDIS and the national DGSs under a full 
insurance scheme. The figure on the left-hand side illustrates the relations during normal times, i.e. before a 
pay-out event, while the figure on the right-hand side illustrates the situation in a regular pay-out event, i.e. 
no preventive or alternative measures. In this exemplary case, a member institution in country A failed. Only 
the actors financially involved have been included in the graphic illustration. 
Source: CEPS elaboration 
 
  
                                           
8 While liquidity provisions take place immediately, losses are typically known only sometime after the pay-
out event, in some cases even years, once the process of the recovery is concluded.  
 Options and national discretions under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and their treatment in the 
context of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
13 
 
2.2 Co-insurance scheme  
Under this scheme, DGSs remain national and each of them would contribute to a 
common fund from the ‘first euro’. This means that unlike re-insurance (see below), 
where national resources must be depleted first, the common fund participates (in a 
given share) to the provisions of the DGS . Indeed, national DGSs transfer part of the 
contributions collected from the member institutions to the central fund. Participating 
DGSs can request both liquidity and loss cover from the pooled funds in the event of a 
pay-out or contribution to resolution. The pooled funds and the national DGS should 
cover the same percentage of the loss. 
 
Figure 2.2 Graphic illustration of co-insurance scheme 
 
Note: The figure above shows the (simplified) financial relations of EDIS and the national DGSs under a co-
insurance scheme. The figure on the left-hand side illustrates the relations during normal times, i.e. before a 
pay-out event, while the figure on the right-hand side illustrates the situation in a regular pay-out event, i.e. 
no preventive or alternative measures. In this exemplary case a member institution in country A failed. Only 
the actors financially involved have been included in the graphic illustration. 
Source: CEPS elaboration 
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2.3 Re-insurance scheme 
Under this scheme, DGSs would remain national and each of them would contribute to 
a common fund. Re-insurance implies that the access to the pooled funds can only be 
possible once the resources of the national DGS have been depleted. National DGSs 
would collect funds through the transfer of part of the risk-based contributions collected 
from the member institutions. A common fund would manage the pooled funds to ensure 
uniform and rapid response in the event the common fund is called upon.  
The contribution to the common fund is calculated based on risk of the domestic (not 
Banking Union) banking system that contributes via the national DGS.  
 
Figure 2.3 Graphic illustration of re-insurance scheme 
 
Note: The figure above shows the (simplified) financial relations of EDIS and the national DGSs under a re-
insurance scheme. The figure on the left-hand side illustrates the relations during normal times, i.e. before a 
pay-out event, while the figure on the right-hand side illustrates the situation in a regular pay-out event, i.e. 
no preventive or alternative measures. In this exemplary case a member institution in country A failed. Only 
the actors financially involved have been included in the graphic illustration. 
Source: CEPS elaboration 
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2.4 Mandatory lending scheme 
Under this scheme, an EDIS would be based on the system of mandatory lending 
between the national DGSs. Funds would be disbursed in the form of loans with a given 
maturity and potentially carry interest payment. The DGS funds would remain at 
national level, with procedures for the collection and use of disbursed funds. The 
maximum amount to be disbursed by each national DGS could be quantified based on 
total covered deposits of the lending DGSs, with possible caps to ensure the national 
DGSs retain enough funds for their prospective pay-outs. 
 
Figure 2.4 Graphic illustration of mandatory lending scheme 
 
Note: The figure above shows the (simplified) financial relations of EDIS and the national DGSs under a 
mandatory lending scheme. The figure on the left-hand side illustrates the relations during normal times, i.e. 
before a pay-out event, while the figure on the right-hand side illustrates the situation in a regular pay-out 
event, i.e. no preventive or alternative measures. In this exemplary case a member institution in country A 
failed. Only the actors financially involved have been included in the graphic illustration. 
Source: CEPS elaboration 
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3 Methodology 
This chapter provides an overview of the various data collection tools and the 
stakeholder consultation involved in the analysis of the NODs (see Figure 3.1). The tools 
include i) desk research, ii) simulations and estimations, iii) surveys, iv) stakeholder 
interviews, v) a validation workshop and, vi) policy analysis.  
 
Figure 3.1 Overview of the data collection and consultation methods 
 
Source: CEPS elaboration 
 
The following stakeholders were consulted to inform the sections regarding the 
motivation, relevance and impact of NODs as well as their treatment in the context of 
EDIS: 
 The national DGSs are key stakeholders for this study. In the EU, there is 
generally one DGS per country. However, Germany has 4 DGSs and Austria, 
Cyprus, Italy, Lithuania, Poland and Portugal each have 2 DGSs;  
 The Ministries of Finance across the EU Member States were consulted 
because they are responsible for the transposition of NODs; 
 The Single Resolution Board (managing the Single Resolution Fund - 
SRF) may require contribution from a DGS in the context of a resolution and 
provides important insights as regards the similarities between the DGS and the 
SRM (e.g. irrevocable payment commitments, the least-cost test); 
 The European Banking Authority provides common guidelines for the 
calculation of banks’ contributions to the DGS and use of payment commitments. 
Moreover, the EBA is also an important source of information, publishing annual 
statistics on the total covered deposits and available financial means as well as 
notifications of DGS interventions; 
 The European Central Bank and the National Competent Authorities are 
part of the single supervisory mechanism and have a central role in the 
prevention of bank failures; and, 
 Member institutions of national DGSs (banks) provide the deposit accounts 
covered by the national DGSs and contribute to these DGSs to benefit from the 
DGS’ guarantee. To enable the calculation of contributions and pay-outs, 
member institutions must provide data to the DGS.  
Data 
collection 
and 
consultation
Desk 
research
Simulations 
& 
estimations
Surveys
Interviews
Workshop
Policy 
analysis
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The consultation strategy used for different stakeholder groups, i.e. participation in a 
survey, interviews and validation workshop, considered the different role of each of 
these stakeholders in the use of the NODs and their knowledge of specific aspects of the 
NODs, as well as other practical considerations. 
 
3.1 Desk research 
A thorough desk research was necessary for a well-grounded and evidence-based 
analysis which was also used as a basis for the preparation of the well-informed 
consultation strategy.  
The desk research was carried out by national experts who identified all relevant 
documents based on common guidelines and template in order to systematise the 
information collected. They focused on the legal analysis, targeted literature review, 
collection of publicly available data and policy analysis. Firstly, all the legislative acts 
relative to the transposition and implementation of 22 NODs in the DGSD were reviewed 
and analysed across all 28 Member States. The aim was to obtain a comprehensive 
overview of their implementation at national level. A similar exercise was also carried 
out for the US, to explore whether provisions similar to those included in the NODs exist 
in the context of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
Secondly, the following documentation was also reviewed: a conformity assessment of 
the DGSD in the Member States, most up-to-date legal, policy and academic research 
relevant for assessing the impact of the application NODs across Member States. This 
included: annual reports and websites of national DGSs, banking supervisory authorities 
and resolution authorities, information published by the International Association of 
Deposit Insurers (IADI), IMF working papers, ECB reports and EBA deposit guarantee 
schemes data and most importantly, publicly available data concerning pay-out events 
as well as specific features of Member States’ banking systems. This required intensive 
searching of quantitative information dispersed over many websites.  
The analysis of the implementation and use of NODs across Member States considered 
the motivation and rationale underpinning their use and the specific national context in 
each Member State. The study team also highlighted both the divergences in 
understanding NODs and commonalities in approaches chosen by each Member State, 
and specific issues encountered by the national authorities in implementation.  
The results of the desk research are referred to throughout the study for a comparative 
analysis of each NOD. 
 
3.2 Simulations and estimations 
Simulations and estimations have been applied whenever accurate information about 
the quantitative impact of the NODs was not available or insufficient, e.g. where the 
necessary information to analyse the NODs could not be retrieved from the primary 
(collected by CEPS for the purposes of the study) or secondary data sources (e.g. 
existing databases) and no or only fragmented information could be inferred from 
practical experiences so far. 
In practice, simulation and estimation techniques are used and tailored for the 
respective NODs in the analysis; particularly in the case of the NOD dealing with 
temporary high balances (THBs). The need for such approach is justified by the 
concurring lack of information and high potential relevance, since this NOD has high 
importance for depositor confidence. 
The methodology for the used simulations and estimations are described in the sections 
presenting the results. The output of the simulations and estimations are used to assess 
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the relative importance of each NOD across Member States and compared to other 
NODs. 
 
3.3 Surveys among banks and DGSs 
Two additional surveys were conducted to fill information gaps that the desk research 
could not complete. The two surveys targeted national DGSs and banks, respectively. 
Their objective was to collect the information, mostly of quantitative nature and assess 
the impact of the NODs. 
31 DGSs from 27 EU Member States took part in one survey: only Croatia did not 
participate, while four German DGSs and the two Italian DGSs did. The survey was 
tailored to cover all NODs relevant from the perspective of a DGS. 48 banks took part 
in the other survey. They provided information about their contributions and covered 
deposits across 20 Member States. The survey for banks was tailored to cover the NODs 
relevant from the point of view of member institutions. 
The results of the surveys have primarily been used for determining: i) whether the 
NODs are considered for the calculation of risk-based contributions; ii) the overall 
importance of each NOD expressed in percentage of covered deposits; and iii) the 
potential relevance of each NOD across Member States. 
 
3.4 Stakeholder interviews 
Two rounds of interviews have been conducted, first at the initial stage of the research 
to focus on the transposition of the Directive and the practical experience, to 
complement the information acquired by the national experts through desk research 
and second, semi-structured interviews at a later stage of the project, to contribute to 
the assessment of the impact of the NODs and policy options.  
The large majority of the initial interviews (in total 319) were conducted by phone, while 
a few were conducted in person or in writing. At a later stage, interviews (in total 2010) 
were mostly conducted by phone, and only few in person and in writing in order to (i) 
clarify the practical experience with the NOD; (ii) gather missing information assess the 
impact of specific NODs under the criteria within the scope of the study; and (iii) 
evaluate the effectiveness of the different policy options when assessing the NODs in 
the context of EDIS.  
A common guideline was prepared to carry out the semi-structured interviews. The 
guideline was designed flexibly enough to allow for exploring and probing specific issues 
that came up during the analysis and adapted to focus on the relevant NODs in each 
Member State and for each stakeholder consulted. The interviews were used throughout 
the study to complete factual information regarding the NODs and to conduct the impact 
analysis and the policy analysis.  
 
3.5 Validation workshop 
A validation workshop was organised at CEPS premises to present both factual 
information and an analysis of selected NODs as well as to collect feedback for the 
purposes of the optimal policy mix. 14 stakeholders participated, representing national 
                                           
9 This includes 7 interviews with Ministries of Finance, 10 with DGSs, 7 with national central banks and 7 with 
national competent authorities. 
10 This includes 13 interviews with DGSs, 3 with member institutions, 1 with national competent authority, 1 
with a Ministry of Finance, EBA, and SRB respectively. 
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DGSs, national competent authorities, member institutions, the ECB (SSM), the SRB, 
and DG FISMA. 
The workshop focused on eight selected NODs considered highly important in terms of 
impact and country relevance. For each of them, following a short presentation by the 
research team, experts provided useful views to validate the main findings on the 
relevance of the selected NODs, the need to integrate/complement the information 
collected and on the feasibility of a number of policy options. This clarified the weighting 
of each of the selected policy options. 
 
3.6 Policy analysis 
The policy analysis constituted the last step in the process. 4 possible policy options 
were formulated for each NOD: i) retaining the NOD in its current form, which is 
considered the baseline policy option, ii) eliminating the NOD, iii) an alternative option 
is formulated taking into account the limits and the strengths of other policy options, 
and the specific experience of Member States in their implementation, and, iv) full 
harmonisation of the NOD in the context of EDIS, which is assumed to take the form of 
a full insurance scheme. 
Each policy option was then examined and evaluated according to four criteria drawn 
from the better regulation framework: efficiency, effectiveness, coherence and 
subsidiarity.  
Overall, the policy analysis builds on the information and analysis obtained in the 
preceding stages of the project. 
 
3.7 Limitations 
The major difficulty encountered in the assessment of applicable legislation at national 
level was public information being unavailable. In practice, besides the legal 
transposition of the NOD, there is almost no information available about the 
implementation of the NODs, their use in practice and their impact. In several 
organisations, only senior officials with long experience know the rationale and technical 
aspects of the NODs. In some Member States, national experts could only access limited 
information (particularly in the case of Croatia, Germany and Portugal).  
In addition, the transposing legislation is often worded in a generic manner without any 
details on the expected practical implementation. The absence of pay-outs in many 
Member States since the implementation of the DGSD added to the uncertainty about 
how Member States would envisage using the NOD in practice. In several cases, 
implementing regulations have not yet been developed to inform the administrative and 
operational aspects. 
Furthermore, a list of pay-outs, following bank failures, that have occurred so far is 
available on the EBA website, but this list is incomplete. More detailed information on 
pay-outs was difficult to obtain and a careful review of reports and websites, available 
only in the national language, was necessary. 
Lastly, given the high degree of specificity of the topics, not all stakeholders surveyed 
and interviewed had sufficient knowledge to respond to the questions asked, as they 
did not always have a full picture on all the NODs. In some cases, this required arranging 
interviews with additional specialised personnel within the same organisation. 
These limitations were partially addressed by two additional quantitative surveys 
targeting DGSs and banks and additional interviews, which proved successful in filling 
the information gaps. However, as it was also confirmed during the validation workshop 
with high-level experts, quantitative information on some of the NODs appears 
unavailable.  
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4 Coverage level and pay-out procedure 
This section provides a comprehensive overview of all NODs related to the coverage 
level and pay-out procedure. It does so by: i) assessing the implementation of the NOD 
across Member States; ii) estimating the impact of the NOD on the risk profile of the 
national DGS, impact on the level playing field, impact on depositor confidence and 
relevance for Member States; and, iii) identifying options in the context of EDIS to 
assess whether the NOD should be retained, eliminated, partially harmonised or fully 
harmonised. 
4.1 NOD 1 – Coverage of pension schemes 
Summary: NOD 1 - Coverage of pension schemes 
DGSD [Article 5(2) a] 
Member States may ensure that the deposits held by personal pension schemes and 
occupational pension schemes of small or medium-sized enterprises are protected up 
to EUR 100 000 as laid down in Article 6(1) DGSD.  
Transposed into national law [5 Member States] 
Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and the United Kingdom 
Practical experience so far [2 Member States] 
Cyprus and Ireland  
Importance 
Up to 1.4 % of covered deposits11 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national DGS 
Level 
playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member 
States 
Overall - -/+ + + 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current form  
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
[Recommended] 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness +/- +/- + - 
Efficiency - + + - 
Coherence - + +/- + 
Subsidiarity + - - - 
                                           
11 Based on actual or estimated amounts provided by 5 member institutions in the Member States that have 
transposed the NOD in their national legislation, the share of deposits covered under this NOD is likely to be 
insignificant. The deposits concerned range between 0.0% and 0.34% of the total covered deposits in the 
respective Member States. However, if one also considers Member States that have not transposed the NOD, 
the amounts can be higher, up to 1.4% of covered deposits of particular institutions. In practice, it cannot be 
ruled out that that there are member institutions of which the concerned deposits account for a higher share 
of covered deposits.  
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 Implementation across Member States 
5 Member States12 have transposed this option. This could suggest that these countries 
are particularly concerned about the protection of pension schemes of small or medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs)13 and consider that bank deposits play a major role in such 
schemes’ investment strategies in the case of SMEs.  
 
4.1.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The main reasons for protecting deposits created from personal pension schemes and 
occupational pension schemes of SMEs are the importance of pension funds for old-age 
income provision and the financial illiteracy of SMEs.  
In Cyprus, following the financial crisis of 2012-2013, people became concerned over 
losses of pension schemes. SMEs are often very small and do – in general – not have 
expertise in investing; they therefore tend to resort to deposits. Their protection is 
important as part of a wider social policy, beyond depositor confidence. For these 
reasons, Cyprus opted to use the full NOD and cover personal and occupational pension 
schemes operated by SMEs.  
Similarly, Luxembourg chose to guarantee those pensions schemes as part of a general 
objective of enhanced protection for the savings of individuals with low pensions, which 
is often the case of small SMEs. However, the amount of deposits concerned is relatively 
small, as they do not cover investment products but only cash deposits. 
In the UK, the following pension schemes are eligible for protection under the DGSD: 
small self-administered schemes, occupational pension schemes of SMEs, stakeholder 
pension schemes, and personal pension schemes. The UK also decided that certain types 
of pensions, including the occupational pension schemes of SMEs and money purchase 
schemes (which is a form of personal pension scheme), are to be compensated on the 
basis of each beneficiary of the pension, who has a separate entitlement to the 
compensation.  
Ireland decided to cover self-administered pension schemes (SSAPs) because they are 
small-scale (12 or fewer members), usually managed by an individual and are not 
investment vehicles. Unlike in other pension schemes, members invest the money 
themselves instead of investing in a life insurance or via an asset manager. 
Portugal limited the scope of protection to personal and occupational pension funds 
whose members are SMEs. The NOD was never used but in the event of a pay-out, the 
scheme (neither the SMEs nor the individuals) would receive the compensation. The 
DGS would have to make a case-by-case assessment on the eligibility based on the 
Single Customer View (SCV). The DGS would rely on information from member 
institutions that are required to identify the schemes holding the deposits and mark 
them as covered. However, only some of the deposits are considered in the calculation 
of contributions to the DGS.  
 
                                           
12 i.e. Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and the UK. 
13 SMEs would be defined as per Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 of the Commission, i.e. 
enterprises with less than 250 employees and turnover of less than EUR 50 million or a balance sheet total 
below EUR 43 million. 
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4.1.1.2 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
No information is available about the use of the NOD in a pay-out. However, some banks 
in Ireland and Cyprus reported that they include such deposits in the calculation of 
covered deposits. 
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The NOD to extend the protection to certain pension schemes mainly impacts the risk 
profile of the DGS and the depositor confidence. The NOD could have a slight negative 
impact on the level playing field and its relevance differs substantially across Member 
States. 
 
4.1.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The extended coverage would imply an increased exposure of the DGS for which there 
is no adequate contribution. Based on the data provided by member institutions in 
different Member States, which have transposed the NOD but also those that did not, 
the size of these deposits ranges between 0.0 % and 1.4 % of covered deposits in these 
institutions.  
In practice, DGS have little information about this category of deposits, while some 
member institutions own more accurate data than others when tracking the schemes.  
For example, according to the DGS in Portugal, the monitoring of the covered deposits 
did not highlight any substantial change in the amounts after the adoption of the NOD 
(which did not exist before). For the Portuguese member institutions, the NOD does not 
lead to any additional deposits covered. In addition, while only some of them indicated 
that the NOD is considered in the calculation of the risk-based contribution, others either 
did not know or considered that the NOD is not reflected in the calculation.  
 
4.1.2.2 Level playing field 
Such small schemes are unlikely to move to another Member State, which would offer 
better protection. The NOD seems closely linked to each particular Member State. While 
the impact on the level playing field across the EU would appear limited, the impact on 
the level playing field between member institutions within the same Member State would 
depend on whether the latter consistently considers such deposits in the calculation of 
the contributions. 
 
4.1.2.3 Depositor confidence  
The extended protection to additional categories of deposits increases depositor 
confidence in the financial system in particular in view of the importance of pension 
savings when administered by non-professionals. Like NODs 2 and 4, this NOD aims to 
protect vulnerable depositors, which in rare events can be exposed to shocks with very 
negative impact. 
 
4.1.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
In the absence of available data, it is difficult to assess the relevance in each country. 
The relevance depends primarily on the extent that personal pension schemes and 
occupational pension schemes of SMEs are used and the investment policy of these 
schemes. Indeed, these kinds of pension products can be held with a bank, but also 
insurance companies, asset managers and pension funds. Moreover, when the funds 
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belonging to the schemes are held with a bank, the scope of the coverage is important. 
In Cyprus and the UK, the higher scope of protection could imply larger covered 
amounts.  
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
Given the specificity of the pension schemes under protection and the general lack of 
data regarding this NOD transposed in only few Member States, the alternative (Option 
3) seems the most sensible. This option considers (i) maintaining the coverage of these 
pension schemes, (ii) including these deposits in the covered deposits to determine the 
risk-based contributions and (iii) extending the coverage for occupational pension 
schemes of SMEs. Indeed, for these occupational pension schemes of SMEs, which 
combine contributions from several individuals, the individual holders are currently 
collectively covered up to EUR 100 000. This alternative option considers repaying each 
individual holder up to EUR 100 000. It would ensure that, on the one hand, the pension 
savings of potentially financially illiterate SMEs are protected, and on the other hand, 
that there is no difference in the coverage between personal and occupational pension 
schemes from the point of view of the private individual. Moreover, these deposits would 
be considered like regular covered deposits, in both the coverage and the risk-based 
contributions. In this context, this would not impact EDIS in terms of potential increased 
administrative burden or financial exposure because (i) the deposits would be reflected 
in the calculation of contributions and (ii) the settlement of depositor claims would 
remain in the competence of national DGS. 
 
4.1.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form  
This option considers maintaining the current NOD, i.e. the deposits that are held by 
personal and occupational pension schemes of SMEs would continue to be protected up 
to EUR 100 000 in the Member States that transposed this NOD. 
Effectiveness: Retaining the NOD in its current form would accommodate the country-
specific objectives to extend DGS protection to deposits held by certain pension schemes 
of SMEs. The impact on the risk profile of the DGS would be limited, if such deposits are 
properly identified and reflected in the risk-based contributions.  
Efficiency: Maintaining the implementation and the use of the NOD in the Member State 
that chose to apply the NOD is the most efficient way to achieve the objective of 
protecting such deposits. This is due to existing local knowledge of the DGS about the 
SMEs concerned and the existing practices of domestic banks. With EDIS in place, there 
would be limited impact on potential complexity and administrative burden as the 
deposits would be still identified by the national DGS in the same way as other deposits.  
Coherence: Retaining the NOD in its current form would have limited impact on the 
coherence of the regulatory framework under EDIS. The NOD is only applied in a few 
countries, where the volume of covered deposits and hence, financial exposure is 
impacted; yet, any negative impact would be mitigated if such deposits are consistently 
reflected in the risk-based contributions. 
Subsidiarity: Given the limited application of this NOD, specific to only a few Member 
States, retaining this option would also appear sensible from a subsidiarity perspective. 
 
4.1.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This option considers eliminating the NOD in order to exclude deposits held by personal 
and occupational pension schemes of SMEs from the regular coverage. 
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Effectiveness: Eliminating this NOD would mean lowering protection to a specific 
category of deposits. With EDIS in place, this option could be justified by potentially 
lowering financial exposure for EDIS. However, eliminating this NOD would affect 
depositor confidence. 
Efficiency: This would increase the efficiency of the overall functioning of EDIS in terms 
of achieving a uniform level of depositor confidence across the EU.  
Coherence: Coherence of the regulatory framework across countries would increase by 
further reducing the existing fragmentation concerning few countries in terms of 
depositor protection.  
Subsidiarity: With EDIS in place, eliminating this NOD could be perceived as negatively 
impacting the subsidiarity principle relative to the pre-existing situation in Member 
States where the NOD was applied.  
 
4.1.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
Under this option, the NOD could distinguish between personal and occupational pension 
schemes of SMEs when considering the limit of EUR 100 000: unlike the personal 
scheme, occupational pension schemes of SMEs, which combine contributions from 
several individuals, could be compensated by repaying each individual holder up to 
EUR 100 000 in addition to its regular coverage. If the NOD is applied in a Member 
State, the deposits should always be added to the covered deposits, to determine the 
base for the risk-based contributions. 
Effectiveness: This option under EDIS would contribute to effectiveness in achieving the 
objective of enhanced depositor confidence in the same way as the NOD, which extends 
the scope of protection to a specific category of depositors saving for old age. In the 
case of occupational schemes with many members (up to 25014), the EUR 100 000 of 
total coverage would otherwise result in a very small entitlement for each individual 
member in the event of a pay-out. Such an approach would impact the risk profile of 
the DGS, whose exposure would be increased, unless such deposits were already 
identified as deposits with absolute entitlement and reflected in risk-based 
contributions.  
Efficiency: The distinction between personal and occupational schemes would not have 
a significant impact on the efficiency of the system, relative to the option of retaining 
the NOD in its current form. On the one hand, since the same principle is applied across 
all Member States, the process would be easier; on the other hand, in the event of a 
pay-out the identification of the members of the scheme could be more burdensome. 
Coherence: This option would strengthen the coherence of the system with a view to 
achieving a uniform level of depositor protection.  
Subsidiarity: This option would not limit the ability of Member States to decide not to 
protect such deposits. Given the limited transposition, overall, of the NOD,subsidiarity 
is likely to be negatively affected.  
 
                                           
14 SMEs should be defined as per Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 of the Commission, i.e. 
enterprises with less than 250 employees and turnover of less than EUR 50 million or a balance sheet total 
below EUR 43 million. 
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4.1.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This option considers harmonising the NOD across Member States, which means that 
any personal pension schemes and occupational pension schemes of SMEs would be 
covered up to EUR 100 000.  
Effectiveness: The full harmonisation of the NOD under EDIS would likely contribute to 
effectiveness in achieving the objective of enhancing depositor confidence in the 
financial system. However, the implementation would be challenging due to differences 
in the pension system. In addition, it would lead to higher costs for the DGS in the event 
of a pay-out.  
Efficiency: The application of this NOD in all Member States would be burdensome by 
requiring the member institutions to either indicate ex ante the account of the 
occupational scheme as a beneficiary account or identify the absolute entitlement of 
(members of) pension schemes and the corresponding amount of covered deposits. 
Finally, the identification of the covered deposits could be more burdensome, when the 
pension schemes do not use separate accounts. 
Coherence: This option would strengthen coherence under EDIS in terms of achieving a 
uniform level of depositor protection. However, differences in the relevant pension 
schemes are likely to persist and impact the overall coherence of the system.  
Subsidiarity: This option would limit the ability of Member States to decide whether or 
not such additional deposits should be protected. The Member State would still have the 
scope to decide which pension schemes can operate in their system. Given the limited 
transposition, overall, of the NOD, subsidiarity would likely be negatively affected.  
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4.2 NOD 2 – Deposits held by small local authorities 
Summary: NOD 2 - Deposits held by small local authorities  
DGSD [Article 5(2) b] 
Member States may ensure that the deposits held by local authorities with an annual 
budget of up to EUR 500 000 are protected up to EUR 100 000 as specified in Article 
6(1) of the DGSD. 
Transposed into national law [7 Member States] 
Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom  
Practical experience so far [1 Member State] 
Czechia 
Importance 
Up to 0.1 % of covered deposits15 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national DGS 
Level playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member 
States 
Overall - +/- + + 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current form  
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
[Recommended] 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness +/- +/- + + 
Efficiency - ++ + + 
Coherence - ++ +/- -/+ 
Subsidiarity + - - - 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
7 Member States transposed this NOD into national legislation.  
There is no common definition of local authority across the EU, nor a clear definition of 
the relevant local authorities in each country. However, based on national sources and 
on the Council of Europe, in general the notion refers to counties, provinces, 
municipalities and city and town councils.  
In the UK, the notion of local authority includes County or Shire Council, and a District, 
Borough or City Council and they are usually responsible for a range of services for 
                                           
15 The amount of deposits covered under this NOD is based on the estimated and actual amounts provided by 
member institutions in the Member States transposed the NOD in national law. In total, five member 
institutions provided amounts covered under this NOD, ranging between 0.00% and 0.11% of their covered 
deposits.  
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both individuals and business-like health services, social services, education, waste 
disposal, roads, etc. In the UK, there are 466 local authorities in total.  
In Spain, the notion refers to the government and administration powers exercised by 
the ‘local entities’, namely municipalities (8 117) and provincial councils or other forms 
of supra-municipal bodies.  
In Portugal, local authorities consist of 308 municipalities and 3 091 sub-
municipalities/parishes (freguesias).  
In Hungary, the local authorities refer to municipalities (3 175), cities, cities with county 
rank, capital city districts and counties. 
In Czechia, local authorities correspond to 6 250 municipalities.  
In Croatia, local authorities correspond to 429 municipalities, 106 towns and 21 cities.  
In Latvia, local authorities correspond to 110 municipalities and 9 cities. 
In view of the above, local authorities can be quite numerous. In Czechia, about 68 % 
of the 6 250 municipalities (i.e. municipalities with less than 2 000 inhabitants) had a 
budget below the limit of EUR 500 000 in 2014. In Spain, more than 600 local authorities 
are covered by the DGS. By contrast, in Latvia, although the NOD seems to have been 
introduced as a result of political pressure by the local governments, no local 
governments appear to have an annual budget below the EUR 500 000 threshold. 
 
4.2.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
This NOD intends to support small local authorities with limited budget, in view of the 
importance of their public functions. Therefore, the main underlying objective of this 
NOD seems to be the fulfilment of a social objective, rather than depositor confidence 
or stability of the financial system per se.  
In Hungary, deposit protection is also extended to budgetary agencies of the local 
governments. The reason is to avoid that the freezing or loss of their deposits could 
hinder the exercise of the local authorities’ public functions, which are often outsourced 
to their budgetary agencies, i.e. agencies set up by the local authorities themselves and 
financed from local budget.  
In Portugal, this NOD (similarly to NOD 1 and 4) is intended to ensure proper protection 
of authorities to avoid any large impact on citizens who rely on the services such 
authorities provide. By contrast, the importance for the financial system as a whole is 
considered marginal. 
In the UK, as a number of small parish and town councils are likely to fall within the 
scope of the NOD, it was considered beneficial to ensure their protection in the event of 
bank failure16. 
 
4.2.1.2 Budget threshold 
The threshold of EUR 500 000 is calculated in different ways across the Member States 
that have transposed this NOD. Most of these Member States also provide guidance as 
to how to interpret this concept. 
                                           
16 See Consultation Paper 15/15, Depositor and dormant account protection — further amendments April 
2015. 
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In Czechia, in order to identify local authorities, the limit of EUR 500 000 is based on 
their tax revenues instead of turnover. This is considered more appropriate than taking 
into account the budget of the territorial unit, which may fluctuate significantly over 
time. In particular, even small municipalities may have a higher budget, e.g. in 
connection with receiving a donation or subsidising a larger investment event, such as 
liquidation of damage after natural disasters. Every year, local authorities must 
demonstrate that their tax revenues are not above EUR 500 000, taking into account 
the different taxes, including physical and legal persons’ income tax, VAT and real estate 
tax. The threshold is applied to the tax revenues in the previous two calendar years. In 
addition, the local authority must apply for a certificate of guarantee from the bank, 
because such deposits would be eligible for repayment upon the issuance of the 
certificate. The Ministry of Finance includes on its website information about tax income 
of all individual municipalities, so it is easy for the banks and the national DGS to check 
which authorities meet the tax revenue criterion. 
The Bank of Spain also maintains a list of local authorities eligible for the coverage. The 
list is regularly updated based on the budget of the preceding year for the first three 
quarters of the year and the budget of the current year for the fourth quarter. Member 
institutions must use this information to notify the DGS about such deposits and must 
reflect them in their contributions. The criteria provisionally used for drawing up the list 
are as follows17: i) only those local entities that are classified as public administrations 
(local corporations subsector) have been included; ii) individual budgets of each main 
local entity and of each of its subsidiaries classified as public administrations (not 
consolidated) have been used; iii) for local entities with public accounts, the amount of 
initial forecasts, including both financial and non-financial forecasts, have been 
considered as ‘budget’; and, iv) in the case of local entities classified as public 
administrations subject to private accounting, the net turnover has been used as a proxy 
for the budget. 
In the UK, banks are required to take reasonable steps to check whether depositors 
qualify as small local authority depositors (with an annual budget of up to EUR 500 000) 
at least on an annual basis. According to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
(FSCS), the banks can rely on a ‘reasonable estimate of their budget’ provided by the 
local authorities themselves to identify which local authorities fall under the DGS. This 
information is then submitted in the Single Customer View (SCV) to the DGS and 
supervisory authorities (PRA). When it is not possible to determine if a local authority is 
eligible, i.e. if it is not possible to determine whether the budget is under EUR 500 000, 
the bank should treat it as a public authority, hence not eligible under the deposit 
guarantee scheme18. 
In Croatia, the relevant threshold refers to the annual budget of the previous calendar 
year, calculated according to the Act on Budget.  
In Latvia, the annual budget is calculated based on the planned expenses for the current 
year. 
In Portugal, there is no list of relevant authorities and no specific recommendations exist 
as to how to calculate the budget. Member institutions are required to check the 
eligibility and mark the deposits of eligible small local authorities as ‘covered’. The latter 
have signalled to the DGS the difficulty of tracking relevant authorities, not least due to 
the volatility of the budget indicator. There are currently exchanges between the DGS 
and the national central bank on how to overcome these practical challenges. In the 
                                           
17 Bank of Spain, Methodological note on Deposits constituted by local entities with a budget equal to or less 
than EUR 500 000. 
18 FSCS Guide to Single Customer View, updated on 27 March 2017, p. 28. 
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event of a pay-out, the DGS will assess the entitlement to the repayment of covered 
deposits based on the Single Customer View. 
 
4.2.1.3 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
In Czechia, the NOD was used in 2016 and some of the local authorities were repaid. In 
order to be eligible, the local authorities had to apply for repayment to the DGS, which 
examined whether they did not exceed the tax income threshold in line with the law. By 
contrast, Latvia and Portugal have not used the NOD in pay-out events. No information 
is available in relation to other Member States. 
 
 Impact of the NOD 
By extending deposit protection to small local authorities, this NOD could negatively 
affect the risk profile of the DGS and positively impact the confidence of depositors and 
in the financial system. 
 
4.2.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The extended coverage could imply an increased risk for the DGS unless such increased 
exposure of the DGS is properly considered in the calculation of contributions.  
Overall, it seems that in the Member States that transposed the NOD, deposits of small 
local authorities are in principle considered in the calculation of the contributions. This 
is clearly the case in Spain, where banks include such deposits in the calculation of risk-
based contributions. In practice, where small local authorities are easily identifiable and 
the system in place enables their prior identification, banks mark their deposits as 
covered and contribute to the DGS accordingly. However, where the budget is close to 
the threshold or the set of relevant authorities is subject to changes from one year to 
another, such deposits may be more difficult to identify. As a result, the volume of 
covered deposits as a basis for calculation of contributions may be either 
underestimated or overestimated. 
In terms of the additional volume of the covered deposits, the available information is 
limited. In Spain, based on the reporting of some member institutions and the 
calculation of the DGS, the eligible deposits of small local authorities range between 
0.03 % and 0.11 % of covered deposits. 
In Portugal, in the absence of more detailed information available to the DGS about 
such category of deposits, the amount could range between 0.01 % and 0.08 % of 
covered deposits based on information provided by some member institutions.  
For the UK, no information about the amounts is available. However, given that member 
institutions also have to identify such deposits, it is reasonable to assume that such 
deposits, whenever clearly identified are marked as covered and reflected in the 
calculation of the institutions’ contributions. 
Overall, given the budget criterion, the set of relevant authorities may vary over time. 
In practice, the identification of the relevant covered deposits for the calculation of 
contribution could be difficult, possibly leading to underestimating them in the 
contributions. In addition, in the absence of an ex ante list of eligible authorities, 
repayments would not be automatic in the event of pay-out. It would be for the local 
authorities to demonstrate their eligibility and for the DGS to assess it. This usually 
affects both the eligibility and the timing of repayment. The impact of the NOD on the 
risk profile of the DGS would be negative, unless there are good practices that ensure 
such deposits are included in the calculation of contributions.  
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4.2.2.2 Level playing field 
This NOD is unlikely to affect the level playing field at cross-border level because local 
authorities are not likely to move their deposits to another country with a higher deposit 
protection. 
 
4.2.2.3 Depositor confidence 
The main purpose of extending protection to additional categories of deposits is to 
protect the functioning of local authorities and make sure they can perform their public 
purpose. Overall, this NOD increases the confidence of depositors, and more generally 
that of citizens and taxpayers in the financial system that protects deposits based on 
tax revenues for public purposes. 
 
4.2.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
Based on the available data, the NOD is relevant in Spain and Portugal. However, the 
total size of such deposits is around or less than 0.1 % of the total covered deposits of 
the member institutions, and all, or at least part of, the deposits are included in the 
calculation of the contributions.  
In the UK, although data are not available, the total number of local authorities is small, 
compared to other countries. This makes the number of relevant small local authorities 
even less important. 
Czechia appears as the Member State where the NOD is most relevant as it has a very 
large number of small local authorities. Based on 2014 data, about 4 500 local 
authorities were in principle eligible for deposit protection. However, the formal 
procedure requiring a specific certificate in order to benefit from the guarantee, which 
has to be repeated every year, is likely to lower the number of eligible applications in a 
potential pay-out. It also appears that the DGS does not have information about the 
increased exposure linked to such deposits, because it does not receive information 
from the banks in order to distinguish the specific categories of deposits covered. 
However, the procedure to issue the certificate for the guarantee implies that member 
institutions should have full information about such deposits and should include them in 
the calculation of contributions.  
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
Eliminating the NOD would appear as the most sensible policy option under EDIS, 
because the NOD is transposed in a small number of Member States and, in terms of 
volume of affected covered deposits, has a low materiality. This would imply that the 
importance of the NOD is not widely shared across the EU and possibly that the need to 
fulfil the objective of protecting the public function does not compensate for the 
operational challenges linked to identification of such authorities.  
However, even if retained, the NOD would not impact EDIS in terms of potential 
increased administrative burden or financial exposure (i) as long as the deposits were 
reflected in the calculation of contributions and (ii) the settlement of depositor claims 
remained in the competence of national DGS. To this end, a common definition of 
relevant local authorities, namely the type of authority and the size (budget, tax 
revenue, etc.) could be required to better ensure a level playing field and in order to 
reflect such covered deposits as accurately as possible in the risk-based contributions. 
However, finding a common definition could likely face significant challenges given 
Member State specificities in terms of territorial governance. 
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4.2.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers retaining the NOD. This means that the local authorities 
with an annual budget of up to EUR 500 000 in the concerned Member States would 
continue to be protected by the DGS. 
Effectiveness: This option would preserve the effectiveness for Member States that 
value the objective of protecting small local authorities. 
Efficiency: This option would also preserve the efficiency of achieving the objective of 
protecting deposits of small local authorities. This is due to existing knowledge of the 
DGS about the authorities concerned. The NOD would not impact EDIS provided that 
they i) have workable ways how to identify the small authorities, ii) reflect their deposits 
in the risk-based contributions, and iii) settlement of depositor claim remains in the 
competence of national DGS. 
Coherence: This option generally contributes to fragmentation in deposit protection. 
However, it would not negatively affect the coherence of the regulatory framework 
under EDIS if such deposits are reflected in the risk-based contributions. This would 
depend on good governance practices ensuring that such local authorities are 
identifiable.  
Subsidiarity: Given the degree of the country specificity and the limited application 
across Member States, leaving the application of this provision at the level of the 
concerned Member State would be the most reasonable policy option from a subsidiarity 
perspective. 
 
4.2.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD. This would mean that local authorities 
with an annual budget up to EUR 500 000 would be excluded from depositor protection.  
Effectiveness: This option would decrease depositor protection in the Member States 
concerned. However, in terms of volume of covered deposits affected, the materiality of 
the NOD is low. Therefore, with EDIS in place, it is reasonable to argue that eliminating 
this NOD could be justified by higher exposure to EDIS because of an increased volume 
of covered deposits. The impact on EDIS would in any case be neutral as long as such 
deposits are properly identifiable and reflected in the risk-based contributions. The 
administrative burden would decrease at the level of the DGS with no impact on EDIS 
because the national DGS remains responsible for assessment and repayment of 
individual claims.  
Efficiency: This option would likely increase the efficiency of the overall functioning of 
EDIS in terms of lesser financial exposure. From the perspective of national DGS and 
member institutions, there would no longer be a need to identify the local authorities 
within the scope of the NOD. 
Coherence: Coherence of the regulatory framework across countries would increase due 
to further reduced fragmentation.  
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity in those Member States that 
currently apply the NOD. 
 
4.2.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option would complement Option 1 (retain in current form) by proposing the 
following targeted modifications: the threshold of EUR 500 000 would apply to an annual 
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budget of local authorities, where a local authority is defined as a municipality and parish 
and the budget is measured as annual tax income. It would also require national 
competent authorities to keep an updated list of the relevant small local authorities that 
benefit from DGS protection so as to facilitate the identification of eligible deposits and 
the calculation of contributions.  
Effectiveness: This option would contribute to effectiveness in achieving the objective 
of greater depositor confidence and of protecting the public function. It would ensure 
the social objective, while limiting the impact on the risk profile of the DGS.  
Efficiency: The definition of the relevant local authority could simplify the application of 
the NOD to ensure its proper reflection in the risk-based contributions. With EDIS in 
place, there would be no impact on the assessment of the claims by EDIS, because the 
repayment of claims to individual depositors in a pay-out would remain within the 
competence of national DGS. Indeed, the national DGS and member institutions would 
still have to identify the local authorities within the scope of the NOD.  
Coherence: This option would maintain fragmentation (because small authorities would 
be covered only in some Member States), but reinforce the external coherence by 
improving the processes of identifying the authorities within the scope.  
Subsidiarity: This option could, to some extent, limit the ability of Member States to 
decide which local authorities are eligible. Given the limited transposition and the 
differences in the transposition, the NOD is in general considered of limited importance 
for Member States. 
 
4.2.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers extending the current provision to all Member States. 
Subject to the political support for such an approach, the key challenge of full 
harmonisation would be a clear and common definition of a small local authority. 
Effectiveness: Similarly to the alternative option, the full harmonisation of the NOD 
under EDIS could be favourable in view of the objective of achieving a uniform level of 
depositor protection, enhancing taxpayer/depositor confidence and protecting the public 
function. However, the actual implementation could be challenging in the absence of a 
common identification of the small authorities across countries. In addition, it would be 
critical to ensure that such deposits are easily identifiable and reflected in the risk-based 
contributions in order to avoid any negative impacts on the risk profile of the DGS.  
Efficiency: In the absence of a clear definition of the relevant small local authorities, the 
application of the NOD could be conducive to legal uncertainty and administrative 
burden, in addition to higher costs for the national DGS or EDIS in case of a pay-out. 
Coherence: This option would strengthen coherence under EDIS in terms of achieving a 
uniform level of depositor protection. Finding a common definition of small local 
authorities would be beneficial in addressing differences between Member States and 
the current low coherence of the system.  
Subsidiarity: This option would limit the ability for Member States to exclude small local 
authorities from the coverage. Given the limited transposition of the NOD, overall 
subsidiarity would likely be affected under this option.  
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4.3 NOD 3 – Exclusion of deposits to pay off a loan on private 
immovable property 
Summary: NOD 3 – Exclusion of deposits to pay off a loan on private 
immovable property 
DGSD [Article 5(3)] 
Member States may provide that deposits that may be released in accordance with 
national law only to pay off a loan on private immovable property are excluded from 
repayment by a DGS. 
Transposed into national law [3 Member States] 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands 
Practical experience so far [1 Member State] 
The Netherlands 
Importance 
Up to approximately 22 % of covered deposits19 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national 
DGS 
Level 
playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member 
States 
Overall - +/- +/- + 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current 
form  
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
[Recommended] 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness + - + - 
Efficiency + - + +/- 
Coherence + - ++ + 
Subsidiarity + - + - 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
Only Belgium, France and the Netherlands have transposed the provision to exclude 
deposits that may be released only to pay off a loan on private immovable property 
from covered deposits. However, based on the responses from DGSs and banks, the 
NOD seems only to be used in the Netherlands. 
The transposition of the NOD is linked to financial products that integrate both a loan 
on immovable property and deposits collected to repay a loan at a later stage. The late 
                                           
19 The importance is based on a simulation of the amount that deposits under this NOD could reach in the 
Netherlands, if these mortgages were not terminated beforehand. The simulation assumes that the EUR 200 
billion in mortgages were all issued at the end of 2012, have a maturity of 30 years, the mortgage holders 
save the entire amount up to maturity and the total covered deposits continue to grow at the average rate of 
the past three years in the coming decades. 
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repayment was beneficial because of a preferential tax regime for interests on property 
loans, taking into account that the interest rate on both the loan and deposits are the 
same. Otherwise, it would be more interesting for both the customers and member 
institutions to settle the loan and deposits immediately or earlier as in other Member 
States. 
 
4.3.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The motives behind this NOD are specific financial products tailored to suit the 
specificities of the national tax system. 
The relevant Member States that have transposed this NOD in their national law, had 
specific financial products that existed before the implementation of DGSD and had also 
been excluded from the DGS coverage.  
The deposits excluded based on this NOD are automatically settled with the loan 
component in the financial product in case of a bank failure. Consequently, in normal 
circumstances, these deposits would not be returned in cash to the depositors. 
 
4.3.1.2 Definition of deposits  
The Belgian government considered that the deposit received to repay a loan on a 
private immovable property granted by the member institution or by another institution 
holding the deposit is not a normal bank deposit, but a separate service that is 
secondary to the main activities of the member institutions of accepting deposits and 
providing loans. The sum on the account is placed as a security for a loan and is not a 
normal deposit, as these deposits finance a specific loan.  
France is following a broad interpretation of this NOD. Deposits pledged as security to 
ensure the successful completion of a transaction, such as the repayment of a loan or 
the completion of a securities transaction, are not protected by the DGS. When the 
holder of such pledges and guarantees recovers the free disposal of the funds (e.g. 
when the loan is fully repaid), the funds become deposits that fall within the scope of 
the guarantee by the DGS. The funds constituting a pledge or a guarantee of a 
commitment in force towards the member institution include mortgages and mutualised 
guarantees on loans. In France, the mutualised guarantee on loans is used more 
frequently than mortgages. In this mechanism, the funds of the borrower are paid to a 
guarantee company as a contribution, in proportion to the amount of its loan. The 
general exclusion of pledge and guarantees shall be waived as soon as the holder 
recovers the use of the funds, i.e. when the secured debt is repaid.  
The Netherlands used to have a specific type of account: ‘bank savings deposit for 
private property’ (bankspaardeposito eigen woning), a regime falling under the Income 
Tax Act 2001. They have been sold in the period between 2008 and 2012 to save money 
over the years for the purpose of paying off a mortgage loan. Upon acquisition 
(purchase) of private property a person would obtain a mortgage loan which would be 
repaid with deposits collected up to the end of the contract with a maturity of 30 years. 
About 550 000 of accounts had been opened by households at the end of 2018 with 
saving deposits to (partially) finance private real estate. 
At present, such accounts are no longer available on the market as the tax regime for 
the deduction of interest on mortgages changed in 2013. Under this tax regime, which 
continues to apply for mortgages issued before 2013, the interest payments on the full 
mortgage loan could be deducted from the personal income that forms the base for the 
personal income tax calculations. This encouraged mortgage holders not to repay any 
of the mortgage loan until its maturity. Instead, the holders of the bank savings deposit 
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for private property kept the same amount of mortgage until the end of the contract, 
instead of immediate or progressive repayment. They pay the same interest rate on the 
mortgage loan and receive the same interest on their deposits. However, as they can 
deduct the interest payments from their personal income for income tax purposes, they 
effectively pay less interest than they receive on their deposits.  
Importantly, the mortgage and savings of these types of accounts are explicitly linked 
in the contract for a ‘bank saving deposits for private property’ account. This means that 
there is no possibility of withdrawing the deposit other than through the execution of 
the mortgage. In addition, in order to ensure that the deposit is never paid out, the law 
on fiscal supervision includes a provision stating that in the event of bank failure, 
the deposit is automatically set off against the linked acquisition debt. The 
automatic set-off of the loan and the deposit takes place ex lege when the Dutch DGS 
triggers the pay-out. Hence, only where the deposit savings are higher than the actual 
mortgage, the DGS would cover the surplus as an eligible deposit in the event of a pay-
out20. 
 
4.3.1.3 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
Based on the information received from DGSs and banks, the Netherlands seems to be 
the only Member State with practical experience with this NOD.  
Interestingly, although no new mortgages of this type are issued, the amount of deposits 
under this NOD is growing. This is because such deposits are accumulated over the 
duration of the loan – typically 30 years – before the loan is repaid. According to the 
Dutch statistical office, there were about EUR 200 billion of mortgages with a savings 
component outstanding in 2016 (equivalent to about 40 % of covered deposits under 
the Dutch DGS at the end of 201821). It is difficult to say precisely how much deposits 
in these products represent. According to the estimations from the Dutch central bank 
and the Dutch statistical office, the amount ranges between EUR 18.5 billion and 
EUR 80 billion (between 4 % and 16 % of covered deposits). This amount is likely to 
grow in the coming years. Based on a simple simulation we calculate that the deposits 
in these products could be equivalent to up to 22 % of covered deposits in the 
Netherlands22.  
None of the DGSs in the Member States that have transposed the NOD into national law 
have been confronted with pay-out events since the adoption of the 2014 DGSD.  
 
 Impact of the NOD  
Such deposits are used to set off specific loans and are not protected by the DGS. 
Excluding deposits that are made to repay a loan on private immovable property does 
not increase the risk for the national DGS, does not distort the level playing field and 
has limited impact on depositor confidence. The NOD remains relevant for the 
Netherlands, as the covered amounts are still growing. The NOD is likely to become less 
relevant in the long term as the products expire, though in quite a distant future due to 
the long maturity of the loans.  
                                           
20 Explanatory memorandum of 24 June 2011 for Amendment of the Financial Supervision Act to implement 
Directive no. 2009/110/EC, p. 3. 
21 CBS (2017), Zijn de hypotheken in Nederland hoog?  
22 The simple simulation assumes that the EUR 200 billion in mortgages were all issued at the end of 2012, 
have a maturity of 30 years, there are no terminations, the mortgage holders save the entire amount up to 
maturity and the covered deposits continue to grow with the average of the past three years (about 2.7% per 
year). 
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4.3.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
As deposits made to repay a loan on private immovable property do not constitute a 
risk for the DGS, exclusion of these deposits is likely to increase the risk profile of the 
national DGS. The exclusion of the deposits is likely to have no influence on repayments 
in pay-out events, as these deposits will be settled beforehand. However, in the absence 
of the NOD, these deposits would be included as covered deposits, which would increase 
the contributions to the DGS. 
 
4.3.2.2 Level playing field 
The level playing field does not appear to be distorted. It could, however, be argued 
that the exclusion of deposits to repay a loan on private immovable property could give 
an advantage to domestic member institutions that do not have to contribute to the 
DGS for these deposits, whereas member institutions in other Member States would. In 
practice, there are no or limited amounts of these deposits in other Member States. 
Moreover, the advantage of a lower contribution to the DGS is reduced due to the higher 
contributions to the SRF. Indeed, the deposits, excluded from the covered deposits 
because of this NOD, are included within the calculation base for the contributions to 
the SRF.23 
 
4.3.2.3 Depositor confidence  
Depositor confidence is likely to be unaffected under this NOD. Depositors are made 
aware that their deposit savings are used to repay the property-related loans and will 
not be protected by the DGS. 
 
4.3.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
Although these types of products are no longer sold, the NOD remains relevant in the 
Netherlands up to 2042 because of the long maturity of the loans. The deposits covered 
under this NOD could at some point in time be equivalent to up to 20 % of the covered 
deposits.  
It is unlikely that the NOD becomes relevant for other Member States, as the issuance 
of new products including deposits to repay property related loans is disincentivised 
under the post-crisis legislation. Hence, both the resolution mechanism and the leverage 
ratio require member institutions with larger balance sheets to contribute more or hold 
more capital respectively. The SRF contribution and the capital requirement will increase 
when the repayment of loans with deposits at the same bank is delayed. 
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
 
In the Netherlands, there is an important volume of deposits which will continue to be 
used to repay outstanding loans on private immovable property to maximise the benefits 
from fiscal measures meant to stimulate home ownership. Therefore, Option 3 seems 
the most sensible to enable the Netherlands to phase-out such deposits. 
In any case, there is no reason to consider these deposits as covered deposits under 
EDIS as, in case of failure, they would be set off against the loan.  
                                           
23 The contributions to the SRF are based on non-covered deposit liabilities. 
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4.3.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers retaining the NOD. Accordingly, the deposits held to pay off 
loans on immovable property would continue to be excluded from the covered deposits. 
Effectiveness: The exclusion of deposits that are to repay a loan on private immovable 
property decreases the amount of covered deposits. This means that they are not 
reflected in the contributions to the DGS fund and in the financial means available. 
However, there are good arguments to retain the current option. First, such deposits 
are not covered by the DGS. Second, this option does not weaken the base for the 
contribution to the DGS fund because such deposits are incremental. In the absence of 
any preferential tax system, the deposits would be used for either immediate or early 
repayment of the loan. 
Efficiency: This option is less costly for the member institutions as they do not have to 
reflect such deposits in the calculation of contributions and in terms of administrative 
burden, because they can consider fewer accounts in this calculation.  
Coherence: This option preserves coherence because the deposits would also not be 
repaid to the depositor under normal circumstances (no pay-out event) and would be 
automatically settled in case of failures. In those situations, the exclusion does not affect 
depositor protection or risk for the DGS compared to Member States where there are 
no such deposits.  
In addition, retaining deposits for later instead of immediate repayment as promoted 
under this NOD increases the size of bank balance sheets. This is penalised under the 
current rules on capital requirements (leverage ratio) and resolution mechanism 
(contribution based on covered deposits and other liabilities). However, the aim of these 
measures is not to limit the size of member institutions per se, but to reduce the risk-
taking of member institutions, which is not affected by the NOD. The NOD can thus also 
be considered consistent with the objectives of other financial policies. 
Subsidiarity: The subsidiarity principle applies in this case, as only Member States with 
specific regimes can incentivise financial products that collect savings rather than 
facilitate early repayment of mortgage loans. 
 
4.3.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD. 
Effectiveness: Under this option, such deposits would have to be included within the 
scope of DGS protection. This would increase the amount of covered deposits and would 
be reflected in a higher risk-based contribution and make more financial means 
available. However, as there is no pay-out for the deposits under the NOD, it will not 
impact the pay-outs of the DGS.  
Efficiency: This option would reduce efficiency. The member institutions would have to 
consider more accounts for the calculation of the covered deposits. Importantly, the 
deposits on the accounts can be sizeable and often held jointly, which makes it more 
complicated to determine the covered amounts. 
Coherence: This option does not appear beneficial for deposit protection as the account 
holders would also not be able to claim the deposits in the absence of the NOD. This 
option does not contribute to the objectives of the other financial regulations. Indeed, 
the NOD encourages the extension of bank balance sheets, but this option does not 
imply additional risks for the member institutions because the loans are fully covered 
by savings. 
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Subsidiarity: This NOD is relevant in the Netherlands in the long term. Such deposits 
would continue to account for a substantial share of total deposits (equivalent to up to 
20 % of Dutch DGS covered deposits) due to maturity dates up to 2042.  
 
4.3.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers phasing out the NOD over time. This would mean that only 
deposits that are currently held to pay off loans on immovable property can be excluded 
from the covered deposits. The provision would expire after a certain phase-out period 
that will last till 2042. 
The impact of this alternative option might in practice be the same as under Option 1. 
This option would primarily ensure that there would not be any new deposits to pay off 
a loan on private immovable property. 
 
4.3.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers extending the NOD to all Member States. This would mean 
that EDIS would not cover deposits that can be offset by loans integrated in the same 
financial products. Moreover, in the current low-interest environment it has become 
even less attractive for member institutions to issue products that would fall within the 
scope of this NOD. The vast majority of Member States do not have tax systems in place 
that would encourage similar long-term saving over early repayment of mortgage loans.  
In practice full harmonisation would not represent any added value as compared to the 
policy option retaining the NOD in its current form (Option 1) because these products 
currently exist in only one Member State.  
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4.4 NOD 4 – Temporary high balances relating to certain transactions 
Summary: NOD 4 – Temporary high balances relating to certain transactions  
DGSD [Article 6(2)] 
In addition to the coverage of EUR 100 000, Member States shall ensure that the 
following deposits are protected above EUR 100 000 for at least three months and no 
longer than 12 months after the amount has been credited or from the moment when 
such deposits become legally transferable:  
a) deposits resulting from real estate transactions relating to private residential 
properties;  
b) deposits that serve social purposes laid down in national law and are linked to life 
events of a depositor such as marriage, divorce, retirement, dismissal, 
redundancy, invalidity or death; 
c) deposits that serve purposes laid down in national law and are based on the 
payment of insurance benefits or compensation for criminal injuries or wrongful 
conviction.  
Transposed into national law [28 Member States] 
a) Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom 
b) All Member States excluding Finland, Estonia and the Netherlands 
c) All Member States excluding Finland, Estonia and the Netherlands 
Practical experience so far [2 Member States] 
Belgium and Spain 
Importance 
Up to 10 % of covered deposits24 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national DGS 
Level 
playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member 
States 
Overall -- - ++ +/- 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current form 
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
[Recommended] 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness + +/- ++ + 
Efficiency - + +/- + 
Coherence - - ++ + 
Subsidiarity + - - - 
  
                                           
24 The importance of the THBs is based on a simulation for all Member States of the Temporary High Balances 
(THBs) created from primary residential property transactions according to the current implementation. In 
fact, the THBs range between 0.5% of covered deposits in Croatia to 10.1% of covered deposits in Lithuania. 
Importantly, this figure does not account for the deposits that could be covered also by the regular coverage 
(EUR 100,000 per depositor per member institution) and is for all Member States additional to the current 
level of covered deposits. This is true with one exception for Spain that in principle already accounts for the 
THBs in the covered deposits. See section on the size of the THBs and Annex 1 for more details. 
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 Implementation across Member States 
The THBs are not a ‘pure’ national option or discretion (NOD). Under Article 6(2) (and 
Recital 26) DGSD, Member States are required to ensure a higher level of coverage 
related to deposits from certain transactions or serving certain social or other purposes. 
However, Member States retain discretion in terms of duration and scope of protection. 
While the duration can be between 3 and 12 months, the list of specific transactions is 
not exhaustive but, instead, associated with the following types of events: i) real estate 
transactions to private residential properties; ii) life events; and, iii) payment of 
insurance benefits or compensation for criminal injuries or wrongful conviction. 
The application of the NOD should take into account the significance of the protection 
for depositors and the living conditions in the Member State concerned. In all such cases, 
State aid rules should be complied with. 
Almost all Member States transposed provisions for the three types of events of Article 
6(2) DGSD. The only exceptions are Estonia, Finland and the Netherlands, which have 
only implemented the option covering real estate transactions Article 6(2)(a) DGSD. 
Almost all Member States do not take into account the THBs in the amount of covered 
deposits for the calculation of the contributions (Spain is the only exception). 
 
4.4.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
When deciding on the extra coverage for THBs, all Member States had to strike the right 
balance between the need for protection taking into account the circumstances targeted 
by THBs, e.g. the life events, and related additional costs for the DGS. 
 
Setting of the higher coverage 
Many Member States have justified setting the extra coverage by referring broadly to 
their domestic living conditions standards25, real estate prices26, or the average amount 
of the deposits serving social purposes (i.e. severance payments, disability severance 
pay, death benefits, employee pension plans, etc. – Czechia, Romania, Poland).  
While some set a higher additional coverage for events linked to depositor protection, 
others prioritise social purposes. In the latter case, the objective is to prevent the 
beneficiaries from becoming dependent on the social aid system and to protect the 
minimum standard of living.  
Some Member States decided in favour of unlimited coverage by setting up no specific 
ceiling for their THBs. The justifications used included differences in local real estate 
prices or, in case of events under for Article 6(2)(b) and (c) DGSD, the very significance 
of the covered event for the depositor. For example, France and the UK set up a general 
ceiling for THBs, except for compensation of personal injuries or incapacity27.  
Additionally, Member States transposed the options with a view to ensuring a level 
playing field with other Member States (Greece, Ireland, Romania). To ensure the 
                                           
25 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Slovakia justified the additional coverage by referring to their domestic 
living conditions standards. 
26 Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden justified the 
additional coverage by referring to their real estate prices. 
27 The unlimited coverage is based on the presumption that a compensation for personal injuries exceeding 
EUR 500 000 should take into account a severe disability of the beneficiary and justifies coverage of the whole 
amount.  
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competitiveness of their domestic banking sector, those Member States aligned the 
amount of their additional coverage with that of their neighbours. 
 
Duration of protection 
The protection should be temporary. It should ensure that depositors have enough time 
to disperse their funds (e.g. take investment decisions) and that depositors’ proof of 
origin of the deposits and the link to THB events is not too complicated28. In some 
Member States, the duration was determined in consultation with the member 
institutions that play an important role in the implementation of the THBs (Estonia) or 
based on the average time during which the THBs are usually spent or diversified 
(Hungary). The duration also depends on whether member institutions are under the 
obligation to identify and inform the DGS of the nature, purposes and amount on the 
covered deposits (Lithuania). 
 
Scope of protection 
While a majority of Member States have taken up all the events mentioned in the DGSD, 
some Member States have limited the application of THBs to specific events. For 
example, marriage is not included amongst the events covered because the Member 
States understand the NOD as a means to protect depositors in relation to life events 
that makes them vulnerable, either from a personal or financial perspective, or because 
money received as a marriage gift is not taxed and the additional protection could, 
according to some of the DGSs, encourage money laundering. 
 
4.4.1.2 Coverage level 
The amount of extra coverage varies significantly from about EUR 130 000 to 
EUR 2 500 000. The following 6 Member States have no upper limit: Finland, Italy, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.  
Some Member States have set different coverage limits depending on the type of events. 
Denmark and Lithuania have higher limits for deposits resulting from real estate 
transactions. In Denmark, while the general extra coverage amounts to EUR 150 000, 
real estate transactions are covered up to EUR 10 000 000 taking into account the high 
risk with regard to non-commercial real estate transactions and the consequences both 
for the real estate market and also financial stability if such risks were not covered. In 
Lithuania, real estate transactions are covered up to EUR 300 000 as compared to 
EUR 200 000 for other types of events.  
France uses the limit of EUR 500 000 and the UK, with the limit of GBP 1 000 000 
(EUR 1 120 000) uses one limit for all events, except for unlimited coverage in case of 
compensation for physical injury29. 
 
Table 4.1 Temporary high balances: Coverage 
Country Coverage 
Austria Up to EUR 500 000 
Belgium Up to EUR 500 000 
                                           
28 This is applicable to France, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands and Poland. 
29 Accordingly, the DGS will repay the whole amount of such a compensation.  
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Country Coverage 
Bulgaria Up to BGN 250 000 (EUR 127 823) 
Croatia Up to EUR 130 000 
Cyprus Up to EUR 150 000 (currently under review) 
Czechia Up to EUR 200 000 
Denmark EUR 150 000 to EUR 10 000 000 (real estate transactions) 
Estonia Up to EUR 170 000  
Finland No limit  
France EUR 500 000 to unlimited (personal injury) 
Germany Up to EUR 500 000 
Greece Up to EUR 400 000 
Hungary Up to EUR 150 000 
Ireland Up to EUR 1 000 000 
Italy No limit  
Latvia Up to EUR 200 000  
Lithuania Up to EUR 200 000 to EUR 300 000 for real estate transactions  
Luxembourg Up to EUR 2 500 000 (max cumulated amount)  
Malta Up to EUR 500 000 
Poland Up to EUR 100 000 
Portugal No limit  
Romania Up to EUR 200 000 
Slovakia No limit  
Slovenia No limit  
Spain No limit  
Sweden Up to EUR 471 750  
The Netherlands Up to EUR 500 000  
UK Up to GBP 1 000 000 (EUR 1 120 000) to unlimited (personal 
injury or incapacity) 
Source: CEPS-Milieu elaboration 
 
Member States have different approaches as to the calculation of the extra coverage. 
Some consider the maximum aggregate amount in case of multiple events (e.g. 
Belgium, Greece, Latvia and Luxembourg), while others do not aggregate the amounts 
and consider each event separately (e.g. Malta, UK). In the case where Member States 
have indicated an aggregate amount for THBs, the principle of aggregation of the 
deposits does not always apply to the three categories of THBs30 in the same way. For 
example, in Belgium, the maximum additional guarantee applies to the cumulative total 
of the THBs, except for deposits resulting from real estate transactions (Article 6(2)(a) 
DGSD), for which the guarantee applies independently. 
 
                                           
30 Article 6(2)(a), (b) and (c) DGSD. 
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4.4.1.3 Deposits serving real estate transactions 
All Member States cover deposits resulting from transactions related to private 
residential properties. 
14 Member States31 use the general wording of the DGSD and do not limit the coverage 
to particular types of residential property e.g. primary versus secondary residential 
property, or to a particular type of operations (only sale, only purchase or both).  
Some Member States only consider the purchase of a new residence for personal use as 
a THB (i.e. Finland) or only the sale of residential property belonging to the depositor 
(i.e. France). In some Member States, the THB for real estate transactions applies only 
to the sale or purchase of real estate used as a principal residence (i.e. Belgium, Malta 
and the UK).  
In addition, some Member States have further specified the scope of the extended 
coverage. In Denmark, the real estate transactions cover deposits of the purchase price, 
sales proceeds and deposits of proceeds of loans for mortgage, deposit of the purchase 
price in accordance with the prior purchase agreement as under the agreement financed 
or to be financed by mortgage bonds or covered bonds. In Hungary, the real estate 
transactions include both the sale of residential property, lease rights and right of 
tenancy. In Greece, expropriation of real estate is also covered along with sale. In 
Ireland, only the deposits and payments related to a private residential property are 
covered. In Luxembourg, the real estate transactions include those relating to private 
residential property (main and secondary residences), as well as compensation received 
for claims incurred in respect of private residential property (fire, floods, etc.). Poland 
covers only sale transactions of residential property, including additional specifications 
linked to the national framework (e.g. perpetual usufruct or cooperative rights of 
ownership). In Slovenia, sale and purchase transaction include also subsidies for young 
family first-time home seekers32 and all real estate transactions involved in state or 
municipality sponsored affordable housing programmes. The UK also provides for a 
negative definition of THBs: general savings for the purchase of a property, including 
deposits for stamp duty and associated legal fees are outside the scope of THB, while 
purchase of land for the construction of the main residence is covered. 
 
4.4.1.4 Deposits serving social purposes 
Under Article 6(2)(b) DGSD, deposits associated with life events are protected as a THB 
in all Member States, except for Estonia, Finland and the Netherlands. Both the 
Netherlands and Estonia have concluded that there are no special types of deposits that 
would fall within the scope of the letters (b) and (c) of the NOD and, hence, did not 
transpose those provisions. 
Other Member States either transposed the provisions literally, without further 
specification33, or decided on an exhaustive list of the covered events34, or finally, 
defined more specifically the types of events covered35. Accordingly, DGSs from the first 
category of Member State usually have more discretion as to the types of deposits falling 
within the scope of the additional coverage as compared to second and third categories. 
Certain Member States also added other types of events, such as birth and care 
                                           
31 I.e. Austria, Cyprus, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
32 This is regulated under the law governing the National Housing Saving Scheme. 
33 E.g. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden. 
34 E.g. Cyprus, Czechia, Greece, Ireland and UK. 
35 E.g. Belgium, Malta and Slovakia. 
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dependency (e.g. Germany), or excluded specific ones, such as marriage, divorce, 
dismissal (e.g. Romania), retirement and invalidity (e.g. Lithuania).  
Some Member States limit the scope of THBs to specific types of accounts which serve 
social purposes by definition, without particularly linking them to specific life events: 
either by directly listing the types of payments (e.g. retirement benefit in France), social 
purposes protected (e.g. THB relating to social benefit payments determined by legal 
acts intended for social objectives in Latvia and Slovenia) or by referring to legal grounds 
in national legislation (e.g. Denmark, Poland and Portugal). Note that for Portugal, under 
the new law, additional legal acts will have to be adopted to specify the types of social 
purposes to be covered.  
Table 4.2 setting out a list of covered events demonstrates the difference across Member 
States. Marriage is the least covered event and no Member State limits the coverage to 
just one event.
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Table 4.2 THBs - Events and payments triggering additional coverage 
Country Marriage Divorce Retirement 
Dismissal/ 
redundancy 
Invalidity Death Other 
Comment 
Austria X X X X X X     
Belgium     X X X 
X 
(non-
heritage) 
  
Only one-time 
exceptional 
payments are 
covered 
Bulgaria X X   X X X   
Covers only 
natural persons 
Croatia X X X X X X Illness   
Cyprus     X X X X   
Covers natural 
and moral 
persons 
Czechia   X 
X 
(single 
settlement) 
X X X Illness   
Denmark   X X X X X   
Covers both 
legal and 
natural persons 
Estonia                 
Finland                 
France X X X X   X     
Germany X X X X X X 
Illness, care 
and birth 
  
Greece   X X X X X     
Hungary     X X       
Covers only 
natural persons 
Ireland X X X X X X     
Italy   X X X X X     
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Country Marriage Divorce Retirement 
Dismissal/ 
redundancy 
Invalidity Death Other 
Comment 
Latvia     X X X   
Other social 
benefits 
payments and 
payments 
determined by 
legal acts 
intended for 
other social 
objectives 
Covers only 
natural persons 
Lithuania           X   
Covers only 
natural persons 
Luxembourg X X X X X X     
Malta   X   
X (unfair/ 
redundancy) 
  X     
Poland   X X X X X     
Portugal     X X X   
Other deposits 
that serve 
social purposes 
There is no 
legislation 
stating which 
types of social 
purposes are 
covered 
Romania     X   X X     
Slovakia X X X X X X     
Slovenia   X   X X X 
Illness, natural 
disasters and 
other 
catastrophic 
events 
  
Spain X X X X X X     
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Country Marriage Divorce Retirement 
Dismissal/ 
redundancy 
Invalidity Death Other 
Comment 
Sweden   
X 
(property) 
X X X X Illness   
The 
Netherlands 
                
UK   X X 
X 
(unfair/redun
dancy) 
X X 
Illness, sale of 
house boats 
and other 
mobile homes 
(primary 
residence) 
  
Total 9 18 21 23 21 22   
Note: The X in italic indicates that the coverage is determined based on the authors’ interpretation of the legal provision. 
Source: CEPS-Milieu elaboration 
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4.4.1.5 Duration 
Member States opted for a duration of either 3, 6, 9 or 12 months. (See Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 THBs - Maximum duration 
Duration Member States 
3 months Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, France, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain 
6 months Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark (B and C), Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, the UK 
9 months Italy  
12 months Austria, Denmark (A), Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Sweden 
Source: CEPS-Milieu elaboration 
 
In most Member States36, the duration starts running after the amount has been 
credited and from the moment when such deposits become legally transferable. In 10 
Member States37, the duration starts running from the date the amount has been 
credited.  
3 Member States use different approaches. In Estonia, the starting date is the date of 
the transfer of the real estate related funds. In Hungary, the transposing legislation 
refers to ‘prior to the commencement date of the compensation’, which is somewhat 
ambiguous. Slovenia refers to the date on which a depositor acquired a claim (credited) 
against a bank. 
 
4.4.1.6 Pay-out procedure 
Member States are obliged to set up procedures to allow depositors to claim THBs. In 
some Member States, the deposits are identified ex ante. They must either be held at 
separate accounts to be eligible (i.e. Hungary) or are registered/identified (Denmark 
and Spain). In these cases, THBs are subject to repayment within 7 working days 
together with the deposits covered under the regular coverage up to EUR 100 000.  
In Hungary, the THBs are only eligible when placed in a special account opened with the 
member institution. The little attention paid to these special accounts suggests that 
most depositors may be unaware of the existence of such accounts as a condition for 
eligibility for a THB (and, it could be surmised, in view of little interest from the banks 
to advertise them). Due to this restriction, depositors might be unable to claim any 
THBs. In Denmark, banks are not required to report information related to THBs to 
authorities on a continuous basis. However, they must be prepared to determine the 
THBs within 24 hours after a potential failure. The member institutions have each 
defined their own set of rules, in the event of failure, to identify THBs, account holders 
and customer groups. If the information is included, THB deposits can be reimbursed 
                                           
36 E.g. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. In Cyprus, it is explicitly provided that the duration starts at either of 
two moments as set out in the DGSD, whichever is earlier. Malta specifies that the starting date is from the 
latest of the first date on which the THBs are credited to the account of the depositor, the first date on which 
the THBs are credited to another account on behalf of a person; and the first date on which the THBs become 
legally transferable to the depositor. 
37 I.e. Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
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immediately. If not, depositors must file a formal request to the DGS with supporting 
documents.  
In most Member States, the depositor must make a claim to the DGS to receive a THB. 
Such requests are necessary where the eligible amounts are not pre-identified (i.e. 
Austria, Belgium and Czechia). For example, in Austria the depositor will have to provide 
the agreement from the seller or buyer to prove the THB is related to a real estate 
transaction. Such supporting documents will help the DGS to ascertain the duration 
(start and end date of the real estate transaction) and the scope of coverage. 
Member States also apply different standards of information disclosure on the THB 
provision. In some Member States, depositors are pro-actively informed in a pay-out 
event. In others, the information is available on the website or only in legislative 
provisions.  
The claim handling period for THBs could in principle be the same as for regular deposit 
claims. However, the pay-out period could often be longer than 7 working days where 
the DGS must assess the validity of the claim (Czechia, Lithuania, etc.). For this, the 
provisions for a longer repayment period can be used (See NOD 9). For example, in 
Czechia, depositors must file a claim via the website within two months after receiving 
the notification from the national central bank. 
According to some DGSs, the claims under the NOD could complicate the pay-out 
procedure and increase the administrative costs related to the pay-outs. Two 
approaches are used: one based on ex ante identification of the THBs and the other 
based on handling of the depositors’ claims ex post. In the former system, the burden 
is primarily on the member institutions as they need to obtain information on the origin 
and purpose of deposits, which is often difficult to obtain. The latter system can be 
burdensome for DGSs when assessing the eligibility of such claims. Moreover, some 
DGSs feared that depositors with balances above EUR 100 000 might submit any kind 
of claim, which would increase their administrative burden. 
 
4.4.1.7 Deposits related to payment of insurance benefits under Article 6(2)(c) DGSD 
Deposits associated with payment of insurance benefits or compensation for criminal 
injuries or wrongful conviction are protected as a THB in all Member States, excluding 
Estonia, Finland and the Netherlands. However, there are significant differences 
between Member States, with regard to both the scope of coverage and the amount 
covered.  
Most Member States did not include any additional restriction regarding insurance 
payments or compensation of victims of crime or wrongful conviction38 or specifically 
included compensation for all types of damages (legal, moral, material or corporal) 
(Belgium, France, etc.). Ireland and Greece have not limited the covered amounts of 
compensation of victims of crimes. They cover the full amount of the compensation of 
personal injuries (e.g. in Ireland) or compensation of injuries caused by tort (e.g. in 
Greece). In Slovenia and Poland, compensation for wrongful conviction also applies to 
non-pecuniary/non-material damages. Lithuania covers all stages of criminal 
proceedings (including pre-trial stage) for compensation in case of wrongful conviction. 
Sweden includes payments related to any fault or negligence in the exercise of 
governmental authority. 
                                           
38 E.g. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. 
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While most Member States cover any kind of compensation linked to a wrongful 
conviction, some Member States have restricted it to certain types of insurance or 
compensation payments. For example, in Czechia, the coverage is limited to insurance 
claims caused by a criminal offences and payments of compensation to victims for harm 
or recovery of unjust enrichment caused by a criminal offence, and compensation for 
harm caused by a decision on custody, punishment or protective measures. In the UK, 
benefits payable under insurance contracts are limited to personal injury or incapacity 
claims. In Denmark, only deposits made in accordance with specific statutory provisions 
are covered. Italy has also limited the coverage of wrongful compensation of victims to 
unjust detention, but has included indirect damages resulting from a criminal offence in 
the coverage. Lithuania has restricted compensation to natural persons that are victims 
of violent crimes. 8 Member States39 have excluded insurance payments. 
In most Member States, this THB would be subject to the same ceiling and timeframe 
as the other THBs40. Unlimited coverage would also apply to the compensation for 
personal injuries in France and the UK and/or for a wrongful conviction in France, Poland 
and the UK41.  
In turn, some Member States have lowered the amount of guarantee compared to Article 
6(2)(a) DGSD. In Belgium, the maximum additional guarantee for Article 6(2)(b) and 
(c) DGSD applies to the cumulative total of these deposits. In Denmark, the maximum 
guarantee is EUR 150 000 for Article 6(2)(b) and (c) DGSD, compared to 
EUR 10 000 000 for Article 6(2)(a) DGSD. In Lithuania, the maximum amount of the 
guarantee is EUR 100 000, lower than for Article 6(2)(a) DGSD. Indeed, the level of the 
coverage for this NOD is, in general, relatively limited in Lithuania. 
 
Table 4.4 THBs - Events and payments triggering additional coverage 
Country 
Insurance 
benefits 
Compensation 
payment for 
criminal 
injuries 
Compensation 
payment for 
wrongful 
conviction 
Comment 
Austria X X X   
Belgium X X X 
Covers all type of 
damages, 
including material, 
corporal or moral 
damages 
Bulgaria X X X 
Covers only 
natural persons 
Croatia X X X   
Cyprus X X X 
Covers natural 
and moral persons 
Czechia   X X   
Denmark   X X   
Estonia         
Finland         
                                           
39 I.e. Czechia, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland and Slovenia. 
40 E.g. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
41 Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden apply unlimited coverage. 
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Country 
Insurance 
benefits 
Compensation 
payment for 
criminal 
injuries 
Compensation 
payment for 
wrongful 
conviction 
Comment 
France   
X 
(damage caused 
to the depositor) 
X 
Covers any 
damage, legal, 
physical or moral 
Germany X X X   
Greece X X X   
Hungary X X X 
Covers only 
natural persons 
Ireland X X X   
Italy X X X   
Latvia   X X 
Payment of 
insurance benefits 
were not included, 
but this should be 
shortly rectified 
by a corrigendum 
Lithuania   X X 
Covers only 
natural persons 
Luxembourg X X X   
Malta   X X   
Poland   X X   
Portugal X X X   
Romania X X X   
Slovakia X X X   
Slovenia   X X   
Spain X X X   
Sweden X X X 
Also covers 
payments related 
to any other fault 
or negligence in 
the exercise of 
governmental 
authority 
The 
Netherlands 
        
UK 
X 
(personal 
injury or 
incapacity) 
X X   
Total 17 25 25  
Source: CEPS-Milieu elaboration 
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4.4.1.8 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
Only a few Member States42 have had pay-outs since the adoption of the DGSD. 
However, only Belgium has dealt with a THB in a pay-out. Potential explanations for 
such a small number of THB-repayments could include the following: (i) most pay-out 
events involved rather small member institutions; (ii) more or less strict assessment of 
the THB claims by the DGS; (iii) sufficient level of the regular coverage; (iv) additional 
protection from IPSs and voluntary deposit insurance schemes; and also (v) limited 
awareness among depositors about THB protection.  
In Belgium, this NOD was used in the Optima Bank case in June 2016, which had, at 
the time of the intervention, already been in resolution for about two years. This might 
have reduced the likelihood of THB repayments, as the depositors would not have 
transferred large amounts of money to a failing institution. In this case, the DGS dealt 
with a total of 2 000 claims, out of which 3 related to THBs. Two THB claims were found 
to be eligible. The contested claim of about EUR 500 000 was related to a real estate 
transaction, but did not come straight from the sale of a house. The total eligible claims 
for THBs amounted to EUR 400 000, equivalent to about 0.015 % of the total pay-out 
amount. 
In Czechia, there was only one pay-out event after the transposition of the DGSD. The 
small First Czech Russian Bank failed in October 2016 and the DGS received 6 claims 
under THB provisions. None of the claims were considered eligible for pay-out. The main 
reason for the rejections was that the money was not deposited at the account in the 
failed bank within three months before the pay-out event. Another motivation for some 
rejections was that the claims were transferred from accounts at another bank to the 
failed bank, i.e. not directly from the account of a purchaser. 
Some Member States43 confirmed specifically that they did not apply the NOD in the 
pay-out procedures occurring after the entry into force of the DGSD. No THBs were 
reimbursed for instance in Luxembourg, because the DGS did not recognise any right 
to a higher compensation. In Lithuania, no depositor claimed a THB compensation, 
which could be explained by the fact that the large majority of THBs would likely be 
covered under the regular deposit coverage of EUR 100 000 and due to limited 
awareness of the provision.  
Spain is the only Member State that takes THBs into account in the calculation of the 
DGS contribution (see pay-out procedure).  
 
 Impact of the NOD 
The coverage of THBs increases the risk profile of the DGS particularly where it is not 
reflected in DGS contributions. In view of the significant fragmentation between Member 
States, its impact on the level playing field is relatively negative. In turn, the NOD is 
important for the depositor confidence and reflects national specificities. 
 
4.4.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The vast majority of DGSs do not account for THBs in their total covered deposits in the 
calculation of the contributions. By contrast, the Spanish DGS is the only one asking 
                                           
42 E.g. Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland 
and the UK. 
43 E.g Cyrpus, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Malta and Poland. Poland experienced pay-outs during the period 
between 2014 and 2016 but had not covered any THB under the DGSD. 
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member institutions to include THBs in covered deposits. Therefore, it could be 
concluded that the covered deposits reported to the EBA are underestimated44. 
We argue that THB pay-outs are likely to vary across Member States as shown in the 
simulation below (see size of the THBs). Moreover, in Member States such as Austria 
(savings banks) and Germany, THB claims are not considered as an issue for member 
institutions of IPSs. The IPSs and voluntary schemes ultimately cover amounts above 
EUR 100 000 because they operate with a view to avoid a pay-out with the use of 
preventive and alternative measures.  
The incidence of THBs is relative, particularly in view of current experience that shows 
many rejections of THB claims. Moreover, based on the experience of several DGSs, 
THBs require an assessment when the deposit qualifies for a higher coverage and the 
repayment period can be rather long. In this sense, the impact on the liquidity risk of 
the DGS is likely to be limited.  
                                           
44 Most Member States do not anticipate the need to back potential pay-outs associated with THBs. 
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Box 1. Size of the THBs for primary residential property 
The information about the incidence of THBs is very limited, difficult to compare and 
there is uncertainty about the quality of the information available. Information on THBs 
on an ongoing basis is available in Denmark (bank-level) and Spain (Member State-
level), but the methodology for the calculation of the amounts of THBs is either not 
disclosed or a large share of member institutions is not covered. There is also some 
limited information on THBs in pay-out events. However, only smaller member 
institutions were concerned and the conditions under which the pay-outs occurred also 
differed. Moreover, in some pay-out events, depositors’ claims under the THB provisions 
were in any case rejected.  
For the purpose of qualifying the importance of THBs across Member States, the 
simulation model covers only primary residential property transactions (Article 6(2)(a) 
DGSD) as this is the only THB provision adopted in all Member States. Its amount 
corresponds to the majority of funds covered based on the expert interviews and the 
limited information available on the various types of THBs. Deposits related to real 
estate transactions are in principle the most relevant as they are the largest and the 
most frequent. 
The simulation model aims to approach as close as possible to the actual size of THBs 
(currently not observed). Such a model is by definition a simplification of reality. The 
amounts and assumptions are based as far as possible on actual data from statistical 
offices and other public sources. However, public information is extremely limited on 
some elements such as the time that deposits originating from residential property sales 
remain on the account of the seller. These assumptions, for which there is no (public) 
information available, as well as the policy options are discussed in the remainder of 
this section to understand the sensitivity and potential consequences for the amounts 
of eligible THBs45.  
The model considers the number of transactions, residential property prices, share of 
deposits used for the purchase or obtained from the sale, and period during which the 
deposits are held on the account. The model estimates THBs for 2017/18, which might 
impact the results somewhat as the number of property transactions and property prices 
in many Member States change over time. The model considers three types of properties 
(detached houses, semi-detached houses, and flats), three types of regions (cities, 
towns and suburbs, and rural areas) and three broad types of actors (first-time buyers, 
second or multiple-time buyers, and sellers) to capture the main known dynamics in 
property markets and depositor behaviour. The methodology is described in detail in 
Annex 1.  
 
Main findings of the model 
- The THBs are estimated to range between 0.5 % of covered deposits in Croatia and 
10.1 % of covered deposits in Lithuania. The EU weighted average is equivalent to 
4.6 % of covered deposits (Figure 4.1). This means that if THBs were included for the 
calculation of the contributions, the total amount of covered deposits would increase by 
4.6 %. 
- With EDIS in place, if the implementation of the NOD were harmonised within the EU 
(maximum coverage level of EUR 500 000, coverage of buyers and sellers, and up to 6 
months after/before transaction) there would be larger differences in THBs between 
Member States. This means that Member States with higher potential THBs are relatively 
more restrictive in their implementation than Member States with lower potential THBs. 
                                           
45 There are some assumptions underlying the model that are likely to hold for the large majority of the 
Member States, but not necessarily all. For instance, the model assumes that all the residential property 
transactions are performed through bank transfers (no cash) and that the bank transfers the mortgage loan 
directly to the buyer or notary. 
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The EU weighted average would be equivalent to 5.6 % of covered deposits (Figure 
4.2). 
- In practice, depositors would likely claim substantially lesser amounts of THBs, as a 
large part of the THBs could potentially already be covered under the regular depositor 
insurance coverage up to EUR 100 000 per depositor per member institution. 
- The settings of the coverage level and the coverage duration have a strong impact on 
the amounts of THBs. 
 
Results of the model 
Estimates suggest that THBs vary largely across Member States in view of different 
national circumstances, including the transposition of the NOD. Figure 4.1 shows the 
estimates for THBs due to primary residential property transactions across Member 
States based on the current implementation. 
The differences between Member States due to duration (between 3 and 12 months), 
amount of coverage (EUR 100 000 to unlimited) and scope of protection, i.e. eligible 
persons (first-time buyers, second and multiple-time buyers, and/or sellers) are also 
addressed in the model. However, the model does not consider the differences in claims 
procedures (quasi-automatic vs. need to file a request) and specific requirements 
related to THBs only applied in a small number of Member States (e.g. special account 
for THBs46). 
 
Figure 4.1 THBs – current implementation 
 
Notes: This figure shows the THBs across Member States and the EU average weighted by the share of covered 
deposits. The THBs are estimated based on the current implementation of THB provisions in Article 6(2)(a) 
DGSD, considering the maximum coverage level, eligible persons, and duration of the THBs. 
Source: CEPS estimates based on model specified in Annex 1 
 
The differences in THBs between Member States become more pronounced when the 
same implementation is assumed for all Member States. Figure 4.2 shows the estimates 
for THBs due to primary residential property transactions across Member States 
assuming the median implementation for all Member States: deposits related to both 
purchase and sales transactions, up to EUR 500 000, for a period up to 6 months. The 
estimated THBs range between 0.9 % of covered deposits in Croatia and 18.5 % of 
covered deposits in Hungary. The EU weighted average is equivalent to 5.6 % of covered 
                                           
46 These approaches could be likely to discourage depositors from claiming THB protection and, hence, reduce 
the effective amount of covered deposits. 
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deposits, about 1.6 % higher than that based on the current implementation. This 
means that Member States with higher potential THBs are relatively more restrictive in 
the transposition. 
 
Figure 4.2 THBs – median implementation across actors 
 
Notes: This figure shows the THBs across Member States and the EU average weighted by the share of covered 
deposits. The THBs are estimated for the median implementation of THB provisions across Member States; 
maximum coverage level of EUR 500 000 coverage of all persons (buyers and sellers) and up to 6 months 
after/before transaction. 
Source: CEPS estimates based on model specified in Annex 1 
 
Importantly, depositors would likely claim substantially lesser amounts of THBs in 
practice. A large part of THBs could potentially already be covered under the regular 
depositor insurance coverage up to EUR 100 000 per depositor per member institution. 
For example, if a couple purchases a residential property using a joint account, the 
coverage for the transaction can be up to EUR 200 000. In practice, the potential 
amount of the THBs already covered under the regular coverage is likely to range 
between EUR 0 and EUR 200 000 depending on whether there are one or multiple 
account holders, the balance on the account, and the transaction amounts. The amount 
of THBs actually covered under the THB provisions can thus be substantially lower than 
the maximum eligible amount. Figure 4.3 shows the estimates for THBs due to primary 
residential property transactions across Member States based on the median 
implementation by EU Member States, indicating the shares of the THBs covered 
applying various coverage levels ranging between EUR 100 000 and EUR 500 000. 
Assuming that EUR 100 000 of the THBs are covered under the regular provisions, the 
average of THBs drops significantly. In some Member States such as Romania (0.1 % 
of covered deposits remaining) and Latvia (0.2 %), THBs would be almost eliminated, 
while in other Member States such as Finland (10.2 %) and Hungary (5.6 %) the THBs 
would still be substantial. Overall, the EU weighted average would drop by about a third 
from 5.6 % to 3.7 % of covered deposits. The actual increase in covered deposits under 
the median implementation of THB provisions would thus be about 3.7 % of covered 
deposits. 
 
18.5%
14.4%13.9%
8.8%8.7%8.4%8.3%
7.5%
7.1%6.9%6.8%6.4%
5.7%5.6%5.3%
4.7%4.6%4.6%4.5%4.1%3.8%3.4%3.1%2.8%2.5%2.3%2.2%
1.1%0.9%
0.0%
2.5%
5.0%
7.5%
10.0%
12.5%
15.0%
17.5%
20.0%
HU FI LT EE BG CZ IT SK LV FR UK PL RO EU SE DK ES PT DE SI IE AT NL BE EL LU MT CY HR
A
s 
%
 o
f 
co
ve
re
d
 d
ep
o
si
ts
Sellers
Multiple time buyers
First time buyers
 Options and national discretions under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and their treatment in the 
context of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
57 
 
Figure 4.3 THBs – median implementation across coverage levels 
 
Notes: This figure shows the THBs across Member States and the EU average weighted by the share of covered 
deposits. The THBs are estimated for the median implementation of THB provisions across Member States; 
maximum coverage level of EUR 500 000, coverage of all actors (buyers and sellers) and up to 6 months 
after/before transaction. 
Source: CEPS estimates based on model specified in Annex 1 
 
Turning to the various options for the duration and level of coverage of THBs, there are 
large differences in the amounts of THBs covered. In particular, the coverage level 
seems to have a significant impact on the amounts eligible under the THB provisions. 
Figure 4.4 shows the EU weighted average of THBs as a share of covered deposits and 
the minimum and maximum level of THBs across Member States for durations ranging 
between 3 and 12 months (left-hand side panel) and maximum coverage levels ranging 
from EUR 100 000 to unlimited (right-hand side panel). 
The amounts eligible as THBs increase with the increased coverage level. However, the 
incremental increase decreases when the coverage level increases. For example, a 
100 % increase in coverage level from EUR 100 000 to EUR 200 000 is likely to increase 
the eligible deposits from 1.9 % of covered deposits to 3.4 % of covered deposits, which 
is an increase of about 80 %. While a 150 % increase from EUR 200 000 to EUR 500 000 
is likely to increase the eligible amount by just over 60 % from 3.4 % to 5.6 % of 
covered deposits. By contrast, the THBs do not increase significantly above a coverage 
level of EUR 500 000. The impact of the coverage level is largely due to differences in 
property prices, which range in the model between EUR 55 000 for a flat in a rural area 
in Bulgaria and EUR 1 147 000 for a detached house in a city in the UK. These property 
prices effectively put a cap on the maximum eligible amount generated.  
Similarly, an increase in the duration covered is likely to lead to an increase in eligible 
deposits. Indeed, a 100 % increase in coverage duration from 3 months to 6 months is 
likely to increase eligible deposits by about 45 % from 3.9 % to 5.6 % of covered 
deposits. A further 100 % increase in coverage duration from 6 to 12 months is 
estimated to increase eligible deposits by only 24 % from 5.6 % to 7.0 % of covered 
deposits. 
 
Figure 4.4 THBs – median implementation dispersion 
a)  Across durations    b)  Across coverage levels  
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Notes: This figure shows the EU average weighted by the share of covered deposits and minimum and 
maximum THBs across Member States for various durations and coverage levels respectively. The other 
conditions for the estimation are based on the median implementation conditions; maximum coverage level 
of EUR 500 000, coverage of all actors (buyers and sellers) and up to 6 months after/before transaction. 
Source: CEPS estimates based on model specified in Annex 1 
 
The impact of a longer coverage duration on eligible deposits would largely depend on 
the (assumed) inflow and outflow rates. The eligibility of deposits from first-time buyers 
largely depends on the date at which an agreement for the purchase of the residential 
property is signed. The existence of such an agreement is often a condition for the 
eligibility for the THB, i.e. the balances on the account are only covered when there is 
a purchase agreement. The model assumes that the share of signed purchases decrease 
by 20 % per month. This means that it is assumed that about 80 % of purchase 
agreements have already been signed in the month before the transaction (100 % - 
20 % = 80 %), while 64 % have already been signed two months before the transaction 
(80 % * 80 % = 64 %), etc. In practice, the share of the agreements might differ across 
Member States and time. This effect is less important for multiple-time buyers as they 
will already be covered through the sales transaction that generates most of their THBs. 
Similarly, the deposits generated from the sale are likely to decrease as time after the 
transaction passes. The rate at which the deposits are used for other purposes such as 
investments might differ between Member States and across time. 
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Figure 4.5 THBs – median implementation across in- and outflow rates 
a)  Across durations    b)  Across coverage levels  
 
Notes: This figure shows the EU average weighted by the share of covered deposits and minimum and 
maximum THBs across various outflow and inflow levels. The estimations are based on the median 
implementation conditions; maximum coverage level of EUR 500 000, coverage of all actors (buyers and 
sellers) and up to 6 months after/before transaction. 
Source: CEPS estimates based on model specified in Annex 1 
 
The higher the inflow and outflow rates are, the lower the deposits eligible under THB 
provisions are. In practice, the inflow and outflow rates might well be lower or higher 
than the 20 % per month assumed in the model (80 % at the account [1 month 
before/after failure], 64 % [2 months], 51 % [3 months], 41 % [4 months], 33 % [5 
months], etc.).  
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Figure 4.5 shows the THBs for different inflow and outflow rates across various covered 
durations (left-hand panel) and coverage levels (right-hand panel). The difference 
between various coverage durations is relatively low for the higher inflow and outflow 
rates, with only 12 % more deposits eligible for an inflow and outflow rate of 50 % 
instead of 20 % per month. More specifically, the eligible deposits increase for a 
coverage duration between 3 months and 12 months from 2.9 % to 3.2 % of covered 
deposits. In turn, inflow and outflow rates of 0 % (i.e. covered deposits remain for the 
entire coverage duration on the account) would imply that the eligible covered deposits 
would almost quadruple from 4.7 % to 17.3 % of covered deposits for the durations of 
3 months and 12 months respectively. For the assumed inflow and outflow rate of 20 % 
per month, the eligible deposits increase by 80 % from 3.9 % to 7.0 % of covered 
deposits for coverage durations of 3 months and 12 months respectively. For the 
different coverage levels the inflow and outflow rates have a similar impact. The eligible 
deposits would almost triple when the inflow and outflow rates decrease from 50 % to 
0 % per month. 
 
Figure 4.6 THBs – median implementation across actors 
a)  Across durations    b)  Across coverage levels  
 
Notes: This figure shows the EU average weighted by the share of covered deposits and minimum and 
maximum THBs across actors for various durations and coverage levels respectively. The other conditions for 
the estimation are based on the median implementation conditions; maximum coverage level of EUR 500 000, 
coverage of all actors (buyers and sellers) and up to 6 months after/before transaction. 
Source: CEPS estimates based on model specified in Annex 1 
 
It follows from the distribution of the different eligible depositors (e.g. Figure 4.6), that 
sellers will be responsible for most of the eligible deposits. This is primarily because they 
are generating the largest share of deposits benefitting from the repayments of the 
mortgage loans during the time that they held the property and price increases. The 
share of buyers and sellers remains stable for various maturities. First-time buyers 
account for about 18 % of total eligible THBs, multiple-time buyers round 12 % and 
sellers about 70 %. As the THBs generated by sellers are higher than for first- and 
multiple-time buyers, the share of eligible deposits held by sellers increases when the 
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coverage level increases, as shown in Figure 4.6 (right-hand side). The sellers account 
for about 58 % of eligible deposits when THBs up to EUR 100 000 are covered and 70 % 
when unlimited amounts of THBs are covered. 
 
Overall, THBs are estimated to have a significant impact on the covered deposits in most 
Member States. However, as many of the estimated THBs remain below EUR 100 000, 
depositors would potentially be able to claim a substantial share of THBs under the 
regular coverage. The relative importance of the THBs differs across Member States, 
coverage levels and coverage durations as well as inflow and outflow rates. 
 
4.4.2.2 Level playing field 
Despite significant fragmentation, the impact of THBs on the level playing field is likely 
to be limited because it reflects national specificities (e.g. the living conditions in a 
Member State). While the coverage is identical within one Member State, in the cross-
border context, the differences in covered events, levels and duration could potentially 
cause distortions in the level playing field to the detriment of a uniform level of depositor 
protection. In particular, some THBs might not be covered to the same extent across 
Member States, which could distort the choice of accounts. Nevertheless, based on 
current experience, the differences in THB regimes do not appear to be well known and 
the perceived benefits are only temporary. If depositors’ awareness about THBs were 
to increase, the existing fragmentation could also create incentives for moving to 
jurisdictions with higher coverage.  
 
4.4.2.3 Depositor confidence  
This NOD is highly important for depositor protection. In a number of life events (e.g. 
sale of an apartment, insurance benefits, to name but a few examples), depositors are 
likely to receive exceptionally large amounts of money on their account, potentially 
above the standard coverage of EUR 100 000 and, in the absence of THBs, lose such 
savings in the event of a bank failure. Therefore, the coverage of THBs aims to protect 
depositors in exceptional circumstances and maintain their confidence in the system. 
 
4.4.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
Despite limited experience so far, THBs appear highly important in nearly all Member 
States. By contrast, they are less important in Member States where account balances, 
including THBs, are unlikely to exceed the regular coverage level of EUR 100 000 per 
depositor per member institution (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia and 
Romania) and where DGSs avoid pay-outs with the use of preventive or alternative 
measures (Austria, Germany, Italy, etc.)47.  
 
 Options in the context of EDIS 
Despite the limited experience so far, THBs are highly important for depositor protection 
and there are differences in the application of THB provisions across Member States. 
In this view, the alternative (Option 3) or the even more ambitious full harmonisation 
(Option 4) building on the current NOD appear as the most sensible policy options 
because they would reduce the existing fragmentation. Both options ensure that the 
                                           
47 In these Member States, the coverage levels are de facto unlimited, making the THBs irrelevant. 
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most important life events would continue to be covered, while reducing the unlevel 
playing field. 
Under Option 3, depositors would be entitled to THB protection up to the limit of 
EUR 500 000 and within a period of up to 6 months48. Under Option 4, all THBs would 
be covered up to EUR 1 000 000 for a duration up to 12 months. The scope of protection 
would remain the same, i.e. all events covered now would continue to be covered49.  
The increased protection for THBs would be likely to have a significant impact in terms 
of financial exposure for EDIS (about 5 % of covered deposits on average), in particular 
when taking the form of a full insurance scheme. This is why, under Option 3, it is 
recommended that THBs are reflected in the calculation of contributions to EDIS. 
Currently, with one exception for Spain, THBs are not taken into account in the 
calculation of covered deposits because it may be difficult to identify their amounts. To 
this end, under Option 3, it would be necessary to estimate50 the amount of THBs for 
every member institution.  
 
4.4.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form  
This policy option considers retaining the current NOD. 
Effectiveness: This option would maintain depositor confidence. Given that THBs are 
generally not taken into account in the calculation of contributions, DGSs could be too 
exposed in the crisis scenario with increased THB claims. Currently, the number of THBs 
is very limited. Important in this respect is that the amount covered under the provision 
is largely unknown. For EDIS, it is important that the burden is equally distributed across 
Member States. As the THBs vary substantially across Member States, no contribution 
would lead to an implicit subsidy of institutions in Member States with relatively low 
THBs to institutions in Member States with relatively high THBs.  
Efficiency: The THB claims can be burdensome for the DGS. In most cases, the DGS 
would assess the claims on a case-by-case basis which could be more or less 
complicated depending on the definition of the scope of protection. With EDIS in place51, 
such impacts would not be exacerbated because handling of claims would remain in the 
competence of national DGS.  
Coherence: The differences in coverage (duration, level and events) across Member 
States reduce the cross-border level playing field and the coherence of the system. In 
turn, the THBs contribute to strengthening financial stability in line with the objective of 
the resolution mechanism (BRRD/SRM). 
Subsidiarity: Under this option, Member States would retain flexibility as regarding the 
amount of the THB, duration and the scope of transactions. This allows Member States 
to include all the life events that may involve more or less large amounts of deposits. 
For example, the amounts of money involved in marriage, dismissal and invalidity are 
more important in some Member States than in others. 
                                           
48 Based on the median implementation, assuming a coverage of EUR 500 000 in the UK with about 87% of 
the deposits covered, the recommended coverage level would cover basically all the deposits related to 
primary residential property transactions in the majority of Member States.  
49 i) deposits resulting from transactions related to private residential properties, ii) deposits related to life 
events, and iii) deposits related to payment of insurance benefits or compensation for criminal injuries or 
wrongful conviction. 
50 According to the estimations in the context of this study, the THBs would be equivalent to 5.6% of covered 
deposits. 
51 The COM proposal provides that EDIS covers the deposits as defined under Article 6(1) DGSD. This study 
considers that EDIS could covers the deposits which correspond to temporary high balances under Article 6(2) 
DGSD. 
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4.4.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the current NOD. In practice, THBs would no 
longer be protected and depositors would be likely to lose an important part of their 
savings – amounts on their account because of important, and often one-off, life events.  
Effectiveness: This policy option would undermine depositor confidence but strengthen 
the financial capacity of DGSs because the DGSs would not have to cover deposits that 
had not been reflected in the calculation of contributions. The amount of deposits 
potentially covered in a pay-out event would be less likely to be underestimated. 
Efficiency: This policy option would reduce the administrative burden for DGS related to 
the potentially burdensome assessment of THB-related claims. This could be 
compensated by increased awareness among depositors who would know about the 
need to disperse any funds above the regular coverage level among more banks.  
Coherence: This policy option would not contribute to a more coherent system in terms 
of adequate depositor protection because it would not reflect the different living 
conditions and real estate prices in the Member States. On the one hand, it might allow 
for more burden-sharing (i.e. THB holders absorb some of the losses), while, on the 
other hand, it might increase the lack of financial stability likely prevailing in resolution 
decisions (i.e. more uncertainty might trigger bank runs).  
Subsidiarity: This NOD is highly relevant for depositor confidence in order to address 
the different living conditions and elimination would negatively impact subsidiarity. 
 
4.4.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers increased harmonisation of the THB in terms of their 
duration, level and events. This would be combined with an increase in covered deposits 
because THBs would be taken into account in the calculation of contributions based on 
a model. This model should consider at least the importance of the various covered 
events, the sums involved and extent that the amounts are already covered under the 
regular coverage at Member State level as well as the relevance of the THBs in general 
at institution level (e.g. THBs are likely to be more important for a mortgage bank than 
for a bank that serves primarily SMEs). 
Based on the median implementation, depositors could claim THB protection up to the 
limit of EUR 500 000 and within a period of up to 6 months. The scope of protection 
would remain the same, i.e. all events covered now would continue to be covered. 
Moreover, in order to reflect THBs in the contributions to EDIS, it would be necessary 
to estimate the amount of THBs for every member institution. This estimate of THBs 
could be performed by the institution responsible for the implementation of EDIS or one 
of the other pan-European banking institutions. According to the estimations in the 
context of this study, the THBs would be equivalent to 5.6 % of covered deposits (of 
which some would already be covered under the regular coverage of EUR 100 000 per 
depositor per institute). 
Effectiveness: The alternative option would likely contribute to enhanced depositor 
confidence, while limiting the uncertainty about the THBs covered. Depending on the 
current coverage level and the living conditions in the Member State, the maximum 
threshold of EUR 500 000 and duration up to 6 months might either improve or decrease 
depositor protection. The broader scope of protection in terms of covered events would 
likely have only a limited effect, as most Member States primarily exclude events that 
appear irrelevant in their national context. The increase in the calculated covered 
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deposits for the target level further ensures that there is an additional contribution to 
the DGS for the THBs. 
Efficiency: Increased harmonisation in terms of the duration, amount and events would 
improve efficiency, while the addition of the THBs to the covered deposits would 
decrease efficiency. Indeed, the simplification of the NOD with standard coverage 
(duration, level and potentially events) should alleviate the assessment of claims by 
DGSs across Member States, which would be particularly important when the deposit 
insurance is arranged centrally (e.g. fully fledged EDIS).  
In turn, most DGSs and member institutions consider it too burdensome to determine 
the exact amount of THBs ex ante. The banks may not necessarily have all the 
information about the origin and destination of the funds possessed by the depositors. 
The alternative option therefore considers determining the amounts of additional 
covered deposits based on a model. The envisaged model can potentially take a similar 
form as the model used in the discussion above, which could likely limit the burden for 
both DGSs and member institutions. 
Coherence: This option would strengthen the coherence of the system due to a reduced 
fragmentation. The option might find a balance between loss absorption and financial 
stability that is closer to optimal. From depositors with large amounts of deposits, one 
could argue that with a coverage of up to EUR 500 000 the most damaging losses are 
avoided and some shared responsibility for higher amounts can be demanded.  
Subsidiarity: This option would reduce the discretion of Member States but address the 
fragmentation with a middle-ground solution based on the current application of the 
NOD. Based on the transposition and interviews, most Member States do not seem to 
have strong preferences for coverage levels and duration.  
 
4.4.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers that the current NOD would be modified by extending the 
level of protection. In practice, all THBs52 would be covered up to EUR 1 000 000 for a 
duration up to 12 months. This means that in some Member States with already high 
protection reflecting living conditions (e.g. high real estate prices), depositors will 
continue to be adequately protected, whereas in other Member States with lower 
protection, depositors would likely be fully protected.  
Effectiveness: This option would adequately maintain depositor confidence because the 
limit of EUR 1 000 000 is used as the ceiling in Member States with the highest real 
estate prices. It would increase depositor protection in other Member States that have 
so far opted for lower protections. However, this would potentially make the DGS more 
fragile and increase financial exposure for EDIS. Compared to the alternative option, 
the improvement in depositor confidence is likely to be limited as very few depositors 
have more than EUR 500 000 due to THBs, whereas the additional amounts per 
depositor are likely to be larger.  
Efficiency: This option would simplify divergent rules by having one level of coverage 
and one duration and would be beneficial for DGS claims assessment. 
Coherence: This option would strengthen internal coherence. External coherence would 
still be impacted due to a less optimal balance between burden-sharing and financial 
stability. 
                                           
52 i) deposits resulting from transactions related to private residential properties, ii) deposits related to life 
events, and iii) deposits related to payment of insurance benefits or compensation for criminal injuries or 
wrongful conviction. 
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Subsidiarity: This option would limit subsidiarity. However, as the survey did not indicate 
strong preferences related to implementation, this option would be reasonable.  
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4.5 NOD 5 – Old-age provision products and pensions 
Summary: NOD 5 – Old-age provision products and pensions 
DGSD [Article 6(3)] 
Member States shall not be prevented from maintaining or introducing schemes 
protecting old-age provision products and pensions, provided that such schemes do not 
only cover deposits but offer comprehensive coverage for all products and situations 
relevant in this regard.  
Transposed into national law [2 Member States] 
Denmark and Latvia 
Practical experience so far [2 Member States] 
Denmark and Latvia 
Importance 
Up to 22 % of covered deposits53  
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national DGS 
Level 
playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance 
for 
respective 
Member 
States 
Overall - - + + 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1:  
Retain in  
current form  
[Recommended] 
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
Option 4: 
Full 
harmonisatio
n 
Effectiveness + - + + 
Efficiency - + +/- + 
Coherence +/- + + - 
Subsidiarity + - - - 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
Denmark and Latvia are the only Member States that transposed and use the NOD to 
maintain or establish schemes protecting old-age provision products and pensions in 
addition to deposits. 
                                           
53 The additional amount covered under the NOD is estimated based on data from the Danish central bank 
and ManaPensija (2019) for Denmark and Latvia respectively. The Danish pension savings are relatively the 
highest, equivalent to 22% of the covered deposits of the Danish member institutions. The additional coverage 
due to the NOD is, however, likely to be substantially less as some is already under the standard coverage 
(EUR 100,000 per depositor per bank). According to estimates provided by a large Danish bank, the additional 
exposure would be less than a third or about 6% of total covered deposits. 
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4.5.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The main motivations are historical as well as to provide a level playing field between 
different providers of pension products and promote private (Pillar 3) savings for old-
age provision products and pensions. 
Pension funds have historically had a high level of protection in Denmark. Non-bank 
pension providers are obligated by law to match liabilities of each customer with assets 
pledged, which ensures that the customers retain their pension savings if the pension 
provider fails. This NOD reflected the priority to encourage saving for old-age through 
supplementary pension schemes offered by banks, which may require protection beyond 
the standard coverage under the DGSD (EUR 100 000 per depositor per bank). 
Latvia decided to provide additional protection for state-funded pension scheme 
investment plans, private pension schemes, and the funds provided for fulfilment of the 
obligations laid down in pension schemes, with the purpose of reducing social insecurity 
among the elderly. 
 
4.5.1.2 Coverage of pension funds and resolution  
In Denmark, the NOD reflects the high level of protection of pension funds; far beyond 
the coverage level under the DGSD54. This NOD was already implemented under 
Directive 94/19/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/14/EC (Article 1 amending Article 
7(3) of Directive 94/19/EC), providing for grandfathering for exemptions for social 
considerations existing before 2008. Denmark has – in transposing this NOD – not 
implemented any special schemes protecting old-age provision products and pensions. 
The national legislation protects any type of pension/retirement schemes and retained 
the pre-existing provision. 
Under the national legislation, pension savings accounts recognised by law shall be fully 
covered. This applies both when the pension funds are in the form of a cash deposit and 
the deposited funds are placed in a pension pool scheme administered by a bank, 
irrespective of whether the pension scheme is subscribed for privately or as part of an 
employer scheme. Cash in pension accounts created under the law are therefore fully 
covered by the DGS. The same applies if the pension funds are placed in securities as 
part of a pension pool scheme55. The transposing measure is formulated in a general 
way so as to apply to any future pension products recognised under the Danish law.  
Full coverage means there is no limitation of the amount and no deduction for overdue 
liabilities towards the member institution. This applies as long as the funds are in the 
pension account. If the funds are disbursed and then placed on a regular deposit 
account, the regular coverage will apply including for THBs (see NOD 4)56. 
In Latvia, funds in state-funded pension scheme investment plans, private pension 
schemes and those provided in fulfilment of the obligations laid down in pension 
schemes are not considered as a bank property under the Law on Credit Institutions 
(KIL). Therefore, the bank cannot use these funds that are not subject to a potential 
bail-in under the resolution regime.  
Accordingly, in order to receive the repayment of the full amount of funds covered under 
the NOD, the depositor shall submit to the member institution the necessary information 
confirming the compliance of the deposit with the specific provisions of the Latvian law. 
                                           
54 Commission Working Paper - Impact Assessment (SEC/2010/0834 final). 
55 Finansiel Stabilitet (2019), Hvordan er jeg sikret, hvis mit institut går konkurs? 
56 In such instances, a special coverage of EUR 150 000 applies for a period of 6 months from the moment 
the payment from a pension account is made. 
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No further details regarding how this evidence is submitted and how it is verified could 
be obtained.  
Deposits currently held by personal pension schemes and occupational pension schemes 
covered by the NOD would therefore be fully repaid by the DGS. 
4.5.1.3 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
Denmark has not been confronted with a pay-out since the implementation of the DGSD. 
However, as the Danish resolution scheme prevents smaller institutions57 to undergo 
normal insolvency proceedings, customers received coverage under this NOD in two 
cases (2015 and 2018) outside an actual pay-out event. Before the implementation of 
the DGSD there have been similar cases of coverage of old-age provision products and 
pensions provided by the Danish DGS in place at that time (also outside a pay-out 
event). 
Latvia has recently dealt with two pay-outs (ABLV Bank AS in February 2018 and JSC 
PNB Banka in August 2019) but it is unclear whether the NOD was used. 
The DGSs were unable to provide the additional amounts covered under the NOD. Based 
on the information from the Danish central bank, there were about DKK 158 billion 
(EUR 21 billion) in special deposits at Danish banks at the end of 2017, of which the 
large majority consist of deposits for pensions in special accounts. These special deposits 
are equivalent to about 22 % of the covered deposits in Denmark. The additional 
coverage due to the NOD is, however, likely to be substantially less as a large amount 
is already covered under the standard coverage (EUR 100 000 per depositor per bank). 
According to estimates provided by a large Danish bank, the additional exposure would 
be less than a third or about 6 % of total covered deposits.  
Similarly, information on the potential coverage of the Latvian pension instruments is 
limited. Based on the overview of the total net asset value (NAV) of Pillar 3 pension 
funds, the amounts are substantially lower in Latvia. According to the figures provided 
by ManaPensija (2019) the total Pillar 3 pension funds account for EUR 434 million, 
equivalent to 5.2 % of covered deposits in Latvia at the end of 201758. This amount puts 
an upper limit on the amounts currently covered under the provision as the third pillar 
pension funds are also provided by some non-banks and some of the funds might also 
be covered under the standard deposit guarantee coverage. It should also be noted that 
the average participant has a claim of only about EUR 1 500 on the pension funds, which 
is well below the standard coverage of EUR 100 000. 
 
 Impact of the NOD 
The coverage of old-age provision products and pensions is potentially increasing the 
risk for the DGS and distorting the level playing field. However, the provisions are 
important for Denmark and Latvia as they improve depositor confidence by avoiding 
that coverage limitations discourage savings for retirement. 
 
4.5.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
This NOD impacts the risk profile of the DGS. The full coverage of old-age products and 
pensions could result in a substantial additional exposure of the DGS. 
                                           
57 According to the Danish resolution authority these smaller institutions also provide critical functions, i.e. 
being a primary bank for customers. 
58 The share of covered deposits has been growing by about 0.5% of covered deposits per year in the past 
three years. 
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In Denmark, old-age products and pensions, other than regular deposits, are held on 
separate deposit accounts that can be identified. The impact on the risk profile of the 
DGS depends on whether the higher exposure increases the probability of pay-out and 
whether this additional amount is backed by adequate contributions to the fund. While 
the amount of old-age products and pensions is not reflected in the calculation of the 
contributions, the Danish DGS reached its target level years ago and has gone well 
beyond it. The available financial means were equal to 1.3 % of covered deposits at the 
end of 2018, which is more than 1.5 times the target level of 0.8 % of covered deposits.  
Latvia introduced this provision only recently59. Like Denmark, Latvia has also already 
reached the target level, and it is well above it, with contributions amounting to about 
2.1 % of covered deposits at the end of 2018, which is about 2.5 times the target level 
of 0.8 % of covered deposits. 
 
4.5.2.2 Level playing field 
This NOD is country-specific and applicable to specific accounts or services that are 
unlikely to be provided by providers from outside Denmark and Latvia, the negative 
impact at cross-border level on the level playing field is limited.  
However, there is also a potential impact within the same country, as the pension 
services are also offered by non-banks whose products do not benefit from the coverage 
under Article 6(3) DGSD. However, these providers are required to have the assets and 
liabilities of the pension products matched to eliminate the risks for the account holder. 
 
4.5.2.3 Depositor confidence  
This NOD covers old-age provision products and pensions, including both deposits and 
non-deposits. In the same vein as the deposit guarantee, the purpose is to offer 
protection to savers, and therefore the deposit insurance increases their confidence in 
the system. In practice, most individuals are likely to expect these products to be safe 
and assimilate them to deposits. 
 
4.5.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
This NOD is relevant in Denmark and Latvia60. Denmark has a strong tradition of high 
protection of pension funds/savings, pre-existing the DGSD and this NOD is relevant 
both politically and financially. Politically, because it reflects social preferences, practices 
and expectations, which are difficult to change, without affecting the confidence of the 
population in the financial system. Financially, because the size of these products to be 
guaranteed by the DGS is significant relative to covered deposits. 
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
Given the limited transposition of the NOD, and the strong country-specific dimension, 
maintaining the current NOD (Option 1) would appear as the most sensible option under 
EDIS. With EDIS in place, it could also be considered to include the funds that fall within 
the scope of the NOD in the risk-based contributions to better reflect the financial 
exposure of the NOD for the DGS. This is currently not necessary as both Denmark and 
                                           
59 It was not possible to confirm with certainty whether the deposits under this NOD are reflected in the 
calculation of the contributions.  
60 In the absence of more detailed information, no assessment about the relevance in Latvia was possible. 
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Latvia have sufficient funds in excess of the target level to cover the additional deposits 
covered under this NOD. 
 
4.5.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers retaining the NOD. This means that old-age provision 
products and pensions would continue to be covered in the Member States which opt 
for the NOD.  
Effectiveness: This option would contribute to the effectiveness of the DGS in terms of 
increased depositor confidence by guaranteeing these deposits that often form integral 
part of the old-age provisions. However, as long as this additional coverage is not 
reflected in the contributions, the risk to the DGS, and potentially EDIS, is increased, 
which could require the intervention of the government if the DGS funds are not 
sufficient. In both Denmark and Latvia, the latter is effectively mitigated with the current 
higher target amount. 
Efficiency: This option would reduce the efficiency of the DGS. However, the additional 
burden for the DGSs and member institutions is relative given that the coverage is 
unlimited and the deposits are held at dedicated accounts. 
Coherence: This option appears coherent with the national regulatory frameworks. At 
least, this seems to be the case of Denmark, where this policy has been in place for 
years, not least to enhance the level playing field among different providers of pension 
products and make sure that from a consumer protection point of view, all savers enjoy 
the same protection on similar products. However, the level playing field would be 
distorted between Member States that fully cover pensions, while others do not. 
Subsidiarity: Although the NOD is only used in two Member States, the coverage of old-
age provision products and pensions might be relevant for a larger number of Member 
States. Moreover, the way the deposits are covered could be harmonised across Member 
States. 
 
4.5.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD. Old-age provision products and 
pensions that include also non-deposit products would not be protected by the DGS. 
Effectiveness: This option would reduce the effectiveness of the DGS and the depositor 
confidence in the relevant Member States. It would not take into account that the DGSs 
in Denmark and Latvia currently have funds in excess of the target level, which reduces 
the likelihood of insufficient DGS funds that would have to be backed by the 
governments. 
Efficiency: Elimination of the NOD would likely improve efficiency by reducing the burden 
for the DGSs and member institutions as they would have to apply a special treatment 
to the accounts for old-age provision products and pensions. 
Coherence: Coherence of the regulatory framework across countries would increase as 
this option would eliminate the current fragmentation in the treatment of such products 
across Member States.  
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity for Member States using the NOD. 
 
4.5.3.3 Option 3: Alternative  
This policy option considers limiting the coverage of the current provisions for old-age 
provision products and pensions that also include non-deposit products up to 
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EUR 100 000 in all Member States. This would assimilate these products and pensions 
to a greater degree to deposits and would apply the same principle of protection. The 
rationale would be to increase savers’ (not only depositor) confidence in the system and 
set a common social objective of reducing insecurity in old age, possibly increasing the 
propensity to save.  
Effectiveness: If this policy objective is shared across Member States, this alternative 
option would increase the effectiveness across EU Member States. However, it would 
also imply a larger exposure relative to the NOD in its current form (as explained in 
Option 1). To ensure effectiveness, the larger coverage would need to be accompanied 
by a proportional increase in the risk-based contributions. 
Efficiency: This option would likely increase the burden for the DGS. Indeed, the DGSs 
and member institutions would have to determine the coverage of the old-age and 
pension products, though this would be easier if such funds were held at dedicated 
accounts. 
Coherence: The coherence of the regulatory framework would increase as the same 
principle would be applied across Member States. This change would resemble the 
introduction of the coverage level of EUR 100 000 to ensure deposit protection. 
Moreover, it could further encourage savings for old-age provision and pensions as a 
way to address the forthcoming challenges of an ageing population. 
Subsidiarity: This partial harmonisation would negatively impact subsidiarity both in 
Member States where the NOD has been applied at national level (and coverage was in 
full) and in those which have not opted for the NOD. 
 
4.5.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers extending the NOD to all Member States. Given that the use 
of the NOD has so far been limited, full harmonisation would likely have the same impact 
as Option 1. However, if more Member States include more products under the NOD, it 
would be beneficial to ensure that the member institutions include such amounts in the 
calculation of contributions to mitigate the exponential increase of the financial exposure 
of the DGS. 
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4.6 NOD 6 – Treated as a single depositor 
Summary: NOD 6 – Treated as a single depositor 
DGSD [Article 7(2)] 
Member States may provide that deposits in an account to which two or more 
persons are entitled as members of a business partnership, association or grouping 
of a similar nature, without legal personality, may be aggregated and treated as if 
made by a single depositor for the purpose of calculating the deposit protection limit. 
Transposed into national law [14 Member States] 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania and the UK 
Practical experience so far [0 Member States] 
N/A 
Importance 
Up to 9 % of covered deposits61 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national 
DGS 
Level 
playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member 
States 
Overall ++ -/+ - + 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current 
form 
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
[Recommended] 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness + - + + 
Efficiency -- + - -- 
Coherence - + ++ + 
Subsidiarity + - - - 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
Under this NOD, Member States may aggregate joint accounts provided such an account 
is held by two or more persons entitled as members of a business partnership, 
association or grouping of a similar nature, without legal personality and treat the 
account holders as a single depositor for the purpose of calculating the standard deposit 
protection limit of EUR 100 000. 14 Member States62 transposed the NOD. 
 
                                           
61 The indicated amount is based on the estimates provided by member institutions in 6 of the Member States 
that transposed the NOD. The amounts for these member institutions ranged between 0% and 9% of covered 
deposits of the respective institutions. 
62 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, 
Romania and the UK. 
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4.6.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The rationale for transposing this NOD varies across Member States. The main 
motivations are avoiding additional compensation, ensuring equal treatment of various 
deposits or maintaining the provisions that existed prior to DGSD adopted in 2014. 
Specific holders of joint accounts are treated as a single depositor eligible for repayment 
of up to EUR 100 000. Without this restriction, the coverage would be equal to the 
number of account holders multiplied by the standard coverage of EUR 100 00063. Some 
Member States have implemented the NOD to ensure that no additional 
compensation has to be paid out (e.g. Ireland).  
In some Member States, this NOD is implemented to ensure equal treatment (e.g. 
Belgium and the UK). For example, there is some overlap between Article 6(2)(b) DGSD 
on Temporary High Balances (see NOD 4) and this Article 7(2) on treatment as single 
depositor. In particular, in the case of an account set up in the context of a heritage 
with multiple account holders, NOD 4 on temporary high balances provides for a 
standard coverage per depositor. Without this NOD, the maximum coverage would be 
determined by the number of account holders. This may create an unequal treatment 
of the heirs.  
In several Member States, the provision already existed prior to the current DGSD. It 
was difficult to extract consistent information about the rationale of the national 
transpositions of the NOD from the feedback of the authorities and DGSs. However, the 
NOD seems to reflect a general principle that the depositor to be protected is the holder 
of the account, which is not necessarily an individual, e.g. an association, a club, the 
heirs altogether or a partnership, even if they do not have legal personality. 
 
4.6.1.2 Types of joint accounts covered 
In Austria, the joint accounts covered under national legislation correspond to the types 
of joint accounts determined in Article 7(2) DGSD. More specifically, ‘an ordinary 
partnership, a limited partnership, a civil law partnership or a business organisation of 
a similar nature’ are within the scope of the NOD, unlike entrepreneur accounts of only 
one natural person. 
Several countries included a so-called co-ownership. In Croatia, this corresponds to the 
case of a joint community of heirs applicable before the inheritance of a deceased person 
is legally divided between his/her heirs. The bank account in the name of the deceased 
would be covered by the NOD during that period, i.e. treated as an account of a single 
depositor.  
France has also added co-ownership (indivision). A co-owned account (compte indivis) 
belongs collectively to a group of persons who cannot act individually or take ownership 
of a part of the sum as long as the co-ownership exists. The notion of co-ownership is 
quite broad and can cover: 
 the account of a deceased person before the estate is settled by a notary and 
the amounts shared between the heirs; 
 the account in which several persons have joined together for a common 
purpose, but without giving a particular legal form to this association, and which 
operates by mutual agreement between the joint co-owners for all transactions; 
 the account created in this form by two persons, which must operate under their 
two signatures, and whose title bears the mention ‘person A and person B’ (for 
instance, matrimonial property scheme). 
                                           
63 Under the assumption that that an account should be divided equally among the depositors. 
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This implies that the co-ownership (and not the individuals) is eligible for the deposit 
guarantee. Thus, any individual accounts held by co-owners would be considered 
separately for the purpose of setting the EUR 100 000 limit for two reasons: (i) neither 
of the holders of such a deposit may act independently or withdraw the part of such a 
deposit until the joint ownership is dissolved; and (ii) a member of a co-ownership is 
not free to choose the bank at which the deposits are held. French authorities have 
concluded that separate consideration of co-owned accounts prevents unequal 
treatment of a member of an undivided co-ownership who happens to have personal 
accounts in the same bank and such an approach is favourable to depositors.  
Similarly, in Belgium, the scope of the NOD is relatively broad, covering ‘assets eligible 
for repayment in the context of deposit protection and placed in a cash account and 
assets eligible for repayment in the context of life insurance protection, to which at least 
two persons may assert rights as members of an association, a group or an co-
ownership (indivision) without legal personality’. This NOD would also apply to any type 
of organisation with lucrative purposes that does not have a real legal personality (and 
is not a legal entity by its strict definition) but still has the characteristics of one. The 
NOD is used to ensure equal treatment. 
In Luxembourg, the terms ‘associations, partnership or groupings’64 concerns, for 
example, business clubs, business associations, business fellowships, building co-
ownerships, or accounts in joint ownership following the death of a person (indivision). 
The rationale for the particular treatment of joint ownership accounts in the latter case 
is that the depositor was the deceased person, not the beneficiaries.  
Italy limits the exception to business associations without legal personality, i.e. all types 
of business entities which are not natural persons and do not have legal personality, 
e.g. partnership (societa di persone). The situation is comparable in Ireland where the 
types of business association, partnership and grouping covered are sole traders, 
partnerships and small companies, while medium or large companies, insurers, public 
authorities, pension funds, collective investment schemes, banks, large financial credit 
schemes, clubs, schools or charities are not covered. 
 
4.6.1.3 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
This NOD has not yet been used. In Belgium, the Ministry of Finance examined a case 
in 2016 in the context of the bankruptcy of the Optima Bank. However, the provision 
was not applied in the end.  
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The treatment of multiple joint accounts as a single depositor is likely to reduce the risk 
profile of the national DGSs, while potentially reducing depositor confidence. The 
relevance of the NOD for the Member States that have transposed the provision appears 
to vary a lot depending on the scope of the national implementation. 
 
4.6.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The treatment of joint accounts as a single depositor limits the coverage on the accounts 
to EUR 100 000, irrespective of the number of account holders. As the maximum 
coverage is lower, the expected pay-out for the DGS is likely to be reduced. In practice, 
in the absence of more detailed information from the DGSs, it is difficult to identify the 
                                           
64 The legislation transposes Article 7(2) of the DGSD in a literal fashion. 
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relevant situations. However, several banks seem aware of the matter and, based on 
their estimates, the size varies from close to 0 to close to 9 % of covered deposits. In 
Austria, Italy and Malta, those accounts are below 0.5 % of covered deposits. In 
Portugal and Denmark, they seem to range between 1 % and 5 % of covered deposits. 
In Belgium, the percentage seems much higher and close to 9 % of covered deposits. 
This may be explained by the relevance of the NOD per country (incidence of the 
relevant entities), but it may also be an overestimation. In practice, banks tend to 
consider all accounts of associations without legal personality as a single depositor, 
when calculating covered deposits. 
 
4.6.2.2 Level playing field 
Most of the accounts within the scope of this NOD are held in the country in which the 
business or the association are established or the deceased person lived. As the NOD is 
applied to all member institutions within the Member States, the level playing field within 
a Member State would not be distorted. Moreover, as such companies and natural 
persons appear rather unlikely to have cross-border accounts, the effect on the cross-
border level playing field seems marginal.  
 
4.6.2.3 Depositor confidence  
The impact on depositor confidence is likely to differ across types of accounts and 
Member States and appears fairly limited.  
Under this NOD, businesses without legal personality would be affected in case of a pay-
out if they have deposits exceeding the standard coverage of EUR 100 000. In some 
cases (e.g. related to administration of heritage), the holders of the account cannot 
choose to disperse the funds into more than one account to increase the protection but 
would benefit from the protection applicable to THBs (NOD 4).  
 
4.6.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
The relevance of the NOD differs across Member States depending on the national law, 
such as potential alternative provisions and holdings beyond the covered amount on 
these accounts. Based on the information provided by banks, the NOD would seem to 
be particularly relevant in Belgium. 
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
Half of the Member States have transposed the NOD and, in this view, both full 
harmonisation (Option 4) or elimination (Option 2) of the NOD would appear in principle 
reasonable to explore.  
With EDIS in place, these two options would give rise to two outcomes at the opposite 
sides of the spectrum. While eliminating the NOD would translate into a higher financial 
exposure for the DGSs and EDIS, because such deposits would be considered as joint 
accounts (i.e. the limit of EUR 100 000 would apply to each depositor), the full 
harmonisation would mean the exact opposite, i.e. less financial exposure for the DGS 
and EDIS. In terms of administrative burden for EDIS, both retaining the NOD in its 
current form (Option 1) and harmonisation (Option 4) would not give rise to additional 
complexity related to differences among Member States because the national DGSs 
would remain responsible for the management of depositor claims. 
This study recommends therefore an alternative (Option 3), which could complement 
either Option 1 or 4. Under the alternative option, only businesses without legal 
personality that make profits would be treated as a single depositor in order to be put 
on an equal footing to incorporated SMEs. By contrast, other joint accounts (e.g. non-
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profit associations or co-ownership) would continue to benefit from the standard 
coverage for joint accounts and result in higher depositor confidence. 
 
4.6.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers retaining the current NOD. 
Effectiveness: This option would contribute to reducing the exposure of EDIS and 
improving the stability of the DGS. However, the NOD affects the depositor confidence 
to some extent. 
Efficiency: In the context of managing depositor claims, DGSs need to distinguish 
between standard joint accounts and those treated as single depositors. This includes 
dealing with potential legal challenges from depositors. Therefore, the NOD impacts 
efficiency. However, with EDIS in place, retaining the NOD would not give rise to 
additional complexity related to differences among Member States because the national 
DGSs would remain responsible for the management of depositor claims. 
Coherence: The differences in the treatment across Member States negatively impact 
the coherence of the system.  
Subsidiarity: Member States would retain their flexibility to decide on the treatment of 
joint accounts and on the relevant situations where the treatment as single depositor 
applies. 
 
4.6.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD. This means that all joint accounts 
would be subject to the same treatment, i.e. the maximum coverage under joint 
accounts without legal personality would depend on the number of account holders. 
Effectiveness: This option would result in higher covered deposits and hence higher 
exposure of the DGS and EDIS, relative to retaining the NOD in its current form. 
However, it would have a positive impact on depositor confidence. 
Efficiency: Eliminating the NOD would positively impact the execution of the pay-out 
because all joint accounts would be treated the same. This would simplify the task of 
the DGS in assessing when the exception from the coverage of joint accounts applies.  
Coherence: The same treatment of joint accounts across the Member States would 
increase the coherence of the system.  
Subsidiarity: The NOD is relevant for about half of Member States but does not seem to 
be used in practice. While this option impacts subsidiarity by limiting Member State 
discretion, in practice the impact would be fairly limited. 
 
4.6.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers applying the current NOD only to businesses without legal 
personality (leaving aside associations, etc.). This would achieve a level playing field 
between businesses without legal personality and SMEs that are considered as a single 
depositor. 
Effectiveness: This option would further nuance the derogation from the standard 
treatment of joint accounts, by defining more narrowly the account holders that should 
be treated as a single depositor. This would improve effectiveness by reducing the 
exposure of EDIS as compared to the option where all joint accounts are treated the 
same (Options 1 and 4). Accordingly, business associations, which make profits but 
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have no legal personality would be treated the same way as SMEs. By contrast, other 
joint accounts (e.g. non-profit associations) would benefit from the standard coverage 
for joint accounts, resulting in higher depositor confidence.  
Efficiency: Under this option, a narrower definition of a joint account treated as a single 
depositor would simplify the treatment of such accounts. This could reduce the 
administrative burden on the DGS as compared to Option 1.  
Coherence: This option would increase the coherence of the system, both across 
countries and in terms of treatment of depositors in similar situation.  
Subsidiarity: This option would reduce subsidiarity in the Member States. 
 
4.6.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers applying the current NOD in all Member States so that 
business partnerships without legal personality would be treated as single depositors. 
Effectiveness: This option would improve effectiveness by reducing the exposure of DGS 
and EDIS. It would also better achieve the equal treatment of depositors. Reducing the 
standard coverage otherwise applicable to joint accounts would, however, reduce 
depositor confidence to greater extent than under Option 3.  
Efficiency: Full harmonisation would impact efficiency. It would increase the burden on 
DGSs and member institutions when assessing the scope of the derogation from the 
standard treatment of joint accounts. However, with EDIS in place, such an approach 
would not give rise to additional complexity related to differences among Member States 
because the national DGSs would remain responsible for the management of depositor 
claims. 
Coherence: This option would positively impact the coherence of the system.  
Subsidiarity: Full harmonisation would limit Member State discretion as opposed to the 
current state of play.  
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4.7 NOD 7 – Set-off of depositor liabilities  
Summary: NOD 7 - Set-off of depositor liabilities 
DGSD [Article 7(5)] 
Member States are allowed to consider the due liabilities of the depositor against the 
bank when calculating the repayable amount. 
Transposed into national law [17 Member States] 
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain 
Practical experience so far [2 Member States] 
Cyprus and Ireland 
Importance 
Up to 5.9 % of covered deposits65 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk 
profile 
national 
DGS 
Level playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member States 
Overall + +/- +/- + 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current 
form  
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
[Recommended] 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness +/- +/- + + 
Efficiency - + - - 
Coherence - + + + 
Subsidiarity + - - - 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
Under Article 7(5) DGSD, Member States may decide to consider the liabilities of the 
depositor against the same member institution when calculating the repayable amount. 
Such a set-off is allowed only when liabilities have fallen due on or before the date on 
which the unavailability of deposits is determined. In addition, the provision is applicable 
only if it is part of the statutory and contractual provisions governing the contract 
between the member institution and the depositor. Depositors must be informed by the 
member institution prior to the conclusion of the contract that their liabilities towards 
                                           
65 The amount is based on the information provided by one DGS and fourteen large European banks, which 
provided amounts ranging between 0.0% and 5.9% of covered deposits. 
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the member institution will be considered when calculating the repayable amount. 17 
Member States66 have transposed this NOD in national law. 
 
4.7.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The main motivations for application of this provision include historical reasons and the 
objective to facilitate the insolvency procedures. 
Several Member States justified transposing the NOD by the need to facilitate the 
insolvency procedures. In Slovakia, the set-off of depositor liabilities speeds up the 
payment of compensation, while improving the effectiveness of the subsequent 
insolvency proceedings. In Slovenia, offsetting was considered beneficial to prevent 
enforcement actions concerning the funds owed by the depositor to the member 
institutions that could potentially be lengthy, costly and not economically viable. The 
application of the general rules on set-off under a general contract law would also be 
costly and lengthy. In Estonia, practical purposes, namely to avoid disputes, form the 
main motivation for the transposition. In Greece, the main reason for the application is 
to facilitate the process of repayment of overdue liabilities of depositors. 
Several Member States mentioned historical reasons stating that this requirement 
was already included in national legislation prior to the DGSD (e.g. Denmark, Estonia 
and Slovakia). 
 
4.7.1.2 Depositor liabilities subject to offsetting 
This NOD is typically broadly formulated in the transposing legislation and does not 
specify which liabilities are to be covered (i.e. whether the set-off is limited to certain 
types of deposits). The supervisory authority or the DGS would normally define which 
liabilities should be considered.  
In Belgium, the Ministry of Finance (i.e. the DGS) determines which obligations of the 
depositors should be considered in calculating the repayable amount depending on 
whether the set-off is statutory or contractual. As this varies across member institutions 
and contracts, when the Ministry conducted a stress test to assess the relevance of the 
provision, it turned out that the information about such deposit contracts was very 
limited. 
In Cyprus, the DGS gave some examples of the liabilities at stake during the pay-out of 
the FBME Bank, namely loans, overdrafts, credit card balances, hire purchase 
agreements and other financing were offset67.  
In Denmark, the national competent authority68 calculates the net compensation on 
behalf of the DGS. It shall determine the liabilities of depositors towards the institution, 
including loans, utilised credit commitments and guarantees, which are due to the failing 
member institution. 
In some Member States, exceptions to offsetting may derive from the application of the 
general rules of the Civil Code or Civil Procedure Code which usually apply to set-off. In 
                                           
66 I.e. Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
67 Announcement by the Management Committee of the Deposit Guarantee and Resolution of Credit and Other 
Institutions Scheme (‘DGS’) regarding the Compensation of Deposits at FBME Bank Ltd – Cyprus Branch 
(‘Fbme’), 14/06/2016.  
68 Finansiel Stabilitet is an independent public enterprise owned by the Danish state through the Ministry of 
Business and Growth, of which the Danish FSA (Finanstilsynet) is an integral part. The Danish FSA is the 
competent authority for bank resolutions and supervision. 
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general, the liabilities considered in the set-off are those due to the failing member 
institutions, in line with the wording of Article 7(3) DGSD which refers to the liabilities 
of depositors to the member institution and do not include liabilities to third parties, 
except for France and Spain. 
In Luxembourg and France, the legislation includes a general prohibition for offsetting. 
However, it enables offsetting (i) provided for in regulatory or legal provisions and (ii) 
deriving from the contract between the depositor and the member institution. In France, 
the offsetting covered by legal provisions is mainly of a temporary nature, and includes 
the different debits related to a payment card and debit premiums, recorded on the date 
when deposits are declared unavailable.  
In France and Spain, third-party claims towards a depositor can be set off against them 
when calculating the amount repayable from the DGS. In France, offsetting extends to 
the sums allocated to the creditor of a depositor69. In this case, the creditor, hence a 
third party, receives from the DGS an amount equal to the amount of the claim to the 
depositor up to the difference between the ceiling (EUR 100 000) and the compensation 
paid to that depositor. Contractual provisions governing the agreement between the 
member institution and the depositor can also provide for such a compensation. Those 
contractual provisions mainly concern legal entities and small traders and are linked to 
commercial considerations, as part of the mechanism for centralising cash and company 
accounts. In Spain, third-party claims are considered if the creditor makes a claim to 
the member institution. 
 
4.7.1.3 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
There are only a few concrete examples of practical experiences with this NOD. In 
Ireland, the DGS stated on their website in relation to the cases of the Rush Credit Union 
and the Charleville Credit Union that, in general, liabilities such as loans are not set off 
against deposits when calculating the DGS compensation. However, the Joint Provisional 
Liquidators, where entitled to do so, could set off arrears which have fallen due on or 
before the date of the liquidation. In practice, liquidators have set off liabilities before 
compensation was paid out on a case-by-case basis. 
The same also occurred in the case of FBME Bank Ltd in Cyprus70. No delay in payments 
in relation to set-offs was recorded, given the small number of loans concerned. 
In Spain, the DGS compensates all the debts due and payable at the moment of the 
pay-out. The set-off has to be established in the contract between the depositor and the 
member institution. As a result, the member institution directly applies this set-off when 
reporting the data to the DGS and includes it in the Single Customer View file. The 
depositor can contest the net amount by sending a disagreement letter. The Spanish 
DGS always tries to pay-out the depositors within the 7 working days period, even 
though there is a possibility to delay it (NOD 9). A procedure through a webpage is 
available to speed up the process. 
In Austria, the due liabilities are not considered in the calculation of covered deposits, 
but they should be taken into account in the pay-out. It emerged from the stress testing 
exercise that the depositors concerned would not go into the DGS’ automatic pay-out 
system. The DGS would have to contact the client, or vice versa, and both overdue 
amounts and loans would be considered. In practice, this could lead to a dispute 
                                           
69 Who is the holder of an enforceable title, who has seized and assigned the claim or notified the notice to 
the third-party holder or any similar act in the hands of the member institution before the date of declaring 
deposits unavailability, but has not been paid by that member institution before that date. 
70 In Cyprus basically all liabilities, including loans, overdrafts, credit card balances, hire purchase agreements 
or other financing become due. 
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between the depositor and the DGS. The simulations indicated that the effect on the 
DGS was less than 1 % of covered deposits. The main reason for the low number is that 
most depositors with overdue amounts and loans in practice did not have any covered 
deposits. 
Czechia did not transpose the NOD. However, it considered a similar provision at the 
time of the biggest pay-out case in 2003. In that case, it was calculated that the set-off 
represented less than 0.5 % of the total pay-out. In practice, given the short time 
available to prepare the pay-out file, member institutions decided not to consider the 
amounts due. Based on that experience, it was deemed reasonable not to apply set-offs 
any longer. 
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The set-off of claims and liabilities of a depositor to the member institution is likely to 
reduce the risk profile of the national DGS, while no significant impact should exist on 
the level playing field and depositor confidence. The relevance of the NOD for the 
Member States that have transposed the provision varies depending on the scope of the 
national implementation. 
 
4.7.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The set-off of claims and liabilities of individual depositors to the same member 
institution is likely to reduce the repayable amount in a pay-out as well as the claims of 
the DGS on the member institution to reclaim the repaid deposits in case of a pay-out 
event. In practice, if the set-off calculation is operated by the member institution, the 
task of the DGS would also be simplified. The amounts covered under the NOD seem to 
range between 0.0 % and 5.9 % based on the information provided by 1 DGS and 14 
large European banks.  
 
4.7.2.2 Level playing field 
The set-off would give a small advantage to the member institutions that also have 
claims on depositors, if the calculation of the liabilities contributed to reduce the amount 
of covered deposits. However, this does not appear to happen in practice.  
In addition, the cross-country impact of the provision is likely to be zero as a depositor 
is ultimately expected to receive the same net amount, unless the deposits are higher 
than the claims of the member institution on the depositor and above the standard 
coverage level of EUR 100 000 per depositor per bank. 
 
4.7.2.3 Depositor confidence  
Although a depositor should expect to receive the same net amount with or without the 
set-off, the set-off could affect depositor confidence. The rationale of having loans and 
deposits with the same member institution is primarily related to liquidity. The claims 
of the depositor on the member institution (current account, savings deposits, and term 
deposits) often have a shorter duration than the claims of the member institution on 
the depositor (mortgages, personal loans, etc.). The set-off of the claims might create 
short-term liquidity problems and thus a potential loss in confidence of depositors that 
have all their savings at a current account with the defaulted institution. However, in 
the case of due claims, the liquidity issue creates lesser concerns as those depositors 
often do not hold any or only limited amounts of deposits. 
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By contrast to this argument, in Denmark, the NOD is seen as a means to increase 
depositor confidence. As a general principle of property law, set-off ensures certainty 
and fair treatment, i.e. each depositor knows the amount (s)he owns and owes. In this 
respect, as mortgages can reside with separate institutions other than these where 
depositors hold their bank accounts, the due liabilities linked to mortgages are not 
necessarily relevant in the application of the NOD. 
 
4.7.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
The relevance of the NOD seems limited because: (i) only some contracts include the 
provision about the set-off; (ii) only certain types of due liabilities are considered for 
the set-off calculation; and, (iii) depositors with due liabilities relevant for the calculation 
are likely to have limited covered deposits, if any. These considerations seem in line 
with amounts based on one concrete experience in Czechia (prior to the DGSD) and the 
stress test exercise in Austria. 
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
With EDIS in place, this NOD would lower the financial exposure of the DGS or EDIS as 
the set-off could reduce the amount of covered deposits (i.e. due liabilities are deducted 
from the amount of the deposits). In addition, the NOD would not impact EDIS in terms 
of administrative burden because the settlement of depositor claims would remain in 
the competence of national DGSs. Indeed, the NOD increases the administrative burden 
for the DGSs and member institutions. 
However, the NOD, although transposed in more than half of Member States, appears 
to have limited relevance and has not been used in practice. Therefore, in view of the 
low materiality, the study recommends to eliminate the NOD (Option 2) in line with the 
main findings that the scope of the NOD is relatively limited. The set-off must be 
provided for in the contract between the depositor and the bank and the amounts 
involved are likely to be marginal. A depositor with due liabilities is unlikely to have 
available amounts of covered deposits that could be set off. The elimination of the NOD 
would also be beneficial for the DGSs in terms of reduced administrative burden that 
would otherwise be necessary to verify depositor contracts. Elimination would mean that 
the responsibility to recover the due amounts would be shifted to a liquidator in the 
insolvency procedure. This policy option would also ensure a level playing field as the 
depositor’s due amounts would be treated in the same way across Member States.  
 
4.7.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers retaining the current NOD in those countries that have 
transposed it. 
Effectiveness: This option would preserve effectiveness in Member States that 
implement the NOD with a view to facilitating insolvency procedures. 
Efficiency: In practice, the information required for the set-off (i.e. the assessment of 
the conditions) is the main impediment to comply with the 7 working days pay-out. For 
example, the analysis of overdue liability may take several days, subject to a possible 
legal challenge by a depositor in case of disagreement with the determination of the 
repayable amount. Currently, in some Member States, depositor liabilities vis-à-vis third 
parties could also be considered in the calculation (ES, FR), which adds to the complexity 
of the assessment. These considerations would lower the efficiency of this policy option.  
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Coherence: This option would impact coherence due to differences in the actual 
implementation of the NOD to the detriment of the harmonised treatment of depositor 
claims. 
Subsidiarity: This option would not impact subsidiarity.  
 
4.7.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD. This would mean that the due liabilities 
of a depositor would not be set off against the deposits. Accordingly, the depositors 
would first receive a repayment of the deposits up to EUR 100 000 and then be liable to 
pay their obligations towards the member institution in the insolvency procedure. 
Effectiveness: This option would to some extent impact the efficiency of insolvency 
proceedings as the failed institution would recover the due liabilities in the pay-out 
procedure. However, this would be largely dependent on the overall effectiveness of 
national insolvency regimes and has rather a remote link to depositor protection. It 
could be argued that if a depositor received a repayment of the covered deposits from 
the DGS, the failed institution would employ standard practices to recover the due 
amounts from debtors.  
At the same time, this option could potentially increase the financial exposure of the 
DGS or EDIS, i.e. result in higher pay-outs. However, it should be noted in this respect 
that, based on available information, the amounts related to the set off of due liabilities 
appear immaterial. 
Efficiency: This policy option would improve efficiency for the DGS by eliminating the 
need to carry out assessments of the conditions of the set-off. This option would also 
be beneficial in terms of reducing the costs and administrative burden of the DGSs, 
which would also remain responsible for the settlement of depositor claims with EDIS in 
place.  
Coherence: This option would improve the coherence of the regulatory framework by 
eliminating the difference as to the treatment of depositor claims across Member States.  
Subsidiarity: This option would negatively impact subsidiarity.  
 
4.7.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers an alternative approach complementing either retaining the 
NOD in its current form (Option 1) or full harmonisation (Option 4). It would modify the 
current provision so that the set-off would be limited to deposits placed on saving 
accounts, as opposed to current accounts. As the balances on current accounts, in 
principle, fulfil short-term payment obligations and expenses, such a modification could 
limit the potential short-term liquidity shortfalls that the set-offs could cause. If such 
depositors had funds on a savings account, the set-off would be performed to preserve 
its function to facilitate the insolvency proceedings. 
Effectiveness: This option would be beneficial for effective depositor protection.  
Efficiency: This option would reduce efficiency despite the fact that additional 
harmonisation would reduce differences in the implementation of the NOD. The main 
reason is that it would remain challenging for the DGSs to carry out an assessment 
whether particular deposits are on current or saving accounts. 
Coherence: This option would improve the coherence of the regulatory framework by 
eliminating the difference as to the treatment of depositor claims across Member States.  
Subsidiarity: This option would negatively impact subsidiarity.  
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4.7.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers extending the current NOD to all Member States. In practice, 
this would mean that the deposits would be set off against the overdue and contractually 
agreed claims of the member institution vis-à-vis the depositor. 
Effectiveness: This option would contribute to the objective of the uniform treatment of 
depositor claims and to facilitate the insolvency procedures. It may however create 
short-term liquidity issues for the depositors. 
Efficiency: This option would negatively affect efficiency in terms of increased 
administrative burden for the DGSs which would be liable to carry out assessments of 
the conditions of the set-off, being the main impediments to ensuring 7-day pay-outs. 
Coherence: This option would improve coherence by eliminating the differences in the 
implementation and practices across Member States.  
Subsidiarity: This option would negatively impact subsidiarity. 
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4.8 NOD 8 – Exclusion of deposits fulfilling a social purpose 
Summary: NOD 8 - Exclusion of deposits fulfilling a social purpose 
DGSD [Article 7(8)] 
Member States may decide that certain categories of deposits fulfilling a social 
purpose defined by national law, for which a third party has given a guarantee that 
complies with State aid rules, are not considered when aggregating the deposits held 
by the same depositor with the same member institution. 
Transposed into national law [1 Member State] 
France 
Practical experience so far [1 Member State] 
France 
Importance 
About 25 % of the covered deposits71 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national DGS 
Level 
playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member State 
Overall + +/- + + 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: Retain 
in current form 
[Recommended]  
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness + + + + 
Efficiency +/- - - + 
Coherence - +/- + - 
Subsidiarity + - + + 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
Under Article 7(8) DGSD, Member States may exclude certain categories of deposits 
when aggregating the deposits held by one single depositor with the same member 
institution. They must fulfil: (i) a social purpose defined by national law and (ii) a third 
party has given a guarantee compliant with State aid rules up to EUR 100 000.  
France transposed this NOD in order to cover three types of savings accounts: Livret A, 
the Livret Développement Durable et Solidaire (LDDS), and the Livret d’Epargne 
Populaire (LEP). A part of the deposits collected by the member institutions are 
transferred to a fund (Fond d’Epargne) used to finance social housing projects, urban 
development and local public investments. In addition, part of the fund is also invested 
in financial assets to generate the due interest payments on savings, and to guarantee 
                                           
71 The balances on the accounts eligible under this NOD amount to EUR 420 billion, which is equivalent to 
36% of the covered deposits under the French DGS. In practice, about 30% of these eligible deposits are non-
centralised and not covered by the DGS. This means that the NOD reduces the covered deposits by 
approximately EUR 300 billion, which is equivalent to about 25% of covered deposits under the French DGS. 
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the liquidity of the fund. All these deposits are regulated, have a fixed return and a 
maximum amount, and are tax exempt. The French state provides the guarantee for 
these deposits. 
 
4.8.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The Livret A are popular banking accounts. The main motivation for the exclusion of 
these deposits from DGS protection was historically to avoid a double guarantee because 
the centralised part of the deposits is guaranteed by the French state under the NOD. 
 
4.8.1.2 Deposits fulfilling a social purpose 
This NOD applies only to the part of the deposits placed on LEP and LDDS, Livret A which 
are centralised in a savings fund managed by the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations 
(CDC) and for which the French state offers a guarantee. This centralised part amounts 
to about 70 % of the total deposits (LEP, LDDS, Livret A)72. The other 30 % placed on 
such accounts is protected by the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de Résolution (FGDR, 
i.e. the French DGS) as part of standard deposit protection and should be aggregated 
with regular deposits. 
This implies that, due to the NOD, only the share of the deposits that are not centralised 
are included in the calculated covered deposits and contributions to the DGS. 
It should be noted that in practice most of these deposits have a quite low ceiling, i.e. 
EUR 12 000 for the LEP and LDDS and EUR 22 950 for Livret A, and no depositor can 
hold more than one of each type. The compensation of THBs (NOD 4) is not included in 
this calculation. 
 
4.8.1.3 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
Only France has used this NOD as it reflects its specific national system that provides a 
state guarantee for certain types of deposits. There is no record of a pay-out related to 
this NOD under the DGSD. 
However, in the event of a pay-out, the FGDR would manage the operations and cover 
the whole amount of relevant regulated savings, both for the centralised part and the 
remainder. The French state will then reimburse the DGS for the part that is centralised 
under the CDC. The reimbursement is done based on the information available in the 
Single Customer View (SCV) file. 
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The exclusion of deposits fulfilling a social purpose with a state guarantee is likely to 
have limited impact on the risk profile of the national DGS, limited impact on the level 
playing field and a positive impact on depositor confidence. The NOD is relevant only 
for France. 
 
                                           
72 Until 2008 all regulated savings were centralised. In 2009 the collection and centralisation of the regulated 
deposits was reformed in order to comply with EU rules. The reform included the possibility for commercial 
banks to distribute regulated deposits, and the reduction of the degree of centralisation. At that time, the 
government committed to a minimum rate of centralisation of 70%, calculated on the Livret A and LDDS. In 
practice this means that the actual amounts centralised may vary over time and across banks.  
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4.8.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
Given that member institutions contribute to the DGS based on the deposits that are 
covered by the DGS (non-centralised deposits), in principle the NOD does not have an 
impact on the risk profile of the DGS. In practice, given that the DGS would manage the 
pay-out of all regulated deposits including the centralised part protected by a state 
guarantee, the procedure of reimbursement may imply an extra administrative burden 
and potentially a liquidity risk. Moreover, the exclusion of the deposits reduces the 
contribution base for the DGS. 
 
4.8.2.2 Level playing field 
The existence of these deposits and the NOD itself do not distort the level playing field 
in France, as all member institutions are allowed, since 2008, to distribute these deposit 
accounts. Since the contributions of member institutions to the DGS are based on the 
share of deposits covered by the DGS, there is – in principle – no impact on the level 
playing field73. However, the level playing field is only slightly distorted from the 
perspective of depositors because the customers of French banks benefit from a slightly 
higher coverage level and from the perspective of banks from other Member States 
because the guaranteed deposits cannot be sold outside France. 
 
4.8.2.3 Depositor confidence  
As the purpose of the NOD is to avoid a double guarantee on a special category of 
deposits, the impact on depositor confidence should be positive. In practice, depositors 
are rather unlikely to be aware of the existence and of the precise implications of a 
centralised and non-centralised part, also due to the collective perception that such 
accounts are guaranteed by the state, as has been the case for decades. It is also likely 
that the FGDR is recognised as the institution that will intervene in case of a crisis, as 
this must be clearly stated to depositors every year by the bank managing the accounts. 
 
4.8.2.4 Relevance for respective Member State 
In France, the practice of placing deposits in special accounts that serve a special social 
purpose and enjoy a state guarantee has a very long tradition (CDC was created in 
1816) and is common throughout the population. This makes the NOD relevant both 
politically and financially.  
Politically, it reflects social preferences, practices and expectations, which are difficult 
to change without affecting people’s confidence in the financial system and state.  
Financially, the total size of the concerned deposits is very large. Total regulated 
deposits amounted to about EUR 420 billion74 at the end of 201875, of which 
approximately EUR 300 billion are centralised and benefit from the state guarantee76. 
This NOD makes it possible to exclude these approximately EUR 300 billion in 
                                           
73 By contrast, an impact exists on the banks’ contributions to the Single Resolution Fund, which are based 
on the total amount of savings, without excluding the centralised part. In this sense, French banks with 
regulated deposits in their balance sheet pay relatively more than other banks. 
74 For almost 90 million accounts (less than EUR 5,000 per account on average). 
75 55 million Livret A accounts representing a total of EUR 267 billion in deposits;  
8.5 million LEP accounts for a total of EUR 43 billion in deposits; 
24 million LDDS accounts for a total of EUR 107 billion in deposits. 
Observatoire de l’épargne réglementée (2019), Rapport annuel 2018. 
76 The remaining EUR 120 billion are not centralised and are recognised as covered deposits, covered by the 
DGS. 
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centralised deposits, equivalent to 25 % of the French covered deposits (as declared to 
the EBA). 
From the perspective of the DGS, the existence of the state guarantee is likely to be 
more an administrative complication than an advantage in terms of lower exposure. For 
the member institutions, the existence of such deposits may be a disadvantage when 
the contributions to the SRF are also considered77. 
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
Given the strong country-specific dimension because the transposition of the NOD is 
limited to only one Member State, the recommended option is to retain the NOD in its 
current form (Option 1). The NOD would not have any impact on the risk profile of EDIS 
because the relevant part of deposits (i.e. 70 %) covered by the NOD are, financially 
speaking, excluded from the DGS protection. From the perspective of the DGS, this 
approach reduces the depositor base and, hence, also the potential pooling benefits. 
This NOD could co-exist with EDIS because such deposits would be outside its scope.  
In addition, the alternative option (Option 3) could also be envisaged to the extent that 
it would contribute to a more coherent DGS at the cost of a slightly higher burden for 
the member institutions and DGS. Under this option, the deposits would be included in 
the covered deposits, but the member institutions would be rewarded with a lower 
contribution to the DGS. This would make the treatment somewhat similar to that of 
members of IPSs (NOD 17). 
 
4.8.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers retaining the current NOD in France, i.e. deposit accounts 
with a social purpose that are guaranteed by the French state would continue to be 
excluded from the DGS coverage. This option could co-exist with EDIS because such 
deposits would be outside its scope. 
Effectiveness: With a view to avoiding a double guarantee on certain deposits, excluding 
the deposits from the coverage does not impact the level of protection for depositors 
and does not impact the risk profile of the DGS, or potentially EDIS. However, the NOD 
contributes to retaining the direct link between member institutions and the national 
governments, which back the state guarantee.  
Efficiency: This option increases efficiency as the DGS and member institutions have to 
consider fewer deposits for determining the covered deposits. However, in the event of 
pay-out, the DGS also executes the repayments of the state-guaranteed deposits and 
is repaid by the government which increases its administrative burden. 
Coherence: This approach impacts the coherence of the EU framework because it 
maintains to some extent the direct link between member institutions and the national 
government. However, it is acknowledged that the main source of incoherence does not 
come from the option itself, but from the pre-existing French system of state-
guaranteed deposits, which has no equivalent in other Member States. 
Subsidiarity: This option does not impact subsidiarity because it takes into account the 
high degree of the country specificity. 
                                           
77 The centralised part of the deposits is reflected in the contributions to the SRF. Consequently, the target 
level of the SRF will be reduced (1% of covered deposits), while the contribution base (non-covered deposit 
liabilities) will be expanded. Overall, the benefit of the target level reduction is less than the corresponding 
contribution base. 
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4.8.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the current provision that allows Member States 
to exclude deposit accounts with a social purpose from the covered deposits. 
Effectiveness: The elimination of the NOD would not reduce the effective depositor 
protection because such deposits would be covered by the DGS instead of the state. 
Indeed, the inclusion of state-guaranteed deposits reduces the maximum amount of 
deposits covered to the regular coverage (EUR 100 000 per depositor per institution), 
i.e. the deposits guaranteed under the NOD are in practice additional to the regular 
covered deposits. 
Efficiency: From the perspective of member institutions, efficiency would deteriorate 
because costs for the member institutions would increase due to higher contributions to 
the DGS78. For the purposes of improved efficiency, the state guarantee would have to 
be eliminated.  
Coherence: In the context of this NOD, it is not straightforward that the elimination of 
national discretion improves the coherence of the regulatory framework across Member 
States. On the one hand, as the NOD aims to mitigate the impact of a Member State 
specificity under standard deposit protection, removing the NOD may lead to less 
coherence. On the other hand, the NOD reduces the contribution base for the DGS, 
increases the contagion risk between member institutions and governments and gives 
French depositors a potentially higher maximum coverage than depositors in other 
Member States. All in all, this option would improve coherence. 
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity. 
 
4.8.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
Under the alternative option, the deposits covered by the NOD would be included in the 
calculation of the covered deposits but the costs for member institutions would be 
mitigated by applying a significantly lower contribution and target level for these 
deposits. This would reflect the double guarantee and be in line with the lower 
contributions for low-risk sectors (NOD 16) and lower contributions for members of IPSs 
(NOD 17). Such adjusted contributions would primarily compensate the DGS for its 
contribution to a potential pay-out (e.g. liquidity and administration). 
Effectiveness: This option would not affect the covered amount for French depositors 
under the DGSD because the deposits fulfilling a social purpose would still be additional 
to the regular coverage (EUR 100 000 per depositor per institution). In practice, 
however, the potential additional coverage for the French deposits is limited79. The state 
would still have to cover losses on the centralised guaranteed deposits (70 % of deposits 
fulfilling a social purpose). The DGS would be compensated, through the extra 
contributions from the member institutions, for the management and pre-financing of 
the state-guaranteed deposits.  
Efficiency: This option would likely increase the burden for the DGS and member 
institutions in order to report and reflect the state-guaranteed deposits in the Single 
Customer View files and in the calculation of contributions, including the discount.  
                                           
78 However, their contributions to the SRF would be reduced. 
79 Holders have on average EUR 5 000 of these guaranteed accounts of which some part might be otherwise 
covered under the regular coverage and some part is not centralised (about 30%). 
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Coherence: This option would likely strengthen internal coherence because the DGS is 
compensated for its contribution under the NOD. 
Subsidiarity: This option would mitigate the impact on subsidiarity by recognising the 
importance of these deposits to French depositors.  
 
4.8.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers extending the current provision as included in Article 7(7) 
of the DGSD to all Member States. This option is de facto the same as retaining the NOD 
in its current form (Option 1), as these special deposits do not exist in other Member 
States. 
  
 Options and national discretions under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and their treatment in the 
context of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
91 
 
4.9 NOD 9 – Longer repayment period for certain deposits 
Summary: NOD 9 - Longer repayment period for certain deposits 
DGSD [Article 8(3)] 
Member States may decide that deposits referred to in Article 7(3) DGSD are subject 
to a longer repayment period, up to three months. This derogation concerns deposits 
for which the depositor is not the person entitled to the sums on the account, but 
another beneficiary, who needs to be identified or is identifiable before the date on 
which the pay-out occurs. 
Transposed into national law [22 Member States] 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK 
Practical experience so far [3 Member States] 
Czechia, Ireland and Luxembourg 
Importance 
Up to 2 % of covered deposits80 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national DGS 
Level 
playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member States 
Overall + + - +/- 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current form 
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
[Recommended] 
Effectiveness + - + + 
Efficiency + - + + 
Coherence + - + + 
Subsidiarity + -- + + 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
Under Article 8(3) DGSD, Member States may subject to a longer repayment period the 
deposits where the depositor is not absolutely entitled to the sums held in an account 
or where several persons are absolutely entitled (so-called beneficiary accounts). This 
longer repayment period cannot extend beyond three months after the relevant 
administrative authority has decided that the member institution is unable to repay or 
after a judicial authority has suspended the rights of depositors to make claims against 
a member institution. 22 Member States transposed this NOD. 
                                           
80 Generally, only limited information was available about the amounts covered under this NOD. Based on the 
information collected for Ireland, about 98% of the depositors were repaid within 15 working days in three 
recent pay-outs. The repayment was delayed in the remaining 2% of the cases because it was necessary to 
verify the identity and entitlement of the person claiming the unavailable deposit or the liabilities to be set-
off. 
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4.9.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The derogation concerns beneficiary accounts which are quite common and makes it 
possible to delay a repayment, if it is required for the identification of the beneficiary. 
In practice, the additional time allows the competent authority to verify the entitlement 
to the repayment and the validity of the claims. 
 
4.9.1.2 Starting date of the repayment period 
In most Member States, the starting date of the repayment period corresponds to the 
decision of the relevant administrative or judicial authority declaring the unavailability 
of deposits. In Germany and Slovenia, the repayment period starts on the day on which 
the competent administrative authority makes the determination of unavailability of the 
deposits. In France, the extended repayment period starts on the day on which the DGS 
has carried out processing operations or the necessary information has been received. 
This appears different from the starting point as set out in the DGSD. In Denmark, the 
3 months’ deadline for the pay-out of beneficiary accounts starts running from the date 
on which the restructuring or bankruptcy proceedings are initiated by the ruling of the 
court.  
 
4.9.1.3 Duration of the repayment period 
The majority of the Member States applies the maximum repayment period of 3 months 
specified in the DGSD. A few Member States apply a shorter duration. Slovakia provides 
for an additional period of 10 working days, with the prior consent of the National Bank 
of Slovakia. In Czechia, the transposing provision provides for a shorter repayment 
period of 15 working days from the date that the deposits could no longer be claimed 
from the member institution. In France, the repayment period is 20 working days from 
the day on which the processing operations have been carried out or the necessary 
information has been received. The shorter period may be due to the different starting 
points for the time limit, which under some circumstances could imply that the whole 
process of repayment would exceed the 3-month period set out in the DGSD.  
 
4.9.1.4 Types of deposits covered 
Member States can apply a longer repayment period to beneficiary accounts i) where 
another person than the depositor is entitled to the sums or ii) where several persons 
are entitled to those sums.  
In most Member States81, the longer repayment period applies in both situations where 
another person than the depositor is entitled to the sums, and where several persons 
are entitled to those sums82. In Denmark, for instance, the longer repayment also 
applies in cases where there is uncertainty as to the identity of the owner of the deposit 
in question. This includes cases where the deposit belongs to a person not registered as 
the holder, or who is not the only account holder83. In Slovenia, the NOD applies to 
‘depositors not autonomously or independently entitled to the repayment’, which 
corresponds to both deposits mentioned in Article 7(3) DGSD.  
                                           
81 E.g. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and the UK. 
82 The transposition measure often cross-refers directly to the measure transposing Article 7(3) or a similar 
provision. 
83 Travaux préparatoires accompanying the legislative proposal for Amending Act 334. 
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Some Member States limit the application of the NOD to specific types of accounts, but 
covering the two types of situations mentioned in Article 7(3).  
In Austria, the reference to a depositor not absolutely entitled to the sums held in an 
account concerns only trust and fiduciary accounts. The deposits on such fiduciary 
accounts should be considered proportionally for each trustee in the calculation of 
eligible deposits of individual depositors in accordance with the requirements applicable 
to the management of these deposits. The same interpretation prevails in Croatia. In 
Austria, this also applies to a trustee whose identity is not known to the bank provided 
that such a trustee can prove his claim to the DGS. The lack of a bank’s knowledge 
about the identity may be based on the application of simplified customer due diligence 
procedures in accordance with anti-money laundering rules, or other federal 
government regulations that may justify the refusal to disclose the identity of the trustee 
in relation to the bank. Those trusts are to be considered in the calculation of eligible 
deposits of individual depositors only from the moment the trustee has proven their 
claim against the DGS. 
In Czechia, the NOD applies to deposits with several beneficiaries, where the funds are 
entrusted to certain entities (namely payment institutions, small-scale payment service 
providers, electronic money institutions, or small-scale electronic money issuers) to 
execute a payment transaction or against the receipt of which electronic money have 
been issued. It also applies to bailiff accounts84, where funds are consigned for eligible 
and registered creditors pursuant to the Execution Code and to accounts entrusted to 
investment firms on which the funds are constituted by the client’s assets pursuant to 
Act No 526/2004 on Business Activities on the Capital Market.  
In Estonia, the relevant accounts concern deposits held by notaries and bailiffs (those 
types of accounts are mandatory for certain transactions under Estonian law). Deposit 
accounts of notaries also fall within the category of accounts where the depositor is not 
absolutely entitled to the sums.  
In Spain, the NOD applies to accounts with one or more beneficiaries, provided that 
they have been identified before the member institution is declared unable to repay its 
deposits.  
Finland adopted a broad understanding of this longer repayment period, by treating 
without distinction (and within the 3-month period) situations where: i) the depositor’s 
entitlement to the deposits is unclear; ii) where the depositor’s rights have been limited 
by way of a decision by an authority; iii) when the account has not been used within the 
last 24 months; iv) where the claim of the depositor is paid in full (extended coverage 
such as THBs); or v) where the deposit concerns a deposit made to a foreign branch.  
In France and Luxembourg, the longer repayment period applies to both accounts with 
beneficiaries and deposits benefitting from the extended coverage such as THBs. In 
Luxembourg, however, the starting point of the repayment period for Article 6(2) DGSD 
types of deposits differs from the one for Article 7(3) DGSD types of deposits (three 
months from the time when the depositor has provided the DGS with the information 
necessary to determine the amount repayable).  
In Slovakia, the DGS has a discretion, if justified and with the prior consent of the 
National Bank of Slovakia, to extend the repayment period in relation to beneficiaries 
which claim the repayment of an unavailable deposit, except for depositors with 
authorised representatives or commissioned persons of national competent authorities 
from other Member States.  
In Belgium, the longer repayment period applies to beneficiary accounts, not mentioning 
situations where several persons are entitled.  
                                           
84 Deposits held by bailiffs are accounts where funds received from debtors are held before being transferred 
to the creditors who are using the services of the bailiff. 
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In the Netherlands, the NOD applies to the situation in which a person entitled to receive 
the DGS repayment is a third party. In this case, the third party would be considered 
eligible for repayment and should be repaid within three months, unless the identity of 
the third party could not be established before the decision of the DNB to trigger DGS 
or the judicial ruling. No maximum timeframe has been set for this type of situation.  
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Slovakia have adopted a broader 
application of the longer repayment, by leaving greater discretion to the DGS. 
Sometimes, the DGS also have discretion to defer the repayment when setting off the 
depositor liabilities (NOD 7). In Cyprus, the transposing provision applies only to joint 
accounts. 
 
1.1.1.1 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
Most Member States85 reported that the NOD has not been used in practice so far.  
In Luxembourg, longer delays in pay-outs have been noted in order to verify the 
eligibility for repayment under anti-money laundering rules and under the exclusion of 
financial institutions. The reasons for delay were not linked to the identification of the 
beneficiary. 
In Ireland, the average duration of pay-outs is 15 working days (98 % of the depositors 
in 3 pay-outs). Only 2 % of the depositors were repaid after 15 working days because 
it was necessary to verify the identity and entitlement of the person claiming the 
unavailable deposit or the set-off of the due liabilities, i.e. the longer repayment period 
applied for both Article 7(3) accounts and Article 7(5) DGSD on depositor liabilities set-
off (see NOD 7). 
In Czechia, the longer repayment period applies to accounts where the funds held are 
entrusted to certain entities (namely payment institutions, small-scale payment service 
providers, electronic money institutions, or small-scale electronic money issuers). In the 
pay-out regarding the ERB Bank, the repayment of the basic compensations started 9 
days after the determination of unavailable deposits86.  
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The longer repayment period for certain deposits has marginal impact on the risk profile 
of the DGS and on depositor confidence because such deposits would be paid out in any 
case once the verification is complete. 
 
4.9.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The longer repayment period would have marginal impact on the risk profile of the DGS 
as such deposits would be paid out in any case once the verification is complete and the 
amounts involved are limited. The NOD contributes to reducing the risk of payments to 
ineligible depositor and, hence, also the risk of potential legal disputes between the DGS 
and the depositor (both the eligible and wrongfully paid). 
 
4.9.2.2 Level playing field 
The impact on the level playing field is expected to be nil both domestically and cross-
border. Domestically, the extension of the payment period has the same impact on all 
                                           
85 E.g. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden. 
86 In that case, the DGS confirmed that it had not initiated repayment of deposits entrusted with payments 
institutions or electronic money institutions owned by the clients of ERB Bank, because according to the 
information submitted to the DGS, no such deposits were maintained with the bank. 
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member institutions. The cross-border impact is also likely limited as most of the 
account holders to which this NOD applies, such as notaries, have in practice almost 
always domestic accounts. 
 
4.9.2.3 Depositor confidence  
The longer repayment period could to some extent increase uncertainty about the 
repayment among the entitled persons. However, the negative impact on depositor 
confidence would rather be marginal as depositors know they would be paid out in any 
case once the verification is complete. The possibility to request an interim payment 
(once the beneficiary has proven to be such) reduces this negative impact further. 
 
4.9.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
Only limited information from the DGSs was available. Most DGSs explicitly mentioned 
that in practice the repayment period would be kept as short as possible and that the 
deadline of 3 months addresses a situation where the DGS is unable to repay earlier 
due to the complexity of the case.  
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
Given the large number of Member States that transposed the provision and in the 
absence of more practical experience with the NOD, full harmonisation appears as the 
most sensible option (Option 4) because complex cases may require additional time for 
verification of depositor claims. At the same time, the NOD provides for a maximum 
time limit in which the claim must be assessed, which increases depositors’ legal 
certainty. DGSs should in any case retain the possibility to repay the depositor earlier 
than upon expiry of the maximum time limit as long as they have sufficiently verified 
the claims. With EDIS in place, this would not give rise to additional complexity because 
the national DGSs would remain responsible for the management of depositor claims. 
 
4.9.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form  
This policy option considers retaining the current NOD.  
Effectiveness: This option would ensure that DGSs have enough time to verify the 
eligible depositors in complex cases. It provides a good balance between a period that 
is too long, possibly affecting depositor confidence in the system, and too short, not 
allowing DGS enough time to verify claims in complex cases. 
Efficiency: This option would positively impact efficiency by giving the DGSs enough 
time to examine complex cases. With EDIS in place, this would not give rise to additional 
complexity because the national DGSs would remain responsible for the management 
of depositor claims. 
Coherence: This option would contribute to the coherence of the system, balancing the 
need for faster pay-outs and the need to assess complex cases by including a maximum 
time limit during which the depositor claims must be assessed.  
Subsidiarity: This option would not impact subsidiarity by giving Member States 
sufficient flexibility to deal with complex cases. 
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4.9.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD. This would mean that all repayments 
would be done in a 7-day pay-out including in complex cases, involving beneficiary 
accounts.  
Effectiveness: This option would not ensure enough time for DGSs to assess complex 
cases. The same would be true under EDIS where the DGSs remain competent for 
assessment of the claims.  
Efficiency: This option would not reflect the policy objective to ensure enough time for 
DGS to assess the eligible claims. The maximum time limit ensures that depositors have 
enough legal certainty about receiving the repayment. 
Coherence: Faster pay-out in all cases would make the system more coherent but would 
not meet the objective to account for complex cases.  
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity.  
 
4.9.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers harmonising the provision regarding the longer payment 
(Option 4) and complementing it with the obligation to provide an interim payment to 
depositors to avoid their not having sufficient financial means for immediate needs. 
Effectiveness: This option would increase effectiveness. It assumes full harmonisation 
under which national DGSs would continue to defer the repayment to ascertain the 
identity of the entitled beneficiaries in order to reduce the risk of repayments to ineligible 
depositors across the EU. In addition, the possibility of an interim payment could 
mitigate the negative impact of the potential repayment delay on depositor confidence. 
Efficiency: This option would positively impact efficiency, relative to the baseline. As the 
process of identification of the entitled beneficiaries can be burdensome, there could be 
synergies in applying the same approach in all Member States in order to reduce 
potential costs associated with wrongful payments. By contrast, the possibility to 
request the interim payment would to some extent reduce efficiency as it increases the 
potential burden in administering such claims. 
Coherence: The existence of the same period of repayment and interim payment across 
Member States would contribute to better coherence.  
Subsidiarity: This option would not impact subsidiarity as Member States would be 
allowed to repay earlier upon the verification of claims.  
 
4.9.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers extending the current NOD to all Member States, which 
means that the NOD would no longer be an option. 
Effectiveness: This option would increase effectiveness. It assumes full harmonisation 
under which national DGSs would continue to defer the repayment to ascertain the 
identity of the entitled beneficiaries in order to reduce the risk of repayments to ineligible 
depositors across the EU. In addition, the DGS would in any case maintain the possibility 
to repay earlier upon verification of claims. 
Efficiency: This option would positively impact efficiency. As the process of identification 
of the entitled beneficiaries can be burdensome, there could be synergies in applying 
the same approach in all Member States in order to reduce potential costs associated 
with wrongful payments. 
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Coherence: The existence of the same period of repayment and interim payment across 
Member States would contribute to better coherence.  
Subsidiarity: This option would not impact subsidiarity as Member States would be 
allowed to repay earlier upon the verification of claims.  
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4.10 NOD 10 – Deadline on validity of repayment claims 
Summary: NOD 10 – Deadline on validity of repayment claims 
DGSD [Article 9(3)] 
Member States may limit the time during which depositors whose deposits were not 
repaid or acknowledged by the DGS within the deadlines set out in Article 8(1) and 
(3) can claim the repayment of their deposits. 
Transposed into national law [20 Member States] 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia 
Practical experience so far [2 Member States] 
Belgium and Cyprus 
Importance 
Up to 0.2 % of covered deposits87 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk 
profile 
national 
DGS 
Level 
playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member States 
Overall + +/- - +/- 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current 
form  
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
[Recommended] 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness - + + + 
Efficiency - - + + 
Coherence - +/- + + 
Subsidiarity + - +/- +/- 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
20 Member States transposed the NOD. However, there are large differences between 
Member States in the way the NOD has been transposed. The main differences concern 
(i) the nature of the claims, ii) the starting point from which a claim may be submitted, 
and iii) the limitation of the duration in which a claim may be submitted. 
In most Member States, the provision sets a deadline for depositors to contest the 
decision of the DGS not to repay their deposits before a court, therefore limiting in time 
their legal claim against the DGS for repayment. 
                                           
87 There is limited public information on the share of the deposits repaid after the initial pay-outs. The indicated 
amount is based on the Optima Bank case in Belgium. Based on this case, only 0.2% of the covered deposits 
remained unclaimed after 1 year. 
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Hungary did not transpose the NOD and the obligation of the DGS to pay out is not 
limited in any way. The DGS had 17 pay-outs in the last 25 years and there are still 
depositors with outstanding claims dating back 15 years because the DGS was unable 
to identify the depositor due to an address change or because the depositor passed 
away. In practice, more than 99 % of the covered deposits is repaid within 20 days and 
the share of such unpaid covered deposits is small. Currently, there is an ongoing 
discussion in Hungary about transposing the provision.  
Austria indicated that the DGS is committed to repay the covered deposit even if the 
time limit expires, e.g. more than 5 years after the institution failed.  
 
4.10.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The main reasons for transposing the NOD are the legal certainty, common-law 
limitation period, proper conduct of restructuring or bankruptcy proceedings and 
historical reasons.  
The NOD ensures legal certainty for both the DGS and depositors by introducing a time 
limit for the possibility to claim repayment. 
In some Member States, a limitation for depositor claims considers the objective of the 
proper conduct of the pay-out procedure and the restructuring or bankruptcy 
proceedings (e.g. Denmark). A limitation period between 2 and 5 years on average was 
considered reasonable for the finalisation of the procedures (i.e. the official closing of a 
bank pay-out process, the necessary time for depositors to claim repayment of their 
deposits) (e.g. Greece) or to undertake any actions aimed at clarifying doubts as to the 
correctness of the payment process (e.g. Poland).  
Some Member States have used general limitation periods for submitting a judicial claim 
in banking matters. For example, in France there is a general civil law prescription for 
actions in banking matters under which depositors may claim repayment within 2 years. 
This gives depositors enough time to become aware of the repayment.  
Several Member States also invoked historical reasons, i.e. the time limit was already 
applicable under the previous legislation on deposits guarantee (e.g. Belgium, Czechia 
and Germany). In Slovenia, a 3-year limitation period existed under the previous 
legislation but was applied to cases of ‘serious medical or other demonstrable reason’ 
proving that the person in question could not exercise their right to compensation. 
Slovakia also decided to maintain the existing limitation period, without requiring a 
motivated justification from the depositor. 
 
4.10.1.2 Nature of the claims  
In most Member States88 depositors are legally entitled to request a payment from the 
DGS within a limited period. This does not, however, exclude the possibility for the DGS 
to internally review the decision. For example, in France, the legislation provides for two 
different limitation periods, one for internal (ex gratia) appeals, which must be 
submitted to the DGS within two months, and one for a judicial appeal before the 
administrative court. The judicial nature of the claim also explains its length: the 
deadline for submitting a claim ranges from 2 to 10 years. 
By contrast, 4 Member States89 have followed a different approach, by requiring 
depositors to address the claim for repayment directly to an administrative authority. 
                                           
88 E.g. Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia. 
89 I.e. Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark and Slovakia. 
 Options and national discretions under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and their treatment in the 
context of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
100 
 
These claims are subject to an administrative review of the DGS pay-out decision and 
do not affect the possibility to submit a judicial claim against the DGS, within the general 
deadline applicable to similar claims. In these Member States, depositors can submit a 
request to the conservator, temporary administrator liquidator and special manager, 
liquidator, temporary trustee or trustee in bankruptcy (e.g. Bulgaria), or to the Financial 
Supervisory Authority, which acts on behalf of the DGS (e.g. Denmark), or to the DGS 
(Belgium and Slovakia).  
When the claim is of an administrative nature, the duration of the limitation period is 
typically much shorter, as it is seen as a procedure preceding a legal challenge in court. 
One exception to this principle is relevant for Slovakia, where the limitation period for 
submitting a repayment claim to the DGS is traditionally much longer (3 years). 
 
4.10.1.3 Starting point for submitting a claim 
In most Member States90, the deadline starts running from the determination of 
unavailable deposits (starting day of a pay-out procedure)91. Some of these Member 
States have also provided for derogations postponing the starting point of the deadline 
if the depositor can justify an inability to claim their right to repayment (e.g. Denmark 
and France). In France, the starting point of the limitation period for contesting the DGS 
decision in an administrative court also depends on the previous introduction of an 
internal administrative review. Where such an administrative appeal has been 
submitted, the limitation period for judicial review starts running from the notification 
of the new decision of the DGS. In a few Member States, the deadline can be either 
postponed (e.g. Latvia and Slovenia) or interrupted (e.g. Czechia and Italy) by the 
initiation of other legal proceedings (i.e. when the deposit is subject to criminal 
proceedings or restrictive measures from national governments or international 
organisations) or when the depositor is not absolutely entitled to the sums held in an 
account (e.g. Czechia and Latvia92).  
In some Member States, the limitation period starts when the depositor or the person 
entitled to repayment is legally presumed to become aware of the pay-out event, i.e. 
the official publication of the decision on the unavailability of the deposits (e.g. Croatia 
and Slovenia), the notification to the person entitled to the deposit (e.g. Germany), or 
when the Fund published the deadline on its website (e.g. Belgium). 
Finally, in Greece, the limitation period starts upon the expiry of the deadlines set out 
in Article 8(1) and (3) DGSD, i.e. the end of the repayment period. 
 
4.10.1.4 Duration of the limitation period for submitting a claim 
Where Member States opted for a general limitation period of the legal entitlement of 
depositors to request a payment, the deadline is either 2 years, 3 years, or 5 years (see 
Table 4.6). In Luxembourg, the period lasts up to 10 years. In Romania, where 
bankruptcy proceedings of the failed member institutions can last more than 5 years, 
the right to receive payment of compensation shall be prescribed on the date of the 
closing of bankruptcy procedures, which means that the duration of the limitation period 
can exceed 5 years. In Czechia, limitation period was reduced from 5 to 3 years since 
the implementation of the DGSD but the NOD has not been used in practice. Based on 
                                           
90 E.g. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
91 No information could be found for Portugal, as the legislation does not specify the starting point, and no 
pay-out event has occurred since 2010. 
92 In Latvia, the suspension of the limitation period only applies if the right of the person to the deposit is 
subject to a legal dispute. 
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previous experience, about 99.8 % of covered deposits are repaid within the standard 
repayment period.  
 
Table 4.5 Duration of general limitation period for submitting a claim 
Duration Member States 
2 years Cyprus, France, Malta 
3 years Croatia, Czechia, Estonia 
5 years Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania 
(5+ years), Slovenia 
10 years Luxembourg 
Source: CEPS-Milieu elaboration 
 
In some cases, such a limitation period also applies to all claims related to compensation 
rights (e.g Estonia), to all actions in banking matters (e.g. France and Portugal) or the 
common-law deadline for civil judicial claims in general (e.g. Italy and Slovenia).  
In the Member States with a deadline for an administrative review of the DGS’ decision, 
the limitation period varies between 2 months (i.e. France), 3 months (i.e. Bulgaria) 
and 3 years (i.e. Slovakia). In Belgium, the DGS has discretion to set up a maximum 
period within which depositors can claim repayment, depending on the circumstances 
of the case. In Denmark, claims submitted after the 4 months’ deadline can still be 
accepted, unless the delay is not justifiable. The Supervisory Authority has full discretion 
for assessing the ‘justifiable’ nature of the delay. 
Italy has two general limitation periods in civil law of 5 and 10 years, but the 5 years’ 
prescription was considered more reasonable in this case. Slovenia also applies a 
limitation period of 5 years, in the absence of other legal regulations.  
The duration appears to balance the need to provide enough time for the depositors to 
gather information on their rights and evidence to support their claims and the necessity 
to limit, at least to some extent, the duration of the fund's financial exposure. For 
example, Romania took into account the duration of a usually lengthy bankruptcy 
proceedings, in order to extend the time available for a depositor to claim compensation 
and to guarantee full and complete protection. 
 
4.10.1.5 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
2 Member States reported to have practical experience with the NOD93. The option was 
used in the Belgian Optima Bank case. While the limitation period is subject to the DGS’ 
discretion, the end of the limitation period was postponed several times to eventually 
reach one year. Based on this experience, only 0.2 % of cases were not closed within 1 
year. In Cyprus, the NOD was used in FBME Bank Ltd case. According to the Central 
Bank, all the covered deposits were repaid within the 2-year period. The deadline for 
claiming repayment is still ongoing in the pay-out events that have occurred only 
recently in other Member States (e.g. Croatia, Hungary, Luxembourg and Lithuania). 
 
                                           
93 No information is available regarding the repayment of deposits in the Bulgarian KTB (Corporate Commercial 
Bank) case although this case entailed delays in pay-outs, mainly due to the late decision of the Central Bank 
to withdraw the licence of the member institutions. 
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Table 4.6 National application of the NOD 
Country Duration Recipient of 
the claim 
Starting point 
Belgium Determined 
by the DGS  
DGS  As soon as the Fund has published the 
deadline on its website 
Bulgaria 3 months conservator, 
temporary 
administrator 
or special 
manager, 
liquidator, 
temporary 
trustee or 
trustee in 
bankruptcy 
From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable 
Croatia 3 years Ultimately 
Court 
Publication of the fact that the insured 
event occurred in the ‘Official Gazette’ 
Cyprus 2 years Ultimately 
Court  
From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable  
Czechia 3 years Ultimately 
Court 
From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable, unless the 
repayment is suspended, pursuant to 
criminal proceedings, restrictive 
measures from national governments 
or international organisations, or 
when it is not sure who is entitled to 
repayment 
Denmark 4 months Finansiel 
stabilitet 
(Supervisory 
authority) 
From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable, unless the 
depositor or investor can justify that 
they have been unable to claim their 
right to repayment and the claim is 
submitted within a justifiable delay 
Estonia 3 years94  Civil Court From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable 
France 2 years95 Administrative 
Court 
From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable or when the 
depositor was informed (the burden 
of the proof lays on the depositor, 
who should demonstrate that he was 
not aware of the unavailability of the 
funds until this moment) 
Germany 5 years Ultimately 
Court 
After notification of the depositor 
about the fact that the credit 
institution is unable to repay deposits 
Greece 5 years Court of 
Athens 
After the expiry of the deadlines set 
out in Article 8(1) and (3) 
Italy 5 years96 Ultimately 
Court 
From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable. The period of 
limitation is interrupted by the 
                                           
94 Common law for claims related to compensation rights. 
95 Common civil law prescription of all actions in banking matters. 
96 One of the prescription periods under the Italian civil law. 
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Country Duration Recipient of 
the claim 
Starting point 
institution of legal proceedings or 
recognition of the right by the deposit 
guarantee fund (i.e. when the 
deposits have been declared 
unavailable) 
Latvia 5 years Ultimately 
Court 
From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable or after the 
circumstances for the refusal to pay 
the guaranteed compensation have 
expired after a Court’s decision  
Lithuania 5 years97 Courts of 
general 
jurisdiction 
From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable 
Luxembourg 10 years Ultimately 
Court  
From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable 
Malta 2 years Ultimately 
Court 
From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable 
Poland 5 years Ultimately 
Court 
From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable  
Portugal 5 years98 Court  No information as the law does not 
specify the starting point 
Romania 5 years Ultimately 
Court 
From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable. 
In case the bankruptcy proceedings of 
the credit institution exceeds the limit 
of 5 years, the right to receive 
payment of compensation shall be 
prescribed on the date of the closing 
of bankruptcy procedures 
Slovakia 3 years DGS From the date the deposits are 
determined unavailable 
Slovenia 5 years99 General Court The publication of the decision on 
unavailability of deposits, unless the 
person entitled to repayment is 
determined by a decision of a Court, 
where the limit starts from the 
moment the decision becomes final 
Note: Information could not be verified regarding the Netherlands100 and Ireland.  
Source: CEPS-Milieu elaboration 
 
                                           
97 Probably general law prescription, as the claims shall be dealt with by the courts of general jurisdiction 
according to the procedure laid down in laws. 
98 General prescription time for administrative offences under the Legal Framework of Credit Institutions and 
Financial Companies. 
99 Common law prescription. 
100 It is not clear from the legislation whether there is a time limit for contesting the claim. Under the Dutch 
law, during 3 months after the notice of application of the deposit guarantee scheme, depositors can 
communicate in writing or by logging on to a website designed for this purpose that compensations that have 
been made available are paid out. This could suggest that upon expiry of this period, the depositor would lose 
their right to repayment and the DGS would instead be likely to apply an approach favourable to the depositor.  
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 Impact of the NOD 
The limitation period for depositors’ claims for repayment is beneficial for legal certainty 
for both the DGSs and depositors. From an operational point of view, it would be 
desirable that the DGSs do not have cases pending over many years. In practice, the 
existence of a fixed term could result in lower amounts in pay-outs for the DGSs, but 
such (positive) effects would likely be marginal because the vast majority of pay-outs 
is paid out during the repayment period. In terms of depositor confidence, the limitation 
period could have a negative effect, in particular if the duration is too short, e.g. 4 
months like in Denmark, unless the depositor is able to justify their inability to seek the 
repayment. Despite the existing fragmentation among Member States, the effect on the 
level playing field would be marginal as nearly all deposits are in practice claimed within 
the standard repayment period.  
 
4.10.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The NOD has a positive impact on the risk profile. The limitation period could in principle 
result in a lower amount of pay-outs. However, based on the feedback from Member 
States, the vast majority of claims is repaid during the standard repayment period. In 
theory, the amount that is not claimed due to the time limit would largely depend on 
the level of awareness of the depositors and complexity involved in claiming their 
deposits. Sometimes depositors are pro-actively approached and, in many Member 
States, information campaigns are undertaken to ensure that depositors have the right 
information to claim their covered deposits. 
 
4.10.2.2 Level playing field 
The NOD does not seem to impact the level playing field as nearly all deposits are in 
practice claimed within the standard repayment period after the deposits have been 
declared unavailable. In addition, the use of the NOD depends on the awareness of 
depositors about the existing limitation periods. Those who are not aware are also 
unlikely to change to another bank in a Member State which applies a longer limitation 
period.  
 
4.10.2.3 Depositor confidence  
Depositor confidence could be reduced in the event that depositors are unable to claim 
their deposits because the limitation periods are too short. While only few Member 
States have short limitation periods (e.g. 3 months in Bulgaria or 4 months in 
Denmark101), others enable depositors to claim the repayment during at least 2 years, 
which often corresponds to the general limitation periods in the civil law. As long as 
there is sufficient time to claim the deposits, the negative impact on confidence in the 
system should be mitigated.  
 
4.10.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
The NOD is relevant in the context of pay-out events. Some Member States can be 
singled out because of relatively short limitation periods.  
 
                                           
101 In Denmark, claims submitted after the limitation period has expired could still be accepted if the delay is 
considered justifiable.  
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 Options in the context of EDIS  
The limitation period in relation to the validity of depositor claims for repayment 
increases legal certainty for both the DGS and depositors. It should achieve that, on the 
one hand, depositors have sufficient time to claim their deposits in cases where they 
have not become instantly aware about the pay-out and, on the other hand, avoid that 
the DGS has pending depositors’ files for many years. Given that most Member States 
transposed the NOD and in view of mainly operational benefits of the NOD for the DGSs, 
either the alternative option (Option 3) complementing the current NOD or, to a lesser 
extent, also full harmonisation (Option 4) would appear as the most sensible options. 
The modification to the current NOD would consist in providing for one single limitation 
period of 3 years in which depositors would be able to claim the deposits. This would 
safeguard the effectiveness of the deposit insurance and reduce the existing 
fragmentation across Member States, while allowing the DGSs to close the outstanding 
repayment cases within a reasonable time frame.  
With EDIS in place, the national DGSs would remain responsible for the management of 
depositor claims. However, Options 3 and 4 would also be beneficial in order to reduce 
potential complexity resulting from the fragmentation among Member States on the 
disbursement of funds between EDIS and the national DGS.  
 
4.10.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers retaining the current NOD and allowing Member States to 
provide for the limitation period for the validity of repayment claims. 
Effectiveness: This option would negatively impact effectiveness due to fragmentation 
among Member States that apply different limitation periods, which are sometimes too 
short. This has negative effects on depositor confidence.  
Efficiency: This option would maintain the fragmentation among Member States, which 
could prove complex in the system based on the disbursement of funds between EDIS 
and national DGSs.  
Coherence: The existence of different limitation periods, which are sometimes too short, 
for the validity of the repayment claims would severely affect the coherence of the 
system.  
Subsidiarity: This option would not impact subsidiarity.  
 
4.10.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD. This means that there would be no 
limitation period for the validity of the repayment claims and the claims for repayment 
could be filed even many years after the pay-out event. 
Effectiveness: This option would positively impact depositor confidence. Under EDIS, 
the depositor would be entitled to claim the repayment at any time.  
Efficiency: This option would impact efficiency in terms of increased administrative costs 
and prove complex in the system based on the disbursement of funds between EDIS 
and national DGSs.  
Coherence: This option would marginally improve the coherence of the system. While 
the depositor would be entitled to claim the repayment at any time, there would still be 
differences between national procedures, which make the system based on the 
disbursement of funds between EDIS and national DGSs too complex.  
Subsidiarity: This option impacts subsidiarity as Member States would not be able to 
provide for a limitation period. 
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4.10.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers full harmonisation, which would introduce one single 
limitation period of 3 years, starting from the determination of unavailable deposits. In 
addition, the limitation period would be extended if considered justifiable by the DGS. 
This option would increase legal certainty for both the DGS and depositors and reduce 
the existing fragmentation among Member States.  
Effectiveness: This option would positively impact depositor confidence because the 
limitation period of 3 years would appear sufficient to enable nearly all depositors to 
claim the repayment. This approach would also address the issue that some Member 
States seem to have too short limitation periods. 
Efficiency: This option would increase efficiency by reducing the fragmentation among 
Member States and would be beneficial for the system of disbursement of funds between 
EDIS and national DGSs when settling depositor claims. From an operational 
perspective, also under EDIS, DGSs would remain responsible for settling depositor 
claims and managing the pending depositor files within a limited period of time.  
Coherence: This option would improve the coherence of the system.  
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity, but would reflect the existing 
practice in most Member States that currently have limitation periods ranging from 2 to 
5 years.  
 
4.10.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers introducing one harmonised time limit of 5 years for claiming 
the repayment of deposits from the DGS. The considerations stated under option 3 are 
fully applicable for this option.  
Effectiveness: This option would positively impact depositor confidence because the 
limitation period of 5 years is sufficiently long to enable depositors to claim repayment. 
This approach would also address the issue that some Member States seem to have too 
short limitation periods. 
Efficiency: This option would increase the efficiency by reducing the fragmentation 
among Member States and increase legal certainty for both DGSs and depositors.  
Coherence: This option would improve the coherence of the system.  
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity, but would be on the upper-side of 
the range of existing limitation periods that most Member States currently have (2 to 5 
years).  
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5 Contributions and available financial means 
This section provides a comprehensive overview of each of the NODs related to 
contributions and available means on the implementation. It does so by: i) assessing 
the implementation of the NOD across Member States; ii) estimating the impact of the 
NOD on the risk profile of the national DGS, impact on the level playing field, impact on 
depositor confidence and relevance for the Member States; and, iii) identifying options 
in the context of EDIS to assess whether the NOD should be retained, eliminated, fully 
harmonised or an alternative option can be recommended. 
5.1 NOD 11 – Payment commitments 
Summary: NOD 11 - Payment commitments 
DGSD [Article 10(3)] 
The DGS’ available financial means may include payment commitments. The total share 
of payment commitments shall not exceed 30 % of the total amount of available 
financial means. Under Article 2(13) DGSD, payment commitments of member 
institutions towards DGS shall be fully collateralised and the collateral shall: (a) consist 
of low risk assets; (b) be unencumbered by any third-party rights and be at the disposal 
of the DGS. 
Transposed into national law [24 Member States] 
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden 
Practical experience so far [5 Member States] 
France, Germany (excl. cooperative banks), Malta, Poland and Portugal 
Importance 
Up to 63 % of the available financial means102  
Impact 
 Risk profile 
national 
DGS 
Level playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member 
States 
Overall -- -- - + 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current 
form  
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
[Recommended] 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness - ++ + +/- 
Efficiency - ++ + - 
Coherence - ++ + + 
Subsidiarity + -- - + 
                                           
102 The importance of the payment commitments varies largely across Member States. On average, payment 
commitments in these Member States amounted to 22% of the available financial means at the end of 2017, 
ranging between 4.3% for the German savings banks and 63% of available financial means of the Maltese 
DGS. Importantly, the Maltese and the French DGS are in transition to bring their payment commitments 
below the 30% limit specified in the DGSD, by July 2024 (see Section 5.1.1.5.). 
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 Implementation across Member States 
Twenty-four Member States have transposed Article 10(3) DGSD in different ways. 
Among these Member States, only very few have used payment commitments in 
practice. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary and the United Kingdom are the only four Member 
States that have not transposed this NOD into their national laws.  
 
5.1.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The main reasons for transposing the NOD are the beneficial accounting and regulatory 
capital treatment and return on committed funds. Historical reasons are also relevant. 
First, the payment commitments provide member institutions – if the auditor allows it - 
a beneficial accounting treatment. The payment commitments are in those cases not 
considered in the profit and loss account of the member institution.  
Second, in some Member States the payment commitments can be used to contribute 
to the regulatory capital and other regulatory requirements. For the euro area banks 
this was changed when the ECB decided to exclude the payment commitments from the 
capital requirements. However, this is currently contested in court by several of the 
banks that risk losing the beneficial treatment. The main issue for both the treatment 
under the accounting rules and regulatory capital requirements is whether the payment 
commitments are indeed irrevocable. Some auditors and national competent authorities 
that allow banks to use the beneficial accounting and capital treatments argue that the 
payment commitments are only irrevocable as long as the institution remains a deposit 
taking institution (i.e. member of the DGS). Provided that the institution ceases to be a 
member of the DGS (merger, stop taking deposits, etc.), the payment commitments 
could, under the current provisions, be undone. 
Third, using payment commitments instead of cash contributions to the DGS can reduce 
the costs for the member institutions. More specifically, the member institutions can 
earn interest or investment returns on their payment commitments (e.g. Germany, 
France and Poland).  
Fourth, several DGSs already allowed member institutions to contribute to the DGS in 
the form of payment commitments before the DGSD was implemented. In France, 
member institutions were able to contribute to the DGS through guaranteed deposits. 
These cash-guaranteed deposits were recorded as debts to the DGS and could reach up 
to 100 % of the contribution of member institutions. With the transposition of the DGSD 
the upper limit has been reduced to 30 % of the total amount of available financial 
means. In Poland, before the implementation of the DGSD, banks were obliged to 
accumulate funds that should have been ring-fenced in the so-called Funds Protecting 
the Guaranteed Deposits (FPGD). Such FPGD were created individually by each member 
institution. The FPGD in Poland and cash-guaranteed deposits in France are equivalent 
to payment commitments. These payment commitments still qualify due to the 
transposition of the NOD in national law. 
By contrast, some of the Member States that do not use payment commitments, 
indicated that member institutions have not expressed any interest in contributing in 
the form of payment commitments. These banks indicated that they might not be 
allowed to benefit from the accounting and capital treatments and that the management 
of the collateral used to back the commitments is too complicated, costly and potentially 
delays the pay-out. 
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5.1.1.2 Maximum level of payment commitments 
Under the DGSD, the payment commitments shall not exceed 30 % of the total amount 
of available financial means. Most of Member States103 either set the maximum payment 
commitments at 30 % of the available financial means of the DGS or at 30 % for each 
individual member institution104 or a combination of both105. In Germany, the limits are 
set at both member institution and DGS level, but the limit per member institution can 
reach up to 100 % of their annual contribution, which means that they are very similar 
to those Member States that set the limit only at the level of the DGS. 
France and Malta deferred the application of the 30 % limit until the end of the transition 
period, i.e. 3 July 2024. Malta is gradually reducing the share of payment commitments 
of the DGS, for 2019 the maximum level of payment commitments is set at 58 % of the 
available financial means106. In France, the 30 % limit can be exceeded if this does not 
compromise the achievement of the financing target set for this facility.107 
 
5.1.1.3 Safeguards for payment commitments 
Payment commitments must be fully collateralised. This collateral must consist of low-
risk assets that are not encumbered by any third-party rights and at the disposal of the 
DGS (Article 2(13) DGSD). The low-risk assets consist of: i) debt securities which 
receive a zero risk-weight for credit risk under the standardised approach for bank 
capital requirements (Category I in Table 1 of Article 336 of the CRR); ii) debt securities 
that have a 20 % or 50 % risk-weight for credit risk and meet the specific conditions in 
the Capital Requirements Regulations (CRR) for banks (Category II in Table 1 of Article 
336 of the CRR) and iii) assets which are considered to be similarly safe and liquid by 
the competent or designated authority. 
The majority of Member States108 have transposed the above requirements into their 
legislation verbatim. Other Member States109 have excluded some of the low-risk assets 
defined in the DGSD, defined the low-risk assets differently or not at all. Malta and 
Poland that have defined the assets differently limit the payment commitments to assets 
denominated in euro (e.g. Malta)110 and  olish Treasury bonds and tradable money bills 
and bonds issued by the Polish Central Bank respectively. In France, the payment 
commitments take the form of cash deposits at the DGS. The Member States111 that 
have not defined low-risk assets, have not received any contributions in the form of 
payment commitments.  
                                           
103 E.g. Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. 
104 E.g. Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain. 
105 E.g. Lithuania, Poland and Portugal. 
106 Under Article 25(9) of the Subsidiary Legislation 371.09 Depositor Compensation Scheme Regulations the 
competent authority may issue banking rules in order to review and amend the effective date or percentages 
indicated in sub-regulation. 
107 The same applies to the mechanism for financing the resolution during the period of building up the 
resources of this mechanism, which runs until 31 December 2024 
108 E.g. Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania and Spain. 
109 E.g. Denmark, Ireland and Poland. 
110 Subsidiary Legislation 371.09 Depositor Compensation Scheme Regulations, Article 25(13). 
111 E.g. Belgium, Finland, Italy and Slovakia. 
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In line with the EBA Guidelines, in Germany, Malta112 and Poland113, haircuts are applied 
to the value of low-risk assets provided as collateral. Additionally, Poland requires 
member institutions to ring-fence funds not less than their payment commitments and 
collateralise these funds accordingly. This means that those funds are invested in a safe 
manner in highly liquid instruments as defined by the statute, so that they can transfer 
funds up to the equivalent of their payment commitments at the first call of the Fund. 
Such funds and assets must be deposited on an account separated for each entity and 
maintained either by the Polish Central Bank or by the National Depository for 
Securities114. Assets pledged as security for payment commitments must be irrevocably 
blocked on these accounts exclusively for the DGS’ benefit. 
In Germany, the member institutions can either use cash or securities as collateral for 
the payment commitments. The cash needs to be held at a subsidiary of the DGS, 
whereas the securities are managed by the German central bank. The central bank is 
responsible for most of the operational aspects, whereas the DGSs formulate the list 
with eligible low-risk securities acceptable as collateral. In order to use payment 
commitments, member institutions need to enter into a framework agreement where 
they commit themselves to provide securities that will be held by the central bank. The 
latter will inform the DGS when the value of the securities falls below a certain threshold 
and there is a need for additional collateral, or when some of the collateral can be 
released. 
In the event of a pay-out, the German DGSs will first assess whether there is enough 
cash before calling the payment commitment. In case of need to call on the payment 
commitments, the DGS sends a letter to the member institutions to invite them to pay 
within 24 hours or the collateral would be sold to fulfil the commitment. 
In Malta, the member institutions can either use cash or securities as collateral for the 
payment commitments. The cash must be held at the Maltese central bank. The 
securities, which are government bonds, are managed by the member institutions. 
These have to apply ECB’s eligibility criteria and haircuts to meet the liquidity criterion. 
In the event of pay-out, cash will be used first and payment commitments will be called 
only in case of need.  
 
5.1.1.4 Approval and monitoring of payment commitments 
In the majority of Member States115 the DGSs are responsible for approving 
contributions in the form of payment commitments, without explicit requirements on 
the procedures. In some Member States, the DGSs can establish some specific 
conditions for the use of payment commitments116 and/or monitoring of the conditions 
for payment commitments, which are either established based on national law or 
requirements by the DGS117. The monitoring covers both the quality and 
overcollateralisation of the payment commitments. 
 
                                           
112 Subsidiary Legislation 371.09 Depositor Compensation Scheme Regulations, Article 25(12). 
113 See §4 of the Regulation of The Minister of Development and Finance of 8 March 2017 on the transfer of 
premiums paid into the Bank Guarantee Fund by banks, branches of third country banks, investment firms, 
cooperative savings and credit unions and the National Cooperative Savings and Credit Fund in the form of 
commitments to pay the premiums paid into the Bank Guarantee Fund. 
114 It could also be the company to which the Depository has delegated the performance of some of its 
activities. 
115 E.g. Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
116 E.g. Czechia, Denmark and Greece. 
117 E.g. Czechia, Germany, Malta, Poland and Spain. 
 Options and national discretions under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and their treatment in the 
context of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
111 
 
5.1.1.5 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
DGSs in France, Germany, Malta, Poland and Portugal have practical experience with 
payment commitments. All these Member States already received some form of 
payment commitments before the new DGSD was implemented.  
The total payment commitments are estimated at EUR 3 011 million or 22 % of the 
available financial means of all the DGSs concerned at 31 December 2017118. In France, 
the amount of payment commitments raised in the available financial means of the DGS 
was EUR 1 575 million119 (around 43 % of available financial means). In Germany, out 
of the three DGSs (private, public and savings banks) that use the NOD, only the DGS 
for savings banks disclosed information on the payment commitments. Their payment 
commitments amounted to EUR 129 million, which is equivalent to 4.3 % of the 
available financial means at 31 December 2017. In Malta, the maximum level of 
payment commitments amounted to EUR 96 million or 63 % of the total available 
financial means at 31 December 2017. The Polish DGS only provided information for the 
contribution to the DGS in 2017, which showed that EUR 50 million or 23.6 % of the 
available financial means was contributed in the form of payment commitments. In 
Portugal, the larger of the two DGSs, Fundo de Garantia de Depósitos, accepted 
payment commitments for an amount of EUR 444 million or 28.7 % of available financial 
means at 31 December 2017. The amount was much higher in the past and has been 
on a declining pattern for some time, expected to gradually disappear, as the reasons 
for keeping payment commitments are also vanishing. 
Looking at the collateral used, most of the collateral takes the form of cash or debt 
securities with a zero risk-weight. The French and German member institutions that 
participated in the survey indicated having cash amounts pledged as collateral equal to 
the payment commitments. The Maltese, Polish and Portuguese banks indicated that 
they have pledged a mix of debt securities with a zero risk-weight under the capital 
requirements legislation. In addition, all of them have more debt securities pledged than 
payment commitments. The overcollateralisation of the member institutions ranges 
between 10 % and 25 %. Putting aside the benefits from payment commitments linked 
to accounting standards and capital requirements, if member institutions hold cash as 
collateral, there is, in the current low-interest environment, almost no difference 
between contributions and payment commitments. If member institutions hold collateral 
in the form of government securities, which generates interest payments for the 
member institutions, there is not much impact on the liquidity of the guarantee fund, 
as DGSs often invest part of the available means in the same assets. In an environment 
with ultra-low interest rates, the impact is limited and may be partially offset by the 
cost of an active management of the collateral, which is typically conducted by the 
member institution and monitored by the DGS and/or the central bank, but it can still 
be positive.  
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The contributions in the form of payment commitments impact the risk profile of the 
DGSs and the level playing field from the perspective of both DGSs and member 
institutions. The impact on the confidence of depositors, if any, is rather limited; the 
NOD is still relevant in some Member States but on a declining trend. 
                                           
118 For the estimate of the total payment commitments, it is assumed that the share of payment commitments 
as of available financial means is the same as the share of annual payment commitments as of the annual 
contributions. Moreover, when the information on the payments is not provided, the share of payment 
commitments is assumed equal to the share of payment commitments of available financial means of the DGS 
that has disclosed information on the payment commitments. 
119 Garantie des Dépôts (2018), Annual report 2017. 
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5.1.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
Although the overall impact on the DGSs is currently rather limited, the payment 
commitments could increase the risks of the national DGSs because they potentially 
reduce the means immediately available for the compensation of covered deposits. 
Although, in principle, payments commitments do not affect the available financial 
means, the only exception would be if the payment commitment were revoked. This 
could happen, as some representatives of national DGSs and national competent 
authorities argued in the interviews, if the member institution stopped taking deposits. 
Moreover, there is also a potential risk, though low given the safeguard measures, that 
the member institution is not able to fulfil the commitment, which would reduce the 
available financial means in the event of a pay-out.  
Accordingly, the realisation of the payment commitments represents a risk for the 
national DGSs that are accepting securities as collateral. After the DGS has requested 
the payment in the event of pay-out, the member institutions have two working days 
to transfer the funds. According to EBA, this time-period is reasonable and adequate120.  
In practice, the DGSs indicated giving the member institutions just one day. If member 
institutions are unable to perform the payment, the DGSs can claim the collateral. For 
example, the payment could be an issue for the defaulted institutions unable to meet 
their obligation to pay the payment commitment.  
Whether the inability to pay the payment commitment also leads to losses for the DGSs 
would depend on the quality and amount of collateral. The member institutions can 
either use cash or securities. In terms of the ability to pay the commitments when called, 
there is not much concern regarding the collateral consisting of cash held at the DGS or 
national central bank for an amount equal or higher than the payment commitments. 
By contrast, payment commitments in securities are ensured, with more than 10 % 
over-collateralisation with zero risk-weighted assets (primarily government bonds), 
which means that the member institutions should in principle be able to pay the 
commitments as long as there are no sovereign defaults. These are low probability but 
high loss events121. 
 
5.1.2.2 Level playing field 
The use of payment commitments has a negative impact on the level playing field. 
Allowing some member institutions to contribute to the DGS through payment 
commitments offers them the possibility to benefit from the accounting, regulatory 
capital and/or return on the assets. As these benefits are only available in Member 
States where auditors, national competent authorities and DGSs allow member 
institutions to use payment commitments, these institutions have an advantage 
compared to member institutions of DGSs in Member States that do not provide these 
benefits. 
 
                                           
120 EBA (2015), Guidelines on payment commitments under Directive 2014/49/EU on 
deposit guarantee schemes. 
121 De Groen, W.P. (2015), The ECB’s QE: Time to break the doom loop between banks and 
their governments, CEPS Policy Brief. 
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5.1.2.3 Depositor confidence  
The payment commitments are likely to have a limited negative effect on depositor 
confidence. The average depositor is unlikely to be aware of the funding of the deposit 
insurance. It is acknowledged that the DGSs that currently allow payment commitments 
may have already a longer tradition in using payment commitments. Moreover, the 
safeguards should ensure that in pay-out events the financial means would be as readily 
available as in the DGSs that do not allow member institutions to contribute in the form 
of payment commitments. However, if depositors become aware that the DGS is not 
fully cash funded or payment commitments cannot be cashed in, this might also impact 
their confidence about the ability of the DGS to repay their covered deposits. 
 
5.1.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
Currently, the NOD appears particularly relevant for France and Malta, where payment 
commitments are considerably above the 30 % limit. The payment commitments are 
also important in Germany and Poland, where the payment commitments are below the 
30 % limit. Moreover, in Poland, the financial means available excluding the payments 
commitments would currently be enough to meet the target level of 0.8 % of covered 
deposits included in the DGSD. 
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
The contributions in the form of payment commitments have the potential to impact the 
risk profile of the DGSs and the level playing field from the perspective of both the DGSs 
and member institutions. As the payment commitments largely depend on the credibility 
of the collateral pledged by each member institution, elimination of the NOD (Option 2) 
is recommended as the most sensible option. This is primarily justified on the grounds 
of efficiency and effectiveness, as, with EDIS in place, the NOD would make the deposit 
insurance too complex, e.g. in terms of the collection of the contributions it could 
ultimately compromise the paybox function if the materialisation of collateral is for any 
reason problematic. Moreover, the benefits for member institutions associated with 
payment commitments have the potential to distort the level playing field.  
 
5.1.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers retaining the current NOD. This means that DGSs in the 
Member States that currently use the NOD may continue to allow member institutions 
to contribute in the form of payment commitments up to 30 % backed-up by collateral 
consisting of low-risk assets. 
Effectiveness: Payment commitments reduce effectiveness. The payment commitments 
must be made good on time in the event of a pay-out and this creates uncertainty about 
the actual availability of financial means. In this respect, it is critical whether the 
member institutions have pledged enough collateral to ensure the payment and whether 
the payment commitment is irrevocable. Moreover, the payment commitments distort 
the level playing field. More specifically, the member institutions of DGSs that allow 
payment commitments enjoy beneficial accounting and regulatory treatment and make 
a return on their payment commitments. This gives these member institutions an 
advantage over those that are not allowed to contribute in the form of payment 
commitments. 
Efficiency: This option would negatively affect efficiency in terms of the collection of the 
contributions. In particular, under EDIS, the DGSs would have to use additional 
resources to collect the payment commitments, calculate the required amount, inform 
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the member institutions, administer the transfers and deplete the collateral (in case of 
non-payment) in the event of a pay-out. Furthermore, the DGSs will need to monitor 
the collateral, which is more difficult for securities than for cash. The securities would 
require continuous assessment of their eligibility and value to ensure that the payment 
commitments are paid. 
Coherence: First, with EDIS in place, the payment commitments could compromise the 
paybox function if the materialisation of collateral is for any reason problematic, 
potentially creating more uncertainty about the funding. 
Second, the NOD does not contribute to the main objective of harmonisation of the 
national requirements under the DGSD and of improved access to DGSs. This is because 
the NOD is currently only applied in three Banking Union countries and provides some 
benefits to member institutions in those Member States compared to others.  
Third, although the impact of the NOD on the sovereign-bank nexus is limited, the NOD 
is not in line with the objective of the Banking Union to break the link between banks 
and their sovereigns in the euro area. The low-risk assets referred to in the DGSD consist 
mostly of debt securities with a zero risk-weight, typically a mix of sovereign bonds 
issued by the home country and other euro area countries. The NOD could reinstate the 
link between banks and their sovereigns, noting that the payment commitments are 
small in size and sovereigns have a low probability of default (De Groen, 2015). 
However, it is acknowledged that most of the collateral for the payment commitments 
in Germany and all of the collateral in France are provided in cash.  
Subsidiarity: The member institutions in the Member States that currently use payment 
commitments for their contributions to the DGS would be able to continue to do so under 
this option. The maximum threshold in the NOD means that, in principle, no legacy 
issues would be created, except for two Member States that currently do not yet fulfil 
the requirement of payment commitments below 30 %. 
 
5.1.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the current provision for payment commitments 
in the DGSD. The overall impact of this option would likely be limited in aggregate as 
the estimated payment commitments in the EU account for EUR 3 011 million, namely 
about 8 % of the available financial means, i.e. 0.04 % of covered deposits. 
Effectiveness: This option would improve the effectiveness of EDIS in the event of pay-
out by removing the concerns about the realisation of the payment commitments and 
need to deplete (some of) the collateral. Moreover, all member institutions would be 
subject to the same treatment in terms of collection of contributions (i.e. cash) which 
prevents the distortion of the level playing field. 
Efficiency: This option would improve efficiency. With EDIS in place, the administrative 
burden for EDIS and national DGS would decrease in the context of the collection of 
funds (e.g. no need for monitoring of the collateral). Moreover the fund would be able 
to invest the committed funds and potentially obtain additional returns122. From the 
perspective of member institutions, this option would mean a potential loss in efficiency 
because they are able to achieve a higher return on their payment commitments than 
the DGSs are able to make on their available financial means. 
Coherence: This option would improve coherence because it has the potential to reduce 
the bank-sovereign nexus (i.e. the collateral often contains sovereign bonds). Moreover, 
                                           
122 In the current negative interest rate environment, the return of EDIS might be negative. Hence, EDIS is 
like the Single Resolution Fund, likely to hold their funds at the central bank, which currently charges for 
holding deposits. 
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it would better ensure access to EDIS by removing the risk that payment commitments 
are not made good successfully. It would also imply that, in line with the principle of 
equal treatment, some member institutions would lose the benefit of the accounting and 
capital requirement treatment of payment commitments. 
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity in the Member States that use 
payment commitments. As most of the payment commitments are currently already 
held in cash, the exercise should be relatively straightforward.  
 
5.1.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers that the current NOD could provide more stringent rules 
regarding the collateral which would be restricted to the cash deposits, while keeping 
the 30 % threshold. This is the current practice in France and of the Single Resolution 
Fund (SRF) within the Single Resolution Mechanism. The latter requires member 
institutions to pledge cash deposits as collateral. So far, the SRF has allowed 15 % of 
an annual contribution to be made in the form of payment commitments. This could 
apply to member institutions in all Member States. 
Effectiveness: This option would improve effectiveness under EDIS. In the event of a 
pay-out, EDIS would be able to call on payment commitments immediately, without 
uncertainty on whether the member institutions are able to make good on the 
commitment or on the value of the collateral. 
Efficiency: This option would improve efficiency, by facilitating the monitoring of the 
collateral and collection. Also with EDIS in place, the collection and monitoring of cash 
deposits (since the deposits are with the DGS) would be easier. More specifically, the 
current negative interest rate environment requires in some cases the replenishment of 
collateral lost due to interest payments, while in a positive interest rate environment 
some of the collateral could be released. The administration costs under this option 
would nevertheless be higher than under Option 2. Moreover, as the member institutions 
would be obliged to use cash, the returns for the DGSs would be the same as for the 
member institutions. 
Coherence: This option would lead to a more coherent framework. As the cash deposits 
are immediately available, there would be no impact on the capacity of EDIS to intervene 
in the event of a pay-out. Moreover, the sovereign-bank nexus would be reduced as the 
commitments are held in cash instead of a mix of liquid assets.  
Nevertheless, the level playing field would still be distorted as only member institutions 
in Member States that transposed the NOD would be allowed to use payment 
commitments and not all member institutions will necessarily be able to benefit from a 
beneficial accounting and capital treatment. 
Subsidiarity: This option would reduce subsidiarity. Some Member States in which cash 
deposits are used as a collateral would continue using them. In others, some of the 
collateral (in the form of securities) would have to be replaced. Moreover, the reduction 
of the maximum amount of payment commitments, would mean that some of the 
payment commitments would have to be made good on and the share of payment 
commitments in new contributions to the DGS reduced. 
 
5.1.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers extending the current NOD to all Member States. This would 
mean that institutions could contribute up to 30 % in payment commitments backed-
up by collateral consisting of cash deposits and low-risk assets. 
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Effectiveness: This option would reduce effectiveness by making the collection of the 
contributions in the event of a pay-out more complex, with higher claims on defaulted 
institutions. The losses of a defaulted institution would further increase if the institution 
had to fulfil the payment commitment; this is because the payment commitments are 
often not accounted for in the profit and loss account. While the opportunity to use 
payment commitments would be available to all member institutions under EDIS, the 
negative impact of the NOD on the level playing field would remain, if accounting and 
regulatory benefits depend on national legislation and practices.  
Efficiency: This option would reduce efficiency potentially for both the DGSs and the 
member institutions. Under EDIS, the collection of the payment commitments and 
monitoring of the collateral would likely become significantly more complex, if 
administered at a greater scale, as the number of member institutions is substantially 
larger. With about 3 450 credit institutions in the Banking Union in 2019, the number of 
institutions at national level range between eight credit institutions in Estonia and about 
1 470 in Germany123. From the point of view of member institutions, in practice the 
benefits are likely to be limited, if any, in those Member States where the auditors and 
national competent authorities require that payment commitments are booked as costs 
and deduct them from regulatory capital. Furthermore, in the current low-interest 
environment, the additional returns on collateral would be negligible, potentially even 
negative when deposited at the central bank or invested in government bonds, and 
would necessitate compensation for the extra administrative resources devoted to 
collateral management. 
Coherence: The option would improve external consistency, while worsening internal 
consistency. The use of payment commitments will lead to a marginal increase in the 
sovereign-bank nexus in the Eurozone, when the collateral consists of sovereign debt 
instead of cash. More frequent use of payment commitments does not need to go hand-
in-hand with depositor protection.  
Subsidiarity: This option would have no impact on subsidiarity as member institutions 
in the Member States could continue using payment commitments.   
                                           
123 Based on a combination of the lists of credit institutions provided by the EBA and ECB.  
 Options and national discretions under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and their treatment in the 
context of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
117 
 
5.2 NOD 12 – Contributions into existing mandatory schemes 
Summary: NOD 12 – Contribution into existing mandatory schemes 
DGSD [Article 10(4)] 
Member States may raise the available financial means through the mandatory 
contributions paid by member institutions to existing schemes of mandatory 
contributions established by a Member State in its territory for the purpose of covering 
the costs related to systemic risk, failure, and resolution of institutions. 
DGSs shall be entitled to an amount equal to the amount of such contributions up to 
the target level, which the Member State will make immediately available to those 
DGSs upon request. The contributions shall be used primarily for the repayment of 
depositors (Article 11 DGSD). 
DGSs are entitled to that amount only if the competent authority considers that they 
are unable to raise extraordinary contributions from their members.  
Transposed into national law [1 Member State] 
UK 
Practical experience so far [0 Member States] 
None 
Importance 
Nihil124 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national 
DGS 
Level playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member State 
Overall + - + +/- 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current 
form 
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
[Recommended] 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness + - +/-  
Efficiency +/- +/- +  
Coherence - + +/-  
Subsidiarity + - -  
 Implementation across Member States 
Only the UK has transposed this NOD in the DGSD allowing Member States to use the 
bank levy to ensure that its available financial means are proportionate to its potential 
liabilities provided and subject to the condition that such a scheme of mandatory 
contributions was existing pre-DGSD.  
                                           
124 Based on some estimations the cumulative bank levies could contribute about 50% of available financial 
means in the UK in 2018 based on the cumulative bank levies. 
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Moreover, as a reaction to the 2007-09 financial and 2010-12 Eurozone debt crises 14 
Member States have also implemented (temporary) bank levies in order to cover the 
costs related to systemic risk, failure, and resolution of institutions125. Slovakia has 
introduced a bank levy126 that can contribute to the DGS. However, the specific 
conditions to this NOD have not been transposed. This means that Slovakia is not 
meeting the conditions to be considered as having transposed this NOD.  
 
5.2.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
Bank levies were introduced in some Member States in the aftermath of the crisis, before 
the adoption of the DGSD. The main motivation for the introduction of the bank levies 
was primarily to compensate for the large bail-outs as well as strengthening the 
robustness of the crisis management framework (systemic risk, failure, and resolution).  
The financial and economic crisis saw many banks bailed-out by their national 
governments. In the UK, in 2008 for instance, the DGS borrowed GBP 20.4 billion 
(EUR 25.6 billion) to fund the costs of compensating or transferring the accounts of 
consumers in the failure of five banks, referred to as the Specified Deposit-taker 
Defaults (SDDs). The SDD loans were financed under facilities originally provided by the 
Bank of England, and subsequently refinanced by HM Treasury127. 
Strengthening the framework for crisis management represents the main motivation to 
use bank levy receipts to contribute to the DGS. In the UK, as part of the design of the 
bank levy, protected deposits are covered by a statutory, state-run guarantee128 or 
insurance scheme and loans backed by the UK government are exempt from the tax 
base. Long-term chargeable equity and liabilities (with a maturity date exceeding one 
year) are charged in the bank levy at half the rate applicable to short-term chargeable 
liabilities. All banks and building societies operating in the UK are liable for the bank 
levy, whatever the amount of guaranteed deposits they hold.  
The UK considers that the use of the bank levy for the DGS could increase the available 
financial means and reduce the risk to taxpayers as well as avoid rendering member 
institutions incapable of providing extraordinary contributions. 
 
5.2.1.2 Level of the bank levy 
In the UK, the bank levy is chargeable on the balance sheet liabilities of the institutions 
including equity and excluding covered deposits, borrowing backed by UK government 
debt and the first GBP 20 billion (about EUR 22 billion) of any taxable debt. The levy 
rate is fixed at 0.078 % for short-term chargeable liabilities, and half this rate (0.039 %) 
                                           
125 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK. With the possible exception of Slovakia, these Member States do not 
use the levies to finance the DGS. 
126 In Slovakia, the tax rate for the bank levy has been fixed at 0.2% of total liabilities excluding equity, funds 
on long-term offer to a branch of a foreign bank, and its subordinated debt, for the period 2015-2020. The 
Slovakian legislation on the special levy of selected financial institutions specifies that the bank levies can be 
used for the sole purpose of covering the costs related to resolution of the financial crisis in the banking sector 
and to protect the stability of the banking sector in Slovakia, including to replenish fund resources necessary 
to cover the expenditure due to compensation payments for unavailable deposits. The other uses of the DGS 
assets mentioned in Article 11 DGSD are not covered by the Slovak legislation. Although not clearly specified 
in the legislation, the National Bank of Slovakia confirmed that bank levies cannot be used to reach the target 
level of contributions. 
127 FCA (2018), Financial Services Compensation Scheme levies for specified deposit-taker defaults. 
128 Including deposits protected by other statutory guarantee or insurance schemes operating outside the UK 
and comparable with the FSCS scheme. 
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for longer maturity liabilities and non-protected deposits (except for deposits from 
financial institutions and financial traders). 
 
5.2.1.3 Conditions related to amounts and availability  
Subparagraph 2 of Article 10(4) DGSD provides for three types of conditions for the 
DGS to be entitled to the bank levies: 
i) maximum amount to which DGSs shall be entitled;  
ii) immediate availability; and, 
iii) exclusive use for the purposes of interventions of the DGS, including 
contributions to resolution.  
This means that the DGSs shall be entitled to an amount equal to the amount of the 
bank levy, up to the target level set up by the DGSD. The Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (PRA)129 in the UK can authorise the Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
(FSCS) to borrow from the bank levy pool an amount equal to its shortfall, when its 
financial resources are inadequate to meet the claims, but there is no reference to the 
target level in the transposing measures. The funds obtained from the bank levy will be 
equal or less than the amounts of pay-outs, which means that the contribution is in 
practice unlikely to exceed the target level (0.8 % of the covered deposits). 
The amounts raised from the bank levy shall be paid to the UK Consolidated Fund, which 
means that they are mixed up with other funds held in the Government’s general bank 
account at the Bank of England. Payments from this account must be authorised in 
advance by the House of Commons. The Government shall present its ‘requests’ to use 
this money in the form of Consolidated Fund Bills. According to the UK Treasury, the 
fact that the bank levies are held in the Government’s general bank account does not 
impact their immediate availability to the FSCS, as the Government would also make 
these funds immediately available in the event of a resolution if required, in accordance 
with Article 100(6) BRRD. The UK Treasury will therefore use the mechanism under the 
same legal basis130 to transfer funds from the bank levy to the FSCS, by which it can 
disburse funds to the Bank of England as the resolution authority to support a resolution. 
This is also justified by the fact that the BRRD also allows Member States to use existing 
ex ante resolution financing arrangements in a different form than as a ‘fund’, and that 
it permits the Government flexibility in the use of those funds when they are not needed 
for resolution. 
The DGS regulations provide that the financial means raised through mandatory 
contributions paid by the financial sector to existing schemes of mandatory contributions 
can be used for the purposes of Article 11(1) and 11(2) DGSD, once the PRA has 
established that the FSCS cannot raise contributions under the compensation scheme. 
Therefore, funds raised from the bank levy can be used to repay depositors and to 
finance the resolution of member institutions, but not for the purpose of Article 11(6) 
DGSD, i.e. to finance measures to preserve the access of depositors to covered deposits, 
including transfer of assets, liabilities and/or deposit book, and in the context of national 
insolvency proceedings (NOD 14). 
 
5.2.1.4 Conditions related to capacity and availability 
Paragraph 3 of Article 10(4) DGSD provides for two additional types of conditions for 
the DGS to be entitled to the bank levies: 
i) incapacity to raise extraordinary contribution; and,  
                                           
129 Which is part of the Bank of England. 
130 Section 228 of the FSMA. 
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ii) obligation to repay the amount granted immediate availability.  
The requirement regarding the incapacity to raise extraordinary contribution is 
transposed by the PRA Depositor Protection Rule 32.2. The rule states that the FSCS, 
which runs the DGS, among other insurance schemes, can only borrow after 
authorisation from the PRA the amounts necessary to meet the liabilities of the DGS 
from the bank levy (through the intervention of the Treasury) if the PRA determines 
that the FSCS is unable to raise levies from its members. Such incapacity will be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis by the PRA, at the time of each call on the DGS funds. 
The PRA expects to consider a range of factors including the likely impact of raising 
levies on financial stability, the size and timing of levies needed to be raised and other 
regular levies already imposed on the financial sector, and the impact of pro-cyclical 
contributions on the setting of annual contributions.  
The provision to repay the amount borrowed is transposed by the PRA Depositor 
Protection Rule 32.3 which provides for a legal obligation for the FSCS to impose a 
compensation costs levy on its members, enough to repay any amounts equal to 
mandatory contributions borrowed in accordance with Article 10(4) DGSD within a 
reasonable time.  
 
5.2.1.5 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
The NOD has not been used in practice. The FSCS has not borrowed from the funds 
raised through the bank levies, but has used the funds standing to the credit of one 
funding class to meet the costs of another on a short-term basis131. The cumulative 
amount of SDD levies collected between 2009 and 2018 accounts for about 0.35 % of 
covered deposits, equivalent to 50 % of available financial means at the end of 2018132. 
This means that the bank levy could potentially deliver a substantial contribution to the 
DGS. The bank levies accumulated constitute an immediately available liquidity pool, 
which will enable the DGS to spread the costs of a repayment or resolution procedure 
(through compensation costs) over several years. This procedure ensures that the 
failure of a member institution does not put too much pressure on an already weakened 
sector during a crisis.  
 
 Impact of the NOD133  
The NOD effectively increases the means available to the DGS134. The funds collected 
through the bank levy are added to the available financial means provided that the 
extraordinary contributions can be obtained, which reduces the risk profile of the 
national DGS and strengthens depositor confidence. However, the level playing field is 
distorted because member institutions with this NOD are likely to contribute more than 
member institutions that did not implement this NOD. Based on the current experience, 
the contribution of the levy to the DGS has a limited relevance to the Member States 
concerned. 
                                           
131 In the UK, the FSCS, which covers savings deposits, insurance policies, and investments, is financed 
through different types of levies, organised in ‘funding classes’ (deposits class, life and pensions provision 
class and general insurance provision class). 
132 See FSCS (2019) for the cumulative amount of SDD levies, and EBA (2019) for covered deposits and 
available financial means as of 31 December 2018. 
133 The assessment of the impact is based on the assumption that the bank levy is introduced with the 
purpose of potentially contributing to deposit insurance when necessary.  
134 This is because the DGS is entitled to the available financial means if the competent authority considers 
that the DGS is unable to raise extraordinary contributions from the members. 
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5.2.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
In the UK that has transposed and can use this NOD, the effective means available to 
the national DGS are around the target level of 0.8 %. Based on some estimates, the 
bank levies could have contributed an additional 50 % of available financial means in 
the UK in 2018. 
Moreover, the UK bank levy is risk-based, which may incentivise member institutions 
towards less risky behaviour and potentially reduce the likelihood of pay-outs and the 
risk profile of the DGS. However, if the bank levy is (too) high, it may affect banks’ 
profitability, which might increase the probability of pay-out events and in turn the risk 
profile of the national DGS. 
 
5.2.2.2 Level playing field 
The member institutions in Member States that raise extraordinary contributions ahead 
of available financial means are likely to experience relatively higher costs than without 
the levy. This puts the member institutions at a competitive disadvantage. Finally, the 
design of the levy can also impact the level playing field. For instance, the impact on 
the savings intermediation is minor if the base for the calibration of the bank levy 
excludes covered deposits (UK). If this is not the case, banks may be motivated to 
restrain collection of deposits or to lower interest rates on deposits. 
 
5.2.2.3 Depositor confidence 
The NOD is likely to strengthen depositor confidence. The main factors that contribute 
to this strengthening of depositor confidence are the increase in funds available to the 
DGS, reduction in the probability of a pay-out, and reduced probability of contagion to 
the national government. Overall, the more robust the DGS is, the more confidence the 
depositors have in the ability of the fund to repay the deposits when necessary. 
 
5.2.2.4 Relevance for respective Member State 
The NOD is only transposed in one Member State. Although the funds have not been 
used by the DGS, the funds could potentially deliver a substantial contribution to the 
DGS. 
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
The purpose of the NOD seems to increase the level of financial means by requiring the 
DGS to raise the extraordinary contributions ahead of using the available financial 
means. In this respect, the DGSD provides for a minimum target level allowing Member 
States to raise more contributions and Member States could achieve the same result by 
increasing the target level. An alternative way to deal with insufficient available financial 
means could be to raise the minimum target level instead (Option 3). However, although 
this would likely improve the protection for depositors, there is currently no evidence 
that the target size of the DGSs is insufficient.  
Because this NOD is specific to only one Member State outside the Banking Union, it 
would be recommended to eliminate this NOD (Option 2). It should be noted that, if this 
NOD is eliminated, Member States would not be prevented from levying a tax on banks 
outside the scope of the DGSD and the DGS using such funds in a systemic crisis. 
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5.2.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers retaining the current provision as included in Article 10(4) 
DGSD.  
Effectiveness: This option is used in one Member State outside the Banking Union and 
would not be relevant under EDIS. The NOD does not impact the effective protection of 
depositors due to the lower pay-out probability and more funds available to the DGS.  
Efficiency: This option does not affect the efficiency of the system.  
Coherence: On the one hand, retaining the NOD in its current form under EDIS would 
contribute to reducing the contagion risk in case of losses between the national DGS 
and the home government, which is one of the main objectives of the Banking Union. 
On the other hand, the bank levy leads to distortions in the level playing field between 
Member States.  
Subsidiarity: This option would not impact subsidiarity.  
 
5.2.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the possibility to use a bank levy to contribute 
to the DGSD. 
Effectiveness: Eliminating the NOD would not impact the effectiveness of the DGS 
because the standard cascade of funding resources would apply instead (extraordinary 
contributions would be raised if available financial means are insufficient).  
Efficiency: This option would improve efficiency because the DGS would first use the 
available financial means.  
Coherence: This option would be beneficial for the level playing field and improves the 
overall coherence.  
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity in a Member State using the NOD.  
 
5.2.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers increasing the target level to contribute to the DGS, beyond 
the target level of 0.8 % of covered deposits, to replace the bank levy as a means to 
contribute to the DGS where it exists. 
Effectiveness: Increasing the target level is likely to have a similar impact as retaining 
the current NOD (Option 1). A higher target level would increase the effective protection 
for depositors due to the higher available financial means, which reduces the risk of 
shortfalls. Furthermore, the additional risk-based contribution would discourage 
excessive risk-taking by member institutions. Risk of contagion to the respective 
national governments would also be lowered. However, there is currently no clear 
evidence that there is a need for more funds. 
Efficiency: Increasing the target level is likely to be more efficient than if the NOD is 
retained in its current form (Option 1). This avoids a parallel system to determine, collect 
and manage the funds. Increasing the target level requires limited extra resources as 
in essence only the amounts change. 
Coherence: Increasing the target level would improve coherence. Like retaining the 
current form, a higher target reduces the contagion risk to the government, which is 
one of the main objectives of the Banking Union. Moreover, as the calculation of the 
target level would be more similar across Member States as well as the potential 
increase of the target level, the distortion of the level playing field between member 
 Options and national discretions under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and their treatment in the 
context of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
123 
 
institutions across Member States is likely to be less than with financing through bank 
levies. Additionally, the increased target level is always used to strengthen the DGS, 
whereas bank levies are sometimes used for additional purposes, unrelated to the 
stability of the banking sector. 
Subsidiarity: Increasing the target level would reduce the flexibility of the Member 
States somewhat as they have less discretion to change the calculation of the 
contribution and determine the management of the funds. 
 
5.2.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers extending the NOD to all Member States which would 
effectively modify the cascade of the DGS funding that currently applies in the majority 
of Member States (raising extraordinary contributions ahead of available financial 
means).  
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5.3 NOD 13 – Financing of failure prevention measures 
Summary: NOD 13 – Financing of failure prevention measures  
DGSD [Article 11 (3)] 
Member States may allow a DGS to use the available financial means for alternative 
measures in order to prevent the failure of a credit institution provided that: 
i) the resolution authority has not taken any resolution action ;  
ii) the DGS has appropriate systems and procedures in place for selecting and 
implementing alternative measures and monitoring affiliated risks;  
iii) the costs of the measures do not exceed the costs of fulfilling the statutory or 
contractual mandate of the DGS; 
iv) the use of alternative measures by the DGS is linked to conditions imposed on 
the credit institution that is being supported, involving at least more stringent risk 
monitoring and greater verification rights for the DGS; 
v) the use of alternative measures by the DGS is linked to commitments by the 
credit institution being supported with a view to securing access to covered 
deposits;  
vi) the ability of the affiliated credit institutions to pay the extraordinary 
contributions. 
The DGS shall consult the resolution authority and the competent authority on the 
measures and the conditions imposed on the credit institution. 
Transposed into national law [9 Member States] 
Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Poland and Spain 
Practical experience so far [0 Member States] 
None135 
Importance 
Nihil136 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk 
profile 
national 
DGS 
Level 
playing field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member States 
Overall + - + + 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current 
form  
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
[Recommended] 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness +/- - + +/- 
Efficiency + - - +/- 
Coherence - + + + 
Subsidiarity + - +/- - 
                                           
135 Based on the collected information, the NOD has not been used in practice since the DGSD has been 
applicable in the Member States. 
136 In view of the limited experience with the NOD, it was not possible to assess the importance of the NOD. 
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 Implementation across Member States 
Under Article 11(3) DGSD, Member States may allow a DGS to prevent the failure of a 
member institution (further referred to as ‘preventive measures’137). Accordingly, the 
funds would be used at an earlier stage by contributing to the prevention of a bank 
failure, instead of using them to pay out the depositors in the event of bank insolvency 
with a view to avoid paying for higher losses that could result from such a failure.  
Preventive measures must meet the following conditions: (i) the resolution authority 
has not taken any resolution action; (ii) the DGS has appropriate systems and 
procedures in place for selecting and implementing alternative measures and monitoring 
affiliated risks; (iii) the costs of the measures do not exceed the costs of fulfilling the 
statutory or contractual mandate of the DGS; (iv) the use of alternative measures by 
the DGS is linked to conditions imposed on the member institution that is being 
supported, involving at least more stringent risk monitoring and greater verification 
rights for the DGS; (v) the use of alternative measures by the DGS is linked to 
commitments by the credit institution being supported with a view to securing access 
to covered deposits; (vi) the ability of the affiliated credit institutions to pay the 
extraordinary contributions to DGS is confirmed in the assessment of the national 
competent authority. 
9 Member States have transposed the NOD138. Most of them have also implemented the 
conditions, with exception of Croatia, Spain and possibly France139, that did not 
transpose Article 11(3)(f) DGSD. 
The NOD leaves a considerable margin for interpretation to Member States as to the 
meaning and choice of preventive measures or the conditions for their use (‘appropriate’ 
systems and procedures in place for selecting and implementing preventive measures 
and monitoring affiliated risks140). At the same time, Article 11(3) DGSD provides for 
several safeguards in order to ensure that the DGS has enough funds to continue playing 
its primary role of paying covered depositors in the event of the failure of a member 
institution. Control on the use of preventive measures is exercised through the EU State 
aid framework141. 
 
5.3.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The main reasons for the use of failure prevention measures are to support the objective 
to avoid the failure of member institutions and to lower the costs of interventions, and 
to promote depositor confidence and system stability.  
For example, this is the case of the Institutional Protection Schemes (IPSs). Their main 
objective is to avoid the failure of their member institutions and, hence, to avoid 
reputational risk as the members of IPSs often have branding in common. Under Article 
113(7) of the Capital Requirement Regulation (CRR), the role of IPSs is to protect their 
member institutions and ensure that they have the liquidity and solvency needed to 
                                           
137 In this study, measures under Article 11(3) DGSD (NOD 13) are referred to as preventive measures 
although the Article 11(3) also uses the word ‘alternative’. This is to ensure clear distinction with measures 
under Article 11(6) that are referred to as ‘alternative measures’ (NOD 14). 
138 I.e. Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Poland and Spain. 
139 It was not possible to confirm if France transposed Article 11(3)(e) DGSD. 
140 Article 11(3)(b) of the DGSD; however, as the DGSD does not specify more details, such assessment is an 
Member State discretion. 
141 See for instance Decision of the European Commission with respect to the Italian Banca Tercas, Commission 
press release IP/15/6395, 23 December 2015 (annulled by the General Court) and the remarks of Italy 
concerning the impact of the decision on the feasibility to use the option from Article 11(3) of the DGSD 
discussed further in this report. 
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avoid bankruptcy where necessary. An IPS may be officially recognised as a DGS (and 
be subject to all provisions of the DGSD) or it may continue its activity as a pure IPS 
(its members need to belong to an officially recognised DGS). For IPSs recognised as 
DGSs, this NOD is crucial as it allows the financing of preventive measures with the DGS 
funds. 
In Austria and Germany, only IPSs are allowed to use their available financial means to 
finance preventive measures. In practice, IPSs generally provide liquidity and solvency 
support to avoid any situation leading to the failure of their member institutions. To this 
end, the IPSs monitor their members more closely than conventional DGSs. The two 
Polish IPSs also intervene through early intervention measures, which avoids pay-outs.  
There are several motivations for IPSs to avoid the failure of their members. First, with 
the interventions, total losses for creditors are likely to be reduced because fire sales in 
the event of insolvency are avoided. Second, the members of IPSs often work quite 
closely together (e.g. branding, product development, interbank lending, etc.) and, 
therefore, the preventive measures avoid a loss in credibility and contagion to other 
member institutions. Third, the preventive measures contribute to preserving the 
diversity in the financial system because IPS members are typically stakeholder banks 
(cooperative banks, savings banks or public banks), which in the case of failure are 
likely to disappear or demutualise. 
Besides, some DGSs consider that failure prevention measures can lower the costs for 
the DGSs, as the value of assets is better preserved in a going concern than in a 
liquidation procedure, involving a pay-out to depositors. According to the Italian DGS, 
loss-minimising, compared to pay-out, is the most important reason for using the NOD. 
In Italy, this was the usual way chosen for intervention by the Italian DGSs prior to the 
DGSD as considered less costly and of less significant systemic impact than letting a 
bank be liquidated. Other Member States shared this rationale (Spain, France, Poland).  
 
5.3.1.2 Type of preventive measures 
Member States do not tend to set strict limits on the type of possible preventive 
measures. Croatia, France, Poland and Spain clarified the types of preventive measures 
that DGSs can take, including by open-ended provisions, like providing financing ‘in any 
form whatsoever’ (i.e. France) and ‘any other financial support measures’ (i.e. Spain), 
hence, in essence leaving the catalogue of possible measures open. In some Member 
States, the type of measures is specified in the statutes of the DGSs (i.e. Germany and 
Italy).  
The types of preventive measures show some commonality but differ across the Member 
State. They include subsidies to the acquiring member institution, capital support, loans, 
asset/liability purchases, support to bridge institutions or asset management 
companies, guarantees on assets/liabilities and take-over of third-party claims (see 
Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1 Preventive measures specified in legislation 
Country 
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Croatia  X  X 
(property) 
 X  
France  X  X X X  
Germany 
(Cooperatives)* 
X X X X  X  
Germany 
(Savings) 
 X X   X X 
Italy (excl. 
Cooperatives) 
 X  X  X  
Italy 
(Cooperatives) 
 X X X  X  
Poland  
(Cooperatives) 
 X X X  X X 
Spain** X X X X 
(unprofitable) 
   
Total 2 8 5 7 1 7 2 
Notes: *Traditionally BVR primarily uses guarantees (80 %) and grants (20 %). **Only the specific alternative 
measures specified in the Spanish law are covered in the table, whereas France and Spain also have a general 
provision that allows any financial support measure. 
Source: CEPS-Milieu elaboration 
 
5.3.1.3 No resolution action 
The DGS can only contribute when the resolution authority has not taken any resolution 
action. All Member States have transposed this condition into their legislation. In the 
specific context of Poland, because the Bank Guarantee Fund (BGF) acts both as the 
DGS and resolution authority, it has the discretion to finance measures (e.g. guarantees, 
loans, cash compensations) to a failing or likely to fail cooperative bank under Article 
11(3) DGSD, or initiate a resolution procedure conducive to the same type of measures 
(e.g. a purchase and assumption transaction) with the use of the resolution fund and 
the DGS142. The decision is nevertheless subject to approval of the Polish financial 
supervision authority (KNF). 
 
5.3.1.4 Systems and procedures for selection and monitoring 
The DGS must have appropriate systems and procedures in place for selecting and 
implementing preventive measures and monitoring affiliated risks. All relevant Member 
States have adopted this condition143.  
                                           
142 The DGS can contribute to resolution within the meaning of Article 11(2) DGSD and Article 109 BRRD. 
143 Although Poland has not officially transposed the condition, it has been implemented in practice as the 
DGS has issued a number of internal resolutions establishing such systems and procedures. 
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Those Member States that used their DGS for the financing of preventive measures prior 
to the DGSD have already had systems and procedures in place (Italy, Poland and 
Spain). In Poland, member institutions covered by the DGS shall provide, at the DGS’ 
request, information required to control the adequate use of assistance and support 
measures (taken under both Article 11(3) and 11(6) DGSD) and monitor the economic 
and financial situation as well as management system of a member institution receiving 
financial assistance (Article 5(2) DGSD). In France, if the DGS accepts to intervene, it 
defines, after consulting the French prudential authority, the conditions for this 
intervention. Therefore, the systems/procedures for selection and monitoring would be 
set when the NOD was applied. In Germany, the DGSs for cooperative banks and saving 
banks have also strong monitoring procedures that existed prior to the DGSD. The 
monitoring is different for Member States that transposed this NOD with the DGSD. For 
instance, the Irish central bank has not put any system in place and intends to create 
procedures on a case-by-case basis for selecting and implementing preventive measures 
and monitoring affiliated risks. 
 
5.3.1.5 Costs not exceeding mandate under the DGS  
The costs of the measures may not exceed the costs of fulfilling the statutory or 
contractual mandate of the DGS. With the exception of Croatia and Italy, all relevant 
Member States have transposed this condition with similar wording as in the DGSD. 
In Croatia, the cost of the measures must not exceed 50 % of the amount of the covered 
deposits of the member institution. In Italy, the cost of the intervention shall not exceed 
the cost which the system would have to bear in order to carry out other interventions 
in the cases provided for by the law or by the DGS’ statutes. 
There is not much information about the practical implementation, probably because 
the NOD has not been used since the adoption of the DGSD. In Poland144, the forced 
administrator appointed by the KNF would prepare the financial information preceding 
its appointment and report on the level of assets, equity, and liabilities, including 
covered deposits. This report would be audited by a certified auditor. Based on the 
experience with multiple failing SKOKs (cooperative credit and saving unions), if the 
administrator finds that the assets are insufficient to cover the liabilities, i.e. in case of 
insolvency, the KNF seeks another member institution (domestic) that would be willing 
and able to safely take over the insolvent member institutions. If the amount of covered 
deposits is higher than the difference between the assets and liabilities, the KNF offers 
to the acquiring bank a non-repayable subsidy to cover this difference between assets 
and liabilities. 
The German IPS for cooperatives have a similar approach. They consider the amount 
that they have to inject in the failing member institution as the costs of the preventive 
measures, while the total covered deposits in the failing member institution are 
considered as the costs associated with the pay-out. The costs of the preventive 
measure need to be less than the covered deposits to meet this condition.  
 
                                           
144 See the announcement of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF), which contains a description of 
how this condition should be checked in practice.  
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5.3.1.6 More stringent risk monitoring for the DGS 
More stringent risk monitoring and greater verification rights for the DGS are another 
condition for the use of preventive measures. Most relevant Member States145 have 
transposed this condition with similar wording as in the DGSD. 
Austria has introduced a stricter wording as compared to the DGSD requiring DGSs to 
impose severe conditions on the entity benefiting from preventive measures.  
In France, this condition, transposed in a general way, does not require specifically that 
the conditions imposed should involve at least more stringent risk monitoring and 
greater verification rights for the deposit guarantee and resolution fund.  
Croatia and Poland have implemented this condition by imposing several detailed 
requirements on entities benefiting from the preventive measures146.  
In Germany, the cooperative DGS has the possibility to replace board members, require 
merger talks, reductions in specific business models, portfolios, etc. This may also 
require a change of the business model to guarantee long-term viability and close 
monitoring to follow the recovery. 
 
5.3.1.7 Securing access to covered deposits 
The preventive measures under this NOD must be linked to continued access to covered 
deposits. All relevant Member States, except possibly for France147, have transposed 
this condition with similar wording as in the DGSD.  
 
5.3.1.8 Ability to pay the extraordinary contributions 
The ability of the affiliated member institutions to pay the extraordinary contributions is 
confirmed in the assessment of the competent authority. Croatia, France and Spain have 
not transposed this condition. 
 
5.3.1.9 Consultation of resolution and competent authority 
The DGS shall consult the resolution authority and the competent authority on the 
measures and the conditions imposed on the member institution. All relevant Member 
States have transposed this condition. Poland has implemented it only in relation to 
preventive measures used for SKOKs. 
Member States introduced various forms of consultation and involved different entities. 
In Austria, an expert opinion by the national central bank and the consent of the 
resolution authority are required regarding the supporting measures and conditions for 
the member institution.  
In Croatia, the DGS decides on the use of preventive measures after obtaining opinions 
of the national central bank as well as of the competent and resolution authority.  
                                           
145 I.e. Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malta and Spain. 
146 This includes information requirements in Poland, the right of the DGS to appoint members of the 
supervisory board, the risk committee and the audit committee, the need to specify the manner and deadlines 
for reporting on the implementation of the restructuring plan as well as the exit strategy and other monitoring 
by the DGS to verify whether the member institution complies with its obligations in Croatia. 
147 The preventive measures were used in 1999 for the last time and there is no other information on how the 
provision would be applied. 
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In Germany, the national competent authority (BaFin) shall confirm the ability of 
affiliated member institutions to pay the extraordinary contributions.  
Ireland has adopted the provisions in the DGSD literally and requires that the designated 
authority shall consult the resolution authority and the competent authority on the 
measures and conditions that it is considering imposing on any member institution. 
However, given that the national central bank acts both as the competent and resolution 
authority, the consultation will take place between the competent departments.  
In Italy, the resolution authority Bank of Italy is consulted by the respective DGS on the 
possibility to reorganise the institution. The DGSs follow internal procedures to assess 
whether the potential restructuring meets the conditions under the DGSD and the Italian 
law. The DGS asks for the opinion of the Bank of Italy before making the final decision. 
The new legal framework does not, however, require specific authorisation from the 
Bank of Italy.  
In Malta, the DGS shall consult the resolution and competent authorities, which are both 
part of the Malta Financial Services Authority, on the measures and the conditions 
imposed on the member institution.  
In Poland, as regards preventive measures for SKOKs, the DGS consults the KNF as the 
competent supervisory authority, which must issue a positive decision about the 
restructuring programme for the beneficiary member institution and lack of risk related 
to the acquisition by another member institution. No consultation requirements are 
provided for in relation to preventive measures to support acquisition of ailing member 
institutions by other members. 
Finally, in Spain, preventive measures would be subject to an agreed plan approved by 
the competent authority, after consulting the Spanish resolution authority (FROB). 
There are no guidelines or internal documents setting out the details of neither the 
collaboration involving the DGS, the FROB and the national competent authority (Bank 
of Spain)148, nor the timeframe of the consultation.  
 
5.3.1.10 Practical experience with the NOD so far  
The preventive measures have been used prior to the DGSD (e.g. Italy and Spain). More 
specifically, the following measures have been used: i) guarantees for losses related to 
certain activities or exposures of the acquired entity (e.g. Italy and Spain); iii) a non-
repayable contribution to cover negative equity (e.g. Italy); iv) a guarantee to cover 
additional costs arising from tax payments on the other financial support (e.g. Italy); v) 
recapitalisation (e.g. Spain); vi) loans (e.g. Spain); vii) acquisition of damaged assets 
(e.g. Spain).  
 
                                           
148 All of them are expected to be involved because the representatives of each authority are present in the 
structural organisation of the other authority: the FROB sits within the Bank of Spain and the Bank of Spain 
is a member of the Managing Board of the Spanish DGS, DGFCI. 
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Italy used to apply preventive measures prior to the DGSD. However, the decision of 
the European Commission in the Tercas Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia di Teramo 
case challenged the possibility for the DGS in Italy to use the preventive measures. 
According to the FITD, the Italian DGS, this created issues for the Italian banking system 
and four banks had to be put into resolution rather than benefit from preventive 
measures. 
Italy approved preventive measures for Tercas in 2014. The FITD support intervention 
was authorised by the Bank of Italy on 7 July 2014 and entailed the following measures: 
i) EUR 265 million as a non-repayable contribution to cover the negative equity of 
Tercas; ii) EUR 35 million as a guarantee (for up to three years) to cover the credit risk 
associated with certain exposures of Tercas. Those exposures (two bullet loans maturing 
on 31 March 2015) were fully repaid by the debtors at maturity and hence the guarantee 
expired without being triggered; and, iii) up to EUR 30 million as a guarantee to cover 
additional costs arising from tax payments on the measure. Such tax payments would 
be necessary if the measure was not tax-exempted under Italian law. That specific tax 
exemption for intervention measures by the FITD would, according to the relevant legal 
text, be subject to the approval of the European Commission. The FITD paid out the full 
amount of EUR 30 million to Tercas at a point in time when the European Commission 
had not yet decided on that tax exemption. On 23 December 2015 the European 
Box 2. Least-cost test of savings banks in Austria and Germany  
S-Haftung is an IPS, recognised as a DGS, for savings institutions in Austria. It does 
not have a detailed methodology for the least-cost test. However, historically the 
least-cost test is on a cash flow basis and considers the covered deposits of the 
distressed institution plus the administrative costs which could be incurred in a 
hypothetical pay-out (i.e. costs to fulfil their obligation as a DGS). In turn, the total 
amount of funds injected in the institution (liquidity support, capital injection, etc.) 
are considered the costs of financing a prevention measure.  
The conditions for the support are based on the contractual agreements of the IPS 
with the member institutions and internal monitoring and financial support guideline. 
In general, there are no restrictions as to which conditions may be imposed. 
Depending on the institution’s difficulties, the conditions would entail changes in the 
management board, credit underwriting standards, approval requirements, additional 
reporting obligations, etc. The conditions are determined on a case-by-case basis 
depending on the support measures and the internal guideline. 
The Deutsche Sparkassen und Giroverband (DSGV) in Germany also has an IPS 
recognised as a DGS. The least-cost test is defined on a cash flow basis, i.e. the upper 
limit for preventive measures is the amount of covered deposits to be compensated 
in case of failure of a member institution. The amount of covered deposits is collected 
quarterly from each of the member institutions. In practice, costs for preventive 
measures (injection of equity, issuance of guarantees and payment of third-party 
claims) are, according to the IPS, much smaller than compensating depositors in case 
of failure of a member institution based on cash-flows. 
If the institution requires support from the IPS, the involved parties enter into a 
support agreement according to the articles of association of the IPS. This agreement 
covers, among others, the support measures, resources to be provided as well as the 
conditions imposed on the member institution that is being supported and the duration 
of the reorganisation phase. The set of conditions imposed on the member institution 
are determined based on a case-by-case basis, taking into account a detailed analysis 
of the specific circumstances of the institution concerned. The conditions can include 
specific performance indicators such as a target agreement for future business 
planning and the initiation of personnel changes on the board of the member 
institution. 
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Commission issued a decision that the three measures constituted prohibited State aid 
and had to be repaid by the beneficiary. On 19 March 2019, the General Court annulled 
the European Commission’s decision and the case is currently pending before the EU 
Court of Justice149.  
In Spain, preventive measures were also used. The most frequently used measures 
included a recapitalisation, guarantees, loans, an acquisition of damaged assets and the 
use of the Scheme for the Protection of Assets (Esquema de Protección de Activos, EPA). 
Under this scheme, the FROB guaranteed the value or part of the value of a set of assets 
of the beneficiary entity (Bank of Valencia, Cajasur, Banco Castilla la Mancha, CAM Bank, 
etc.). The scheme serves, consequently, to protect the acquiring member institution 
against potential losses of an entity in financial distress so as to enable and ease the 
sale. The costs should be limited as the guarantees are meant not to be called, due to 
the recovery of the asset value.  
Most of the IPSs in Austria and Germany combine the DGS and IPS function with another 
voluntary fund. The other voluntary funds are private and can be used for preventive 
measures when the DGS cannot be used. In practice, these other funds are likely to be 
depleted first before the DGS will contribute. For example, the German savings banks 
have both an IPS recognised as DGS and a private IPS. Both DGSs have a target level 
of 0.8 % of covered deposits until July 2024; the amounts in the IPS have not been 
disclosed. In 2018 and 2019, the IPSs had to deal with one case each year.  
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The use of DGS funds for early intervention can both increase and decrease the risk 
profile of the national DGS. It distorts the level playing field, strengthens depositor 
confidence and is most relevant for Member States with IPSs recognised as DGSs. 
Overall, the main challenge for this NOD is its interaction with the BRRD and State aid 
policy. Currently, the NOD seems available for use mainly to private DGSs that are not 
subject to State aid, this being under scrutiny in the Tercas case pending before the EU 
Court of Justice. 
 
5.3.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
When all the conditions are met, the costs of preventive measures should lower the 
costs for the DGS and thus the risk profile of the DGS. The least-cost test should 
normally ensure that the costs for the DGS are less than in the case of a pay-out. 
However, the methodology used for the test does not necessarily take into account the 
potential recovery in insolvency given the preferential creditor ranking of the DGS. 
It is not straightforward to perform the least-cost test even with a more sophisticated 
methodology. In practice, for every real case, one can observe the costs of the 
preventive measures with a counterfactual of a hypothetical pay-out event. However, 
the two costs can never be observed ex post at the same time and for the same event. 
The valuation of a failing institution is uncertain and must often be based on 
assumptions (default rates, recovery rates, economic forecasts, etc.) and can turn out 
better or worse compared to the anticipated economic developments. The use of 
preventive measures could therefore either increase or decrease the risk for the national 
DGS. The potentially most detrimental risk is that the DGS uses such measures to 
                                           
149 The General Court annulled the European Commission’s decision because it concluded incorrectly that the 
measures granted to Tercas entailed the use of State resources and were imputable to the State. The Court 
also ruled that in a situation in which the measures were taken by a private DGS, the Commission had to 
have sufficient evidence to conclude that those measures were taken under the actual influence or control of 
the public authorities and that, accordingly, they were, in fact, imputable to the State.  
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prevent a failure of an institution, which nevertheless fails afterwards. This could be 
conducive to moral hazard (amounting to saving ‘zombie’ institutions) and, most 
importantly, leave the DGS with insufficient funds to compensate depositors in the same 
or other subsequent events of failure. 
 
5.3.2.2 Level playing field 
The early interventions from the national DGS are likely to distort both the domestic as 
well as cross-border level playing field because a member institution that would have 
otherwise failed, will receive a financial benefit while other banks in the same situation 
would be put into insolvency. This allows the beneficiary member institution to continue 
operating and thus competing with other institutions in the same market. In a cross-
border context, banks in the jurisdiction allowing for preventive measures are placed at 
an advantage compared to member institutions of DGSs in other Member States not 
using the NOD. In practice, this distortion is to some extent mitigated through the State 
aid rules, which limit distortions to competition. 
The same consideration applies to depositors because creditors, including eligible 
depositors (with non-covered deposits above EUR 100 000) are less likely to lose their 
funds in Member States where such measures are applicable, as pay-out events would 
be less frequent, if any. 
In addition, the Tercas decision also gives rise to an unlevel playing field, as the NOD 
seems available for use mainly to private DGSs which are more likely than public DGSs 
to fall outside the State aid rules. However, the origin of available financial means of 
both public and private DGSs is the same, i.e. based on contributions from member 
institutions.  
 
5.3.2.3 Depositor confidence  
Preventive measures strengthen depositor confidence. As the member institution is 
rescued, by preventing the failure, all deposits, including those above EUR 100 000, 
would be shielded against a potential loss in insolvency. Accordingly, preventive 
measures maintain the depositors’ access to their deposits, whereas in pay-out events 
they would have to wait a few days for repayment or to claim the non-covered deposits 
in insolvency.  
 
5.3.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
The NOD is relevant for Member States with IPSs recognised as DGS and to a lesser 
extent for the DGSs aiming to avoid pay-out and reduce the losses resulting from failing 
member institutions150. There are two broad views about this way of tackling bank 
failures. On the one hand, some argue that failures should be dealt with to the extent 
possible in the same manner as other business failures, i.e. limit public intervention as 
far as possible and use the insolvency framework when possible. On the other hand, 
others take the view that bank liquidations are not appropriate given the social and 
economic impact , including losses of eligible depositors and destruction of economic 
value in insolvency151.  
                                           
150 The latter events to reduce losses resulting from failing member institutions can also be addressed with 
the alternative measures under Article 11(6) DGSD assessed in NOD 14. 
151 More specifically, the surveys demonstrated that while the SRB argues and acts very much in line with the 
former view, other resolution authorities such as the Danish and Italian authorities would be in favour of the 
latter view.  
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In practice, the NOD has not been used during the recent ‘peace time’ years since the 
adoption of the DGSD in 2014. Only very few capital measures would meet the 
conditions of Article 11(3) DGSD. Instead, several preventive measures were taken 
under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). These so-called 
precautionary recapitalisations are allowed when the bank is solvent and when the funds 
are not used to offset losses that the institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the 
near future152. In the case of precautionary recapitalisation, the costs for executing the 
mandate under the DGSD would be zero (as the bank is solvent, there is no expected 
pay-out to depositors)153. This was also expressed in the Tercas decision, which made 
it de facto impossible up to the start of 2019 to use the NOD. Hence, the support to 
Tercas was considered State aid as the capital injection went, according to the European 
Commission, beyond the repayment of depositors154. The ongoing judicial procedure 
might change the scope for using this NOD.  
Currently, the NOD is mostly relevant for IPSs (e.g. Austria and Germany) aiming to 
prevent the failures of member institutions and therefore any pay-out. Moreover, they 
also have additional voluntary schemes outside the State aid rules allowing for more 
manoeuvre to use preventive measures. 
 
Box 3. Role of preventive and alternative measures in crisis management 
framework 
The role of preventive measures (Article 11(3) DGSD – NOD 13) has been marginalised 
within the current crisis management framework. There are in practice very few cases 
that would meet the conditions. 
     -  The DGS can only deliver a preventive contribution when the costs of the 
preventive measures do not exceed the costs of fulfilling its mandate (least cost 
test). 
     -    The State aid rules seem to constitute the main obstacle to the use of preventive 
measures. Some IPSs seem to be allowed to use preventive measures whereas 
some DGSs cannot.  
     -    The preventive measures can be used for banks that are not considered failing 
or likely to fail (FOLTF). Otherwise, depending on the public interest assessment 
of the SRB, the bank falls under the resolution framework or the national 
insolvency proceedings (liquidation or alternative measure according to Article 
11(6) DGSD – NOD 14). 
However, this does not mean that there is no potential role for preventive measures in 
the crisis management framework. More specifically, the IPSs i) avoid failures of their 
members to minimise the losses for creditors (also non-covered deposits), ii) avoid 
contagion to other member institutions, and iii) preserve stakeholder banks (cooperative 
banks, savings banks or public banks). The IPSs are currently organised as either 
voluntary schemes or recognised as DGSs. 
Given the difference in the objectives of the IPSs and DGSs and order of the crisis 
management measures, it would therefore appear sensible to separate both functions. 
This would allow the IPSs to support preventive measures to their member institutions 
before the resolution authorities intervene. 
 
                                           
152 See Article 32(4) of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. 
153 This is different for liquidity concerns that can lead to concerns about the repayment of covered deposits, 
but are not necessarily accompanied with solvency problems that make a member institution failing or likely 
to fail. 
154 See the Decision of the European Commission with respect to the Italian Banca Tercas, Commission press 
release IP/15/6395, 23 December 2015. 
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Figure 5.1 Priority of crisis management measures  
 
Note: The figure above shows some of the applicable crisis management 
measures (they also include early intervention). In practice, some of the 
measures (in particular the precautionary recapitalisation and preventive 
measures) could be taken in parallel. For example, the deposit insurance can 
contribute to the financing of resolution tools or prevent or contribute to the 
insolvency.  
Source: CEPS elaboration 
 
Unlike the preventive measures, the objectives of alternative measures and of the 
deposit insurance are largely aligned. Both ensure that the covered deposits are 
protected, while the alternative measures make it possible to reduce the costs for the 
DGS in the pay-out. It is therefore reasonable to allow the DGS to also take alternative 
measures to reduce the required available financial means. 
 
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
The preventive measures (NOD 13) are crucial for IPSs recognised as DGSs. These IPSs 
rely on this NOD to achieve their main goal, i.e. to prevent the failure of member 
institutions by intervening before the resolution phase. In addition, some DGSs are also 
interested in using preventive measures to lower the costs of intervention as compared 
to a pay-out. The latter could, however, achieve the same result using the alternative 
measures (NOD 14).  
Against this background, it is recommended to enable DGSs and IPSs recognised as 
DGSs to perform the preventive measures with voluntary funds (Option 3). The IPSs 
recognised as DGS would be compensated by reducing their contributions to the DGS 
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(NOD 17). This policy option would appear the most compatible with EDIS taking the 
full insurance scheme. 
Alternatively, depending on the outcome of the political negotiations in relation to the 
final design of EDIS (assuming an amount of funds left at national level) and if there is 
a political will to maintain the NOD, some targeted improvements would be required 
(Option 1). The least-cost test should be defined in order to (i) ensure the level playing 
field in the Banking Union (between IPSs and private and public DGSs), (ii) protect the 
available financial means of the fund, and (iii) avoid support to institutions that would 
fail after the preventive measure. 
The recent changes to the creditor hierarchy regarding the preferential ranking of 
covered deposits can have a strong impact on the least-cost test and can reduce the 
possibility of applying preventive measures. For the calibration of the least-cost test, 
some factors that could mitigate the impact of the ranking of depositors could be 
envisaged, such as the impact of pay-out on financial stability and on the available 
financial means of the DGS155.  
In addition, it would be necessary to strengthen the level playing field across the EU.  
- The State aid rules need to be clarified. They seem to constitute the main 
obstacle to the use of the NOD and seem to allow some IPSs to use preventive 
measures whereas some DGSs cannot. 
- In a cross-border context, some institutions can benefit from preventive 
measures (if the article 11(3) DGSD has been transposed into national law) 
whereas others in the same situation cannot. Moreover, the available tools for 
preventive measures differ across the EU, which distorts the level playing field. 
Therefore, the protection of depositors differs across the EU. 
Finally, the interactions between preventive measures and the resolution framework 
should be clarified (see Box 3). 
 
5.3.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form  
This policy option considers retaining the NOD to allow DGSs to use preventive measures 
under EDIS. However, the following improvements would be recommended: the least-
cost test should be defined, the level playing field should be strengthened (State aid 
rules, set of tools available for DGSs), and the interaction between preventive measures 
and the resolution framework has to be clarified. 
Effectiveness: This option would contribute to effective depositor protection because it 
maintains access to deposits, both covered and non-covered, and could also reduce the 
destruction of economic value in insolvency, including of the expected funds required in 
case of a pay-out. However, the current least-cost test is not sufficiently clear as to 
whether it takes into account the preferential ranking of the DGS in insolvency (i.e. 
extent that repaid deposits can be recovered).  
Efficiency: Despite the formalisation of the least-cost test that might increase the costs 
for the DGSs, preventive measures are in general considered less costly than pay-outs 
that form a considerable administrative burden for the DGSs.  
Coherence: This option in its current form has a negative impact on coherence and the 
level playing field. While the conditions under this NOD should ensure that ‘zombie’ 
institutions are not rescued, member institutions in the jurisdiction allowing for 
preventive measures are put at an advantage compared to member institutions of DGSs 
in other Member States not using the NOD. The same unlevel playing field also applies 
                                           
155 In an insolvency procedure, the DGSs could face uncertainty and potentially also temporary liquidity needs 
as they might wait a lot of time for the recovery in insolvency. 
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to depositors because eligible depositors (with non-covered deposits above 
EUR 100 000) are less likely to lose their funds in jurisdictions using the NOD and 
avoiding the pay-out. By contrast, in a pay-out, eligible depositors would be able to 
recover their uninsured deposits depending on the losses of the failed institution. 
Another incoherence consists in a different treatment of private and public DGS from 
the perspective of State aid rules (see discussion of level playing field above).  
Subsidiarity: This option would maintain the current level of flexibility for DGSs and IPSs 
recognised as DGSs.  
 
5.3.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD. 
Effectiveness: The NOD has been used only in very few cases during the recent years. 
However, in the event of crisis, eliminating of the NOD could reduce effectiveness in 
terms of higher costs for failures and lower depositor confidence. 
Efficiency: The elimination of the NOD could potentially increase the costs of the DGS. 
However, as the NOD is only used in exceptional cases, the impact on efficiency is limited 
overall. 
Coherence: Eliminating the NOD would reduce the distortion of the level playing field by 
treating all member institutions in the same way. However, the IPSs would be still able 
to use preventive measures outside the DGSD framework. 
Subsidiarity: This option would reduce subsidiarity and impact the functioning of IPSs 
and DGSs using preventive measure to tackle bank failures. 
 
5.3.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
Depending on the transposition of the NOD into the national laws, the DGSs can 
currently have different objectives across the EU: protection of covered deposits only 
(paybox function), or also preventive measures (IPSs) or alternative measures (see 
NOD 14). These differences could make the build-up of EDIS taking the form of the full 
insurance scheme more complicated. 
Therefore, this policy option considers that the DGSs could still use preventive measures 
but would have to finance them with voluntary funds. In addition, the definition of the 
least-cost test would not be necessary under this option. However, the State aid rules 
may still need to be clarified (see above). 
Effectiveness: Under this option, an additional buffer of funds could be raised by DGSs 
to be used for preventive measures and would thus be beneficial for effective depositor 
protection and financial stability.  
Efficiency: For the members of IPSs recognised as DGSs, the contributions would be 
split between the DGSs and IPSs. The costs for these institutions would be higher than 
in the current framework. In practice, however, the existing IPSs recognised as DGSs 
already have voluntary funds. The DGSs would still have to meet the target level of 
0.8 % of covered deposits, while the remainder or additional contributions could be used 
to finance preventive measures.  
Therefore, this alternative option would increase the contributions for the members of 
IPSs recognised as DGSs. Importantly, the additional contributions to the voluntary fund 
might be partially offset by lower contributions to both the DGS (see NOD 17) and the 
resolution fund. 
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Coherence: The alternative option potentially improves the consistency as it mitigates 
the distortion of the level playing field. 
Subsidiarity: This option impacts subsidiarity as compared to the current state of play.  
 
5.3.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers that preventive measures would be applied in all Member 
States. This option is similar to Option 1 under which DGSs retain discretion whether to 
use DGS funds for preventive measures. The DGSD would be amended so as to remove 
the text ‘Member States may allow’. 
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5.4 NOD 14 – Financing of measures to preserve access of covered 
deposits 
Summary: NOD 14 - Financing of measures to preserve access of covered 
deposits 
DGSD [Article 11 (6)] 
Member States may decide that the available financial means may also be used to finance 
measures to preserve the access of depositors to covered deposits, including transfer of 
assets and liabilities and deposit book transfer, in the context of national insolvency 
proceedings, provided that the costs borne by the DGS do not exceed the net amount of 
compensating covered depositors at the member institution concerned. 
Transposed into national law [11 Member States] 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Malta, Poland 
and the UK  
Practical experience so far [3 Member States] 
Italy, Poland and the UK 
Importance 
Limited156 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national 
DGS 
Level 
playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member States 
Overall + +/- + + 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current 
form 
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
[Recommended] 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness +/- - ++ +/- 
Efficiency + - ++ + 
Coherence + +/- + + 
Subsidiarity + - -/+ + 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
Under Article 11(6) DGSD, DGS’ available financial means may be used for other 
purpose than compensating depositors of failing banks (so-called alternative 
measures).157 
                                           
156 The potential reduction in costs for the DGS varies largely across cases. Based on experience so far, the 
NOD is primarily used for small member institutions, which involves relatively small amounts of covered 
deposits. 
157 In this study, measures under Article 11(6) DGSD are referred to as ‘alternative measures’, to distinguish 
them from ‘preventive measures’, under Article 11(3) DGSD (NOD 13). 
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Such alternative measures are normally used for banks for which there is no public 
interest in resolution and which are to be liquidated under national insolvency 
proceedings. In this case, in order to preserve the access of depositors to covered 
deposits and, at the same time, limit the destruction of value in a piecemeal liquidation, 
the DGS can finance the transfer of the assets and liabilities, or only a deposit book, 
from a failing bank to an acquiring bank in the context of insolvency. 
The ability to use the NOD depends on whether national insolvency law provides the 
possibility of such transfers in liquidation.  
11 Member States transposed the NOD158.  
In Lithuania, this NOD had been implemented only in relation to credit unions and 
became ineffective as of 1 January 2018 when the new law reforming the Lithuanian 
credit union system came into force.  
Poland also implemented the NOD first in relation to credit unions and most recently 
extended the application to other member institutions159. The types of measures that 
the Polish DGS can adopt to financially support the acquiring entity are: (i) assumption 
of shares of an acquiring member institution; (ii) granting a loan or guarantee; (iii) 
granting a guarantee of the total or partial coverage of losses resulting from the risk 
associated with the assumed or acquired property rights or assumed liabilities; and, (iv) 
granting a subsidy for the potential loss for the DGS160. 
 
5.4.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The main objectives of the NOD are to lower the costs of a pay-out and enhance 
depositor confidence and system stability. 
First, most Member States transposed the NOD because these alternative measures can 
be less costly compared to pay-outs. As a general principle, the sale of part of a member 
institution in blocs would likely lead to higher revenues (e.g. at least some of the 
franchise value is maintained) than atomistic sales (including fire sales) which usually 
take longer, entail more administrative costs and destruction of value, and hence lower 
revenues. The IMF is supportive of this approach161. In the EU, Italy has had long 
experience in the application of alternative measures. Out of 12 interventions of the 
FITD over the last 30 years, only 2 cases led to pay-outs. The other 10 interventions 
were managed through preventive measures (NOD 13) and alternative measures (NOD 
14), namely transfer of assets and liabilities and/or support to member institutions in 
situations of extraordinary administration. 
Second, some Member States transposed the NOD because of reduced disturbance for 
depositors and the financial system. The transfer of the deposits facilitates a smoother 
and market-based wind-up of member institutions. In Greece, the provision was 
transposed to put in place the possibility for a fast transfer of covered deposits to 
another member institution in order to avoid the typical and time-consuming processes 
involved in opening an account. 
                                           
158 I.e. Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and the UK. 
159 Article 5a and 268a of the BGF Act, adopted on 29 November 2018 and entered into force on 
1 January 2019. 
160 Article 264(2) of the BGF Act. 
161 IMF (2018), Euro Area Policies - Financial Sector Assessment Program: Technical Note, Bank Resolution 
and Crisis Management. 
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By contrast, the complexity of alternative measures, including notably the least-cost 
test, were frequently mentioned as the main reason for not transposing the NOD. 
 
5.4.1.2 Decision to use DGS funds for alternatives 
This NOD has been used to a very limited extent and only a few Member States have 
more specific provisions regulating its use162.  
Member States allow for various alternative measures in their national transpositions. 
Finland and Greece allow for a deposit book transfer, while Italy allows the transfer of 
assets and liabilities (including deposit book). In Denmark, the NOD has been 
transposed through a specific concept of a ‘dowry’ whereby the DGS contributes to the 
resolution of a financial institution by transferring means or providing guarantees to 
cover all its non-subordinated creditors (i.e. both covered deposits, other deposits and 
other non-subordinated creditors). The remainder of the member institution is 
afterwards liquidated. Finansiel Stabilitet163 can, on behalf of the Danish DGS, decide to 
contribute to the liquidation of the bank by providing funds or providing a guarantee.  
The authorities competent to decide on the use of alternative measures are also very 
different across Member States: the Financial Stability Authority in Finland, the DGS and 
the Malta Financial Services Authority jointly in Malta, the DGS in consultation with the 
Bank of Italy164 and the KNF in Poland165.  
 
5.4.1.3 Least-cost test 
Under the least-cost test defined under Article 11(6) DGSD, the DGS intervention is 
limited to the ‘net amount of compensating covered depositors’ in consideration of the 
liquidation process, i.e. corresponding to the total amount required to reimburse 
covered depositors minus the amount of proceeds DGS would receive from the 
insolvency estate. This is different from the least-cost test under Article 11(3)(c) DGSD 
which only states that the amount of the intervention should not exceed ‘the costs of 
fulfilling the statutory or contractual mandate of the DGS’.  
                                           
162 For example, in Belgium, a Royal Decree is expected to determine the terms and conditions for undertaking 
such measures, but has not been issued so far. 
163 Finansiel Stabilitet is an independent public enterprise owned by the Danish state through the Ministry of 
Business and Growth, of which the Danish FSA (Finanstilsynet) is an integral part. The Danish FSA is the 
competent authority for bank resolutions and supervision. 
164 The DGS consults before adopting the measures, as Bank of Italy is the national competent authority to 
decide the opening of a liquidation procedure and appoints the liquidator. However, the decision whether to 
intervene or not and in what manner lies with the DGS. The DGS would only consider an intervention when 
the acquiring bank is very strong. Bank of Italy implements the decision. 
165 The Polish Financial Supervisory Authority (KNF) appoints a forced administrator who prepares the financial 
information for the day preceding its appointment. The administrator reports on the level of assets, balance 
sheet equity, and liabilities, including covered deposits. This report is audited by a certified auditor. If the 
administrator finds that the assets of the member institution (SKOK) are insufficient to cover its liabilities, 
which meant that the SKOK was insolvent, the KNF first seeks another SKOK that would be able to safely take 
over the insolvent SKOK. Once this search proves unsuccessful, the KNF seeks in an open procedure a 
domestic bank that could safely take over the insolvent SKOK. If this search also proves unsuccessful, the 
KNF starts insolvency proceedings in court. A court decision declaring the SKOK bankrupt triggers deposit 
guarantee pay-outs. By contrast, if there is a domestic SKOK or member institution willing to take over the 
insolvent SKOK and the amount of covered deposits in that SKOK is higher than the difference between the 
balance sheet value of the SKOK’s property rights and the balance sheet value of the its liabilities from the 
guaranteed funds, the KNF offers to the acquiring SKOK or other member institution a non-repayable subsidy 
to cover this difference between assets and liabilities. Since January 2019, besides SKOKs, this NOD can also 
be used for other member institutions. 
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There is no detailed information about the application of a least-cost test at national 
level. Most Member States transposed the condition that the costs borne by the DGS 
shall not exceed the net amount of compensation for covered depositors at the member 
institution concerned.  
Italy specified that such interventions constitute an alternative to the reimbursement 
of depositors where it is less costly compared to pay-out, taking into account, in the 
evaluation, the impact the liquidation of the bank could have on other banks in crisis 
and on the system as a whole. In Italy, two broad criteria are usually applied: the 
risks should be realistic and the estimated costs reasonable (see also Box 4). 
Poland transposed this condition by requiring that the funds committed by the DGS for 
the alternative measures are not higher than the total amount of covered deposits 
guaranteed166. This condition must be demonstrated before the decision to grant 
support to the acquiring entity. In other words, the costs of the measures should not 
be higher than the amount of covered deposits, which means that the implementation 
deviates from the intention of the legislation to consider the net covered deposits, i.e. 
in simple terms the total covered deposits minus the covered deposits that will be 
recovered in insolvency. 
 
In Malta, the national resolution authority (MFSA) should state the amount that would 
be requested from the DGS, the amount of the estimated pay-out, and the cost for the 
DGS. The DGS and MFSA might envisage the alternative measures if the financing 
costs less than a pay-out. It has never been used so far.  
 
 
 
                                           
166 Article 265 of the BGF Act. 
Box 4. Least-cost test of Italian cooperatives 
The least-cost test of the Depositors’ Guarantee Fund of Cooperative Banks (FGD -
the DGS of Italian cooperative banks) is based on the net costs. They consider the 
estimated net contribution of the fund. The costs under normal insolvency regime 
are basically the covered deposits minus the amount that the DGS would be 
expecting to recover. The recovery rates vary in view of social, economic and 
administrative differences across regions. The expected costs for the administration, 
liquidation procedure and other costs such as the costs for the migration of IT 
systems are also considered. As the liquidation procedures in Italy require several 
years, a discount factor is applied to obtain the net present value of the contribution 
of the DGS under the liquidation framework. These costs are compared to the net 
present value of the costs of the alternative measure and, in most cases, cover 
support for the transfer of assets and liabilities to the acquiring institution. In the 
search for an acquiring institution the FGD has the following order of preference: a 
cooperative bank (BCC) in the same district, ten largest BCCs, other non-cooperative 
institutions. This order reflects the objective of the FGD to preserve the Italian 
cooperative banking sector. 
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Box 5. Least-cost test of the FDIC 
Since 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the US has only 
been allowed to choose the least costly option to the Deposit Insurance Fund. 
Before the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) was implemented in 1991, the FDIC could 
also consider other factors such as local availability of banking services and stability 
of the bank sector. The only condition was that the cost of the alternative measures 
was less than that of a pay-out.  
To identify the least costly option, the FDIC performs a least-cost analysis. In this 
analysis the bids received for the assets and/or deposits (covered deposits or all 
deposits) of the failing bank are compared to the costs for the fund of liquidating the 
failing bank. The liquidation costs include estimation of the losses on assets as well 
as the receivership expenses of the FDIC. 
The least costly option according to the FDIC methodology is the option that 
generates most funds to compensate the claims on receivership (covered deposits, 
preferred creditors, uninsured depositors, etc.). The FDIC uses the following 
calculation (simplified):  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
= 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 − 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐶 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 (𝐵𝑖𝑑) − 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝  
Source: FDIC (2019). 
Box 6. Least-cost test in Denmark 
In Denmark, the default option for addressing bank failures is resolution. The Danish 
DGS can contribute to these institutions in resolution by transferring financial means 
and providing guarantees on all non-subordinated creditors. The scheme originally 
implemented in 2011 resembles the measures covered under this NOD. Importantly, 
under the scheme, all non-subordinated liabilities are transferred to the acquiring 
institution with support from the DGS (Dowry Scheme). The remainder of the 
institution is liquidated. 
The costs of the support from the DGS to the institution in resolution must be less 
than under regular bankruptcy proceedings. The latter is based on the Valuation 3 as 
defined under Article 74 BRRD, which is defined in the EBA regulatory technical 
standards (RTS) on valuation in resolution. This ensures that there is no creditor 
worse off in resolution than under regular bankruptcy proceedings. 
The Valuation 3 set out in the EBA RTS on valuation in resolution considers the 
discounted amount of cash flows under the normal insolvency proceedings applying 
the relevant discount rates, including i) the applicable insolvency law and practice; ii) 
foreseeable administration, transaction, maintenance, disposal and other costs which 
would have been incurred as well as financing costs; iii) information on recent past 
insolvency cases of similar entities. Moreover, the calculated proceeds from the 
valuation should be allocated to the shareholders and creditors, including the DGS, 
to determine the expected loss for the DGS. 
This exercise might be relatively simple but can take quite some time for mid-sized 
and larger banks. For example, in the case of Banco Popular, the SRB took more than 
one year after the resolution to finalise and publish the Valuation 3 report. 
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5.4.1.4 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
Only Italy, Poland and United Kingdom have used this NOD under the new DGSD.  
The Interbank Deposit Protection Fund (FITD, one of the two Italian DGSs) intervened 
in April 2018, in the context of the national insolvency proceedings of Banca Sviluppo 
Economico with a contribution of EUR 4.5 million to support the transfer of assets and 
liabilities (including deposits) of the mentioned bank to the Banca Agricola Popolare di 
Ragusa. The cost of the intervention that made it possible to preserve the access of 
depositors to their covered deposits was considered lower than the net amount of 
covered depositors to be compensated. The guaranteed deposits amounted to 
EUR 26.8 million (EUR 22.3 million above the FITD contribution) covering 1 602 
depositors167. The intervention was considered successful because there was no material 
effect on the balance sheet of the acquiring member institution168.  
Since the entry into force of the DGSD, Poland has used alternative measures 11 times. 
In all cases, alternative measures took the form of support granted to member 
institutions to take over an ailing SKOK. This support in each case had the form of i) a 
non-repayable subsidy to cover the difference between the balance sheet value of the 
acquired property rights and the balance sheet value of the acquired liabilities from the 
guaranteed funds, and ii) a guarantee to cover losses resulting from the acquired 
property rights. The amount of support granted by the Polish Bank Guarantee Fund 
(BGF) to acquire insolvent SKOKs was significantly lower than the amount of deposits 
that these SKOKs held at the moment when they were considered insolvent. No detailed 
information on the net gain due to the asset transfer was, however, available. 
The UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) transferred the deposits of the 
Shiremoor and District Credit Union Limited to Moneywise Credit Union Limited in July 
2018169. 
In addition, Denmark, Luxembourg and United Kingdom used such alternative measures 
to preserve access to deposits prior to the new DGSD. 
In Denmark, Finansiel Stabilitet used the Dowry Scheme once prior to both DGSD and 
BRRD (see also Box 6). The non-subordinated creditors of Spar Salling were in 2012 
transferred to Den Jyske Sparekasse. Finansiel Stabilitet considered various amounts 
for the assessment of the costs of the transfer. It considered the costs of the pay-out 
to Den Jyske Sparekasse to acquire the non-subordinated creditors, the amount in 
resolution and the estimated run-off costs. The latter formed the maximum amount that 
Finansiel Stabilitet contributes to the Dowry Scheme. 
In Luxembourg, this intervention was used in the context of the restructuring of 
Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg in 2008-2009. The private banking and deposit banking 
activities were finally taken over by Blackfish Capital, with the agreement of the AGDL, 
and invested in a new entity (Banque Havilland). The AGDL transferred to the new entity 
the amounts corresponding to deposits still not repaid, which later became fully 
accessible to depositors.  
In the UK, alternative measures were used in March 2009 for the retail and wholesale 
deposits, branches, head office and originated residential mortgages (other than social 
housing loans and related deposits) of Dunfermline, which were all transferred to 
Nationwide. This followed a sale process conducted by the Bank of England under the 
Special Resolution Regime provisions of the Banking Act 2009. The Treasury made a 
                                           
167 Notification from the Italian Interbank Deposit Protection Fund (Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi) 
in relation to the national insolvency proceeding of Banca Sviluppo Economico S.p.A.  
168 Banca Agricola Popolare di Ragusa had at the end of 2018 according to its annual accounts EUR 3 000 
million deposits and EUR 600 million capital end-2018. 
169 FSCS (2018), Shiremoor and District Credit Union Limited declared in default. 
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payment to Nationwide to cover the liabilities that were not covered by the assets that 
Nationwide also acquired. 
Many DGSs indicated that the possibility for using the NOD depends largely on the 
creditor hierarchy. The recent changes to the creditor hierarchy regarding the 
preferential ranking of covered deposits are likely to reduce the possibility of applying 
alternative measures such as the transfer of deposits. Indeed, more senior status for 
covered deposits implies fewer ‘ultimate’ losses on the DGS in liquidation. However, the 
transfer of deposits can still be financially attractive for the DGS as the funds required 
for the transfer can be substantially less than the funds required to repay the covered 
deposits in a pay-out event.  
Indeed, in a pay-out event, the DGS first has to repay the covered deposits, for which 
it receives a claim on the member institution in insolvency. The latter allows the DGS 
over time to recover some and potentially all of the repaid amount (gross costs > net 
costs of the pay-out). In the case of an asset and liability transfer which preserves the 
access to covered deposits, the repayment and recovery form a single transaction, which 
is settled around the time that the repayment would take place (gross costs ≈ net costs 
of the transfer). This means that the DGS requires in principle less funds for alternative 
measures than for immediate pay-out after the failure. To address the fact that a DGS 
prefers to have its funds at hand instead of a claim in insolvency, a discount factor can 
be applied in the least-cost test170.  
 Impact of the NOD  
Alternative measures are likely to have a largely similar impact to that of preventive 
measures (NOD 13). The impact on the risk profile of the DGS and on depositor 
confidence is likely positive, provided that the least-cost test is well executed, whereas 
the level playing field is somewhat distorted. The NOD could potentially be interesting 
for all Member States, notably with smaller member institutions, as these constitute the 
most frequent candidates where such measures could be applied. 
 
5.4.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The costs related to the intervention should in principle be lower than a normal pay-out, 
taking into consideration the potential recovery in insolvency. If the least-cost test is 
well defined and executed, the risk profile of the DGS is likely to decrease. 
However, in most cases, the methodology used for the test does not seem very 
sophisticated. It is acknowledged that it would always require some assumptions 
(default rates, recovery rates, economic forecasts, etc.), which can in practice mean 
that the least-cost test is either too positive or too negative about the value of the failing 
institution or recovery value in the event of a pay-out. This is less problematic than in 
the event of preventive measures (NOD 13), as the deposits are with the transfer carved 
out from the failing institution, which requires the failing institution to take the first loss 
instead of a potential renewed intervention in the case of preventive measures. All in 
all, targeted modifications in order to clarify the least-cost test would be beneficial, 
possibly following the rules used in the Valuation 3 in the BRRD. 
The take-over of the assets and liabilities could also destabilise the acquiring institution. 
To limit the risk of potential multiple rounds of depositor pay-outs, the DGS should also 
assess not only the value of a potential bid of an interested acquirer (i.e. least-cost 
test), but also the impact on the stability of the acquiring institution. When the acquiring 
                                           
170 As the recovery from the claim on the failed institution often requires time, it would be attractive to accept 
the assets and liability transaction even though the normal pay-out might ultimately cost less based only on 
the cash flows, i.e. not considering the lower value of later pay-outs anticipated in the least-cost test with the 
discount factor. 
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institution is fragile or becomes fragile due to the acquisition of the deposits, the DGS 
would risk having to pay out depositors of a larger institution. 
 
5.4.2.2 Level playing field 
In principle, the transfer of the (sometimes only covered) deposits or, more broadly, 
assets and liabilities from the failing institution to another institution, does not distort 
the level playing field. Besides the deposits that are carved out, the failing institution is 
wound down under the normal insolvency proceedings. 
However, there is a potential distortive effect on the level playing field due to the 
potential advantage for the acquiring institution. This institution might gain a 
competitive advantage from taking over the deposits at a low price. Such an effect would 
however be mitigated with an open competitive procedure.  
Lastly, there is also a cross-border impact on the level playing field for all players (DGSs, 
banks and their depositors), as DGSs and member institutions from jurisdictions that 
do not allow alternative measures are not able to benefit from the possible positive 
effects of alternative measures. Such positive effects include the interest and ability of 
a potential acquirer to take over assets and liabilities at a higher price than if the assets 
were sold at a fire sale in insolvency – conducive to lesser destruction of value for non-
covered deposits and economy as a whole, and the least-cost for the DGS. 
 
5.4.2.3 Depositor confidence  
The preserved access to deposits is beneficial for depositor confidence. If depositors 
continue to have access to covered and potentially also non-covered deposits, their 
confidence is not impacted despite few noticeable changes (ownership or name of the 
bank). In practice, the transfers of assets and liabilities are often presented as take-
overs instead of bank failures. 
 
5.4.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
The NOD has only been used to a limited extent in the recent ‘peace-times’. However, 
it could potentially be an interesting measure for Member States with many smaller 
retail institutions and low recovery values where the losses for those institutions and 
the banking sector would likely be higher. In addition, smaller institutions can generally 
be more easily absorbed by larger acquiring institutions and alternative measures could 
prove beneficial for further consolidation of the banking sector.  
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
In view of the current experience (including in Denmark, Italy, Poland and the US), 
alternative measures have demonstrated a high potential to give rise to positive effects 
on depositor confidence conducive to higher consolidation of the banking sector while 
mitigating the destruction of economic and social value, resulting into more optimal 
financial results for the DGS.  
Therefore, an alternative option (Option 3) would be recommended to introduce 
targeted modifications to the current NOD in order to ensure (i) an open competitive 
procedure to find a potential acquirer interested in taking over either assets and 
liabilities or just the deposit book at a higher price than the latter would have otherwise 
been materialised in insolvency (i.e. lesser destructive value), (ii) that such a 
transaction constitutes the least-cost for the DGSD, and (iii) does not put at risk the 
financial stability of the acquirer. 
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The alternative measures could either be financed by EDIS under the full insurance 
scheme or, alternatively, depending on the form EDIS takes, also by national DGSs. 
Indeed, this can change the incentives for the DGS. Within a framework where EDIS 
finances pay-outs and the national DGSs finance the alternative measures, the national 
DGSs would not have any real incentive to use their funds and could encourage a EDIS 
intervention.  
 
5.4.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers retaining the NOD to allow national DGSs to continue using 
preventive measures under EDIS and finance them from the available financial means 
that remain at national level, depending on the allocation of funds between EDIS and 
the national DGS. 
Effectiveness: Retaining the NOD in its current form would contribute to effective 
depositor protection and reduced risk for the DGS, provided that the least-cost test is 
well executed and there are sufficient available funds at national level. The least-cost 
test must ensure that the acquiring institution obtains the deposits at a competitive 
price in order not to distort the level playing field. The assessment of the least-cost 
should also include the analysis of viability of the acquiring institution. 
Efficiency: The transfer of deposits to another institution would reduce the 
administrative burden associated with a pay-out and subsequent recovery of the 
subrogated depositor claims in insolvency.  
Coherence: Retaining the NOD is coherent with the resolution mechanism. It would 
ensure preserved access to deposits in insolvency by allowing member institutions to 
fail in an orderly manner, without government support. However, in order to ensure that 
the level playing field is not distorted, the competitive procedure should be as inclusive 
as possible, subject to the available time frame of the transaction.  
Subsidiarity: The NOD does not impact subsidiarity. The NOD seems more relevant in 
Member States with less efficient insolvency regimes (lower recovery values) and many 
small banks (more attractive). 
 
5.4.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD. This means that it would not be 
possible to perform alternative measures to preserve depositors’ access to covered 
deposits. Consequently, banks, which are not subject to resolution, would only have to 
be liquidated in insolvency. The DGS’s function would be limited to a pay-out and 
contribution to a resolution.  
Effectiveness: This option would negatively impact depositor protection, despite the fact 
that it is currently only used in very few cases and for small retail institutions. The costs 
of failures would likely increase. The ability of a potential acquirer to take over parts of 
assets and liabilities would likely mitigate at least some of the destruction of value that 
could otherwise occur in insolvency (impacting the recovery of the DGS). 
Efficiency: This option would potentially increase the costs for the DGS, as it could no 
longer benefit from the reduced administrative burden. The administrative costs for the 
DGS are higher in the event of pay-outs and insolvency than in the case of asset and 
liability transfer.  
Coherence: This option would mean that the DGS operates as a paybox to guarantee 
covered deposits, which is in line with the main objective of DGSD. However, this may 
be conducive to higher costs for the DGS and ultimately to higher losses for the 
governments that form the backstop for the DGSs. This would go against the objective 
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of the crisis management framework to avoid that tax payers must contribute in case 
of failures of member institutions. In turn, this option would also lead to an equal 
treatment of all institutions across the EU, which would avoid distortion of the level 
playing field. 
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity in Member States, often with many 
small member institutions that would not otherwise have been subject to resolution, 
which prefer to preserve access to deposits while also potentially compensating for 
inefficient insolvency regimes. 
 
5.4.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
Under this policy option, the current NOD would be amended to introduce targeted 
modifications in order to ensure: 
(i) an open competitive procedure to find a potential acquirer interested in 
taking over either assets and liabilities or just the deposit book at a higher 
price than the latter would have otherwise been materialised in insolvency 
(i.e. lesser destructive value); 
(ii) that such a transaction constitutes the least cost for the DGSD. To this end, 
the least-cost test would benefit from more detailed rules, possibly 
resembling the Valuation 3 used in the BRRD. This modification could also 
entail possible changes into creditor hierarchy, by levelling the covered and 
uninsured deposits171; 
(iii) an assessment of the viability and sufficient robustness of the acquiring 
institution in order avoid a chain of failures.  
Under these more stringent circumstances, the alternative measures could either be 
financed by EDIS under a full insurance scheme or, alternatively also by national DGSs 
when EDIS would take the form of a re-insurance, co-insurance or mandatory lending 
scheme. It would be also beneficial to reflect about a possible coordinating role of the 
SRB for the purposes of managing the open competitive procedure and performing the 
least-cost test. 
 
Effectiveness: This option would positively impact effectiveness for the DGSs and lead 
to more optimal results. A clearer least-cost test would likely lead to a well-informed 
decision on the use of the NOD and thus reduce the risk that alternative measures 
eventually lead to more cost than a pay-out172 or a chain of pay-outs. An open 
competitive procedure would improve the ability of the DGS to look for the highest bid 
for the covered deposits of the failing institution.  
Efficiency: This option would better ensure the least cost for the DGS. Following a clearer 
articulation of the least-cost test, alternative measures could be more easily embraced 
in the Member States and positively contribute to financial stability, by preserving the 
value of the failing banks. The more articulated least-cost test would likely increase the 
administrative costs for the DGS compared to the current practice, however this would 
be more than compensated by the reduced risk and lower costs for the DGS. 
Coherence: This option would be beneficial for coherence with the resolution framework, 
particularly if the SRB assumes a coordinating role when managing the competitive 
procedure or conducting the least-cost test. It would ensure preservation of access to 
                                           
171 This is because the recent changes to the creditor hierarchy regarding the preferential ranking of covered 
deposits are likely to reduce the possibility of applying alternative measures. 
172 Particularly, in view of the preferential ranking of covered deposits in a creditor hierarchy. 
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deposits in insolvency by allowing member institutions to fail in an orderly manner, 
without government support. However, in order to ensure that the level playing field is 
not distorted, the competitive procedure should be as inclusive as possible, subject to 
the available time frame of the transaction.  
Subsidiarity: This option would positively impact subsidiarity because it would respond 
to challenges that appear to prevent Member States from applying the NOD in practice.  
 
5.4.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
Under this policy option, all Member States would need to apply alternative measures, 
subject to the conditions. This option could be similar to the retaining the NOD in its 
current form (Option 1) or the alternative option (Option 3), if the targeted modifications 
are also included. This would benefit coherence and reduce distortion of the cross-border 
level playing field.  
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5.5 NOD 15 – Voluntary lending between DGSs 
Summary: NOD 15 – Voluntary lending between DGSs 
DGSD [Article 12(1)] 
Member States may allow the DGS to lend to other DGSs within the Union on a voluntary 
basis, provided that the borrowing DGS:  
(a) is not able to pay claims because of a lack of available financial means;  
(b) has made recourse to extraordinary contributions;  
(c) commits to use the borrowed funds to pay claims;  
(d) is not subject to an obligation to repay a loan to other DGSs under this Article;  
(e) states the amount of money requested;  
(f) ensures the total amount lent does not exceed 0.5 % of its covered deposits;  
(g) informs the EBA without delay. 
The loan should be repaid within five years and the interest rate be at least equivalent to 
the ECB marginal lending facility rate. The lending DGS should inform the EBA of the initial 
interest rate and duration of the loan. 
Transposed into national law [14 Member States] 
Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Romania and Slovenia 
Practical experience so far [0 Member States] 
None 
Importance 
Nihil173 
Impact of the NOD  
 Risk profile 
national 
DGS 
Level playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member States 
Overall +/- +/- +/- +/- 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current 
form 
Option 2: 
Eliminating  
Option 3: 
Alternative 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
[Recommended]  
Effectiveness +/- -- ++ +/- 
Efficiency +/- -/+ + +/- 
Coherence - +/- + + 
Subsidiarity + + - + 
 
                                           
173 DGSs indicated in the interviews that it is unlikely that they would voluntarily lend to one another. This 
means that the provision does not have any impact. 
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 Implementation across Member States  
Half of the Member States have transposed the NOD, typically (almost) verbatim, 
without providing further details or specifications in their national legislation on how it 
could be made operational. While some Member States clearly cover both lending and 
borrowing in their legislation, Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania 
and Slovenia refer only to the possibility of lending to DGSs of other Member States. 
The implementation also varies across Member States in terms of approval requirements 
for lending and payment of interest rates. A system of mandatory lending between EU 
DGSs had originally been put forward in the Commission's proposal for a recast Directive 
in 2010 but was subsequently rejected by the co-legislators as undesirable. Mandatory 
lending thus does not exist in current legislation.  
 
5.5.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The NOD seems to be justified by the commitment to ensure the functioning of the 
financial market based on the principle of solidarity. More specifically, such temporary 
bridge loans or additional liquidity injections could have positive effects on the banking 
system at EU level (e.g. Slovenia).  
Some of the Member States who chose not to transpose the NOD indicated concerns 
linked to the difficulties in the implementation and notably its effectiveness. In 
particular, these concerns related to the negative impact of the potential rejection of a 
loan request, as for example in the case of a systemic banking crisis (e.g. Greece) or 
limited resources available to support another DGS in other Member States.  
Another reason for not transposing the NOD concerned the restriction for the DGS to 
invest funds only in liquid assets. This condition would not be fulfilled with a loan 
agreement with a maturity of five years, or even a shorter maturity and hence the 
creditor DGS could not include it in the available financial means (e.g. Latvia). 
 
5.5.1.2 Approval of voluntary lending 
Some Member States have chosen to make the voluntary lending conditional on the 
approval of or consultation with specific bodies as to the assessment of the conditions 
specified in the NOD. 
The management bodies of DGSs are frequently responsible for such approvals. In 
Cyprus, the Management Committee of the DGS, consisting of the staff from the Ministry 
of Finance and the national central bank, decides whether the DGS may grant or receive 
a loan. In Poland, the DGS Board of Directors decides after receiving the approval of the 
Council of the DGS. In Czechia and Lithuania, the Ministry of Finance must give its 
approval. Further authorities are the Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority in 
France and the Financial Services Authority in Malta.  
Such requirements have been motivated by the need to carefully consider the risk of a 
future shortfall if a DGS pay-out occurred (i.e. lending to another DGS may expose the 
providing DGS to credit risk in case a pay-out event occurred in its jurisdiction during 
the duration of the lending).  
Other Member States do not require any approval and/or consultation by law, and the 
detailed and concrete procedure would be developed in the event of using the NOD.  
 
5.5.1.3 Payment of interest 
Cyprus, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Romania have reproduced the text of Article 
12(2)(a) DGSD verbatim, in order to regulate the interest payments on loans to another 
DGS. Estonia, France and Slovenia have clearly indicated that the payment of interest 
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would take place at maturity, at the time of the full repayment of the loan. By contrast, 
Austria provides that the payment of the interest is linked to the respective annual 
instalments. 
 
5.5.1.4 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
The NOD has not yet been used in practice. While the objective of the NOD is beneficial 
for financial stability, the concerns about the risks that it can have both for the lending 
and borrowing DGS in two Member States, and the political implications, make the use 
of the NOD unlikely. By contrast, voluntary lending between DGSs can be realistically 
envisaged within the same country. In fact, in Austria, a DGS would consider lending to 
another Austrian DGS, if needed. This would happen if the means available, including 
additional contributions from members, are insufficient to reimburse the deposits in the 
event of a pay-out.  
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The NOD (if it were used in practice) impacts the credit and liquidity risk profile of the 
DGS, namely the risk that the borrowing DGS does not pay back and the risk that the 
lending DGS needs funds for a pay-out event. The NOD has ultimately a positive impact 
on depositor confidence although depositors may be unaware about it.  
 
5.5.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The NOD affects the risk profile both negatively and positively because it increases credit 
risk and liquidity risk for the lending DGS, which is reflected in the reduced risk of the 
borrowing DGS. 
Lending to another DGS may result in a future shortfall in pay-out capacity, which could 
pose a serious risk to the DGS and to the financial stability of the financial system. While 
the voluntary nature of lending and the approval process should, in principle, prevent 
loans in risky situations for the lending DGS, the long period (up to five years) of 
reimbursement of the loan could be a source of liquidity risk. The financial crisis showed 
that stability conditions can deteriorate quite quickly and across many countries. A 
detailed analysis of the additional risks under this NOD is difficult because of the 
voluntary nature and the discretion enjoyed by Member States, i.e. even if requested, 
a DGS could still decide not to lend. In other words, there is no exogenous event 
triggering the use of the lending possibility because the lending DGS is fully responsible 
for risks entailed by such lending.  
On the side of the borrowing DGS, the lack of certainty about the loan being granted 
could prevent it from requesting it in the first place in order to mitigate the effects of 
rejection which, if known, could exacerbate the crisis. If the loan is provided by the 
lending DGS, in practice, it may be challenging for the borrowing DGS to reimburse 
within five years in a severe crisis scenario, given that funds are based on contributions 
from member institutions. Depleted financial means would have to be replenished by 
member contributions which could be pro-cyclical in a crisis.  
 
5.5.2.2 Level playing field 
This NOD has no impact on the level playing field among financial institutions. However, 
the existence of bilateral agreements between DGSs, to the extent possible, could lead 
to different implicit levels of protection across Member States. Some DGSs mentioned 
that, in case of need, they would naturally request a loan to the DGS from another 
Member State, if they already have close relations. 
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5.5.2.3 Depositor confidence  
The NOD would both positively and negatively impact depositor confidence, if it were 
used in practice. However, in view of the voluntary nature, such impacts would be 
relatively indirect, even if it were publicly known that such an NOD has been translated 
into national legislation.  
The impact on confidence could, to some extent, materialise through signalling effects, 
although these may be fairly limited. For example, in the country of the lending DGS, 
informed depositors might fear that this could reduce the capability of the national DGS 
to repay their deposits in the event of a pay-out. This could negatively affect their 
behaviour and confidence. The need for borrowing could indicate that the borrowing 
DGS is in a difficult situation because of insufficient available financial means. At the 
same time, knowing that another DGS is providing funds could reassure them and boost 
confidence in the overall system. In practice, such signalling effects, including the 
awareness of depositors about the legal regulations (e.g. the transposition of the NOD) 
should not be overestimated. 
 
5.5.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
The NOD has not been relevant for the respective Member States because it has not 
been used in practice.  
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
Voluntary lending has a potential positive impact on both depositor confidence and 
financial stability. However, because the voluntary lending has not yet been used in 
practice, there is no evidence supporting the best policy approach to it.  
With EDIS taking the form of a full insurance scheme, the national DGSs would be 
mutualised at Banking Union-level. The policy recommendation envisages that the NOD 
could be applicable between EDIS and the DGS of EU Member States which are not part 
of the Banking Union or between the DGSs outside the Banking Union to enable mutual 
lending and borrowing (both ways) (Option 4).  
Given that the size of EDIS would be much larger than any other national DSG, it would 
be more likely for EDIS to actually lend to DGSs outside the Banking Union to mitigate 
potential spill-over contagion effects. To ensure fair treatment, the possibility for EDIS 
to borrow from non-Banking Union DGSs should not be discarded either. Therefore, full 
harmonisation (Option 4) could also be recommended in the context of EDIS. Beyond 
the scope of this NOD, the discussions on the steady state of EDIS also include the 
existence of a lender of last resort or a backstop. Although this is part of a broader 
discussion which goes beyond the scope of this NOD and is politically charged, the 
consideration of an EDIS backstop could further enhance the willingness for voluntary 
lending.  
The alternative option (Option 3) of mandatory lending, included in the effects 
analysis174, has already been discussed in the context of the EDIS design (See Section 
2.4) and could also be envisaged depending on political ambition. 
 
                                           
174 See European Commission (2016), Effects analysis on the European deposit 
insurance scheme (EDIS). 
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5.5.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers retaining the current NOD by allowing DGSs to lend and 
borrow on a voluntary basis.  
Effectiveness: Voluntary lending may be a useful tool in case of distress and a possible 
safeguard in case of liquidity shortfalls. The conditions informing the decision to lend to 
another DGS should provide assurances about the risk-based assessment, which should 
increase the robustness and effectiveness of such decisions. However, in view of the 
uncertainty around obtaining the funds, the voluntary nature of the lending may also 
negatively impact the effectiveness of the tool.  
Efficiency: The uncertainty inherent in voluntary borrowing and lending could negatively 
impact efficiency. In practice, a rejection may have significant consequences since the 
liquidity stress of the national DGS would not be mitigated and other possibilities would 
need to be explored to fund a pay-out. 
Coherence: This option would not impact coherence as it represents the status quo. The 
flexibility of voluntary lending may avert the risk of liquidity, which, in the overall 
picture, would outweigh the lack of consistency. Practical application would be limited 
to those cases where lending would be necessary and justified. 
Subsidiarity: This option would not impact subsidiarity.  
 
5.5.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option analyses eliminating the NOD by removing the voluntary lending from 
the scope of harmonisation of Union law. This would be equivalent to the state of play 
prior to the DGSD, Member States would be allowed to use the tool of voluntary lending 
subject to their national law. 
Effectiveness: This option would reduce the effectiveness of the system by reducing its 
flexibility and safeguards in case of heightened liquidity shortages in the EU.  
Efficiency: This option would improve efficiency as the uncertainty inherent in the 
voluntary borrowing and lending would be avoided. 
Coherence: This option would not impact coherence.  
Subsidiarity: This option would not impact subsidiarity.  
 
5.5.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
The voluntary nature of lending constitutes a weakness from the perspective of reducing 
liquidity risks in the DGSs. An alternative option would consider mandatory lending 
among DGSs, depending on political ambition because of the credit and liquidity risks it 
may entail and the lack of optionality or flexibility in the decision. Mandatory lending 
has already been considered in the design of EDIS (2016 effects analysis [European 
Commission, 2016] and Section 2.4).  
Effectiveness: This option would be more effective both in terms of increased stability 
of the financial system, as it would reduce liquidity risks in case of many (concurrent) 
pay-outs as compared to the voluntary lending, and in terms of depositor confidence.  
Efficiency: The system would be more prescriptive and cumbersome than the other 
options because it would entail prescribing concrete rules and procedures as to how the 
mandatory lending would take place, both in the phases preceding the full EDIS 
mutualisation as well as in the steady state.  
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Coherence: A system of mandatory lending might enhance coherence and consistency 
. However, there would be a significant reduction in flexibility to cater for specific 
circumstances.  
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity.  
 
5.5.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers applying the NOD in all Member States in order to enable 
voluntary lending between EDIS and DGSs both within and outside the Banking Union, 
and vice versa. This option would require a high level of political ambition. Beyond the 
scope of this NOD, the discussions on the steady state of EDIS should also include the 
existence of a lender of last resort or a backstop. Although this is part of a broader 
discussion, which goes beyond the scope of this NOD and is politically charged, the 
consideration of an EDIS backstop could further enhance the willingness for voluntary 
lending on a harmonised basis.  
Effectiveness: Voluntary borrowing and lending between EDIS and DGSs may be an 
option in case of distress and a possible safeguard in case of liquidity shortfalls. On one 
hand, the voluntary nature of the lending still implies that there is no ex ante certainty 
around obtaining the funds, which would impact effectiveness. On the other hand, the 
assessment of conditions informing the decision to lend to non-BU DGSs should provide 
assurance that an assessment of risks has been performed, which would boost the 
robustness of decisions and therefore, their effectiveness.  
Efficiency: The uncertainty inherent in the voluntary borrowing and lending would 
negatively impact efficiency. In practice, a rejection may have significant consequences 
since the liquidity stress of the national DGS would not be mitigated and other 
possibilities would need to be considered to fund a pay-out. 
Coherence: This option would improve the coherence of the EU framework, with EDIS 
in place. Practical application would be limited to those cases where lending would be 
necessary and justified.  
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity because the decision to lend funds 
from EDIS to other non-Banking Union DGSs would be likely taken by the authority 
responsible for EDIS. However, there could be room for maintaining a degree of 
subsidiarity for Banking Union countries in such decision-making processes through a 
consultation process (to be analysed in the design of the EDIS governance structure).  
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5.6 NOD 16 – Lower contributions for low-risk sectors 
Summary: NOD 16 – Lower contributions for low-risk sectors 
DGSD [Article 13(1), 2nd subparagraph] 
Member States may provide for lower contributions for low-risk sectors which are regulated 
under national law.  
Transposed into national law [4 Member States] 
Ireland, Germany, Hungary and Slovenia 
Practical experience so far [0 Member States] 
None 
Importance 
Nihil175 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national DGS 
Level playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member 
States 
Overall +/- + +/- -- 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current form 
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
[Recommended] 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness +/- + + +/- 
Efficiency - + - - 
Coherence -- + -- + 
Subsidiarity + +/- -- - 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
Under this NOD, lower contributions for low-risk sectors are intended for member 
institutions operating within sectors for which Member States have already imposed, 
through regulation, restrictions that substantially reduce the likelihood of failure. Such 
contributions to the DGS may be proportionately reduced, if adequately justified.  
According to the EBA Guidelines176 on the calculation of contributions, lower 
contributions from institutions belonging to low-risk sectors should be allowed based on 
empirical evidence that within these sectors the occurrence of failures has been 
consistently lower than in other sectors. The competent authority should grant the 
agreement to reduce contributions in cooperation with the designated authority, after 
consulting the DGS. Such reductions should be implemented in the calculation method 
                                           
175 This NOD is not used in practice so far and DGSs indicated in the interviews that it is unlikely that they will 
use it in the future, which means that there is no financial impact. 
176 EBA (2015), Guidelines on methods for calculating contributions to deposit guarantee schemes, September. 
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by including an additional risk indicator into the risk category ‘Business model and 
management’. 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland and Slovenia have transposed this NOD into their national 
legislation but so far none of them has used it in practice177. For example, in Slovenia, 
the Bank of Slovenia sets a regular annual contribution for member institutions with a 
low-risk business model independently of the extent of the guaranteed deposits of these 
banks. However, in practice, a lower contribution regime for member institutions with 
lower risk business models is currently considered not applicable, as all business models 
of commercial banks are considered as having similar risk. There is currently no need 
for a separate group of banks with lower risk.  
 
5.6.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
This NOD takes into account the situations in which the indicators for the risk-based 
contribution do not fully reflect the riskiness of the member institutions, i.e. based on 
such indicators, the member institution seems to have a higher risk of pay-out than it 
actually has. This can be due to the specific activities of the member institutions 
concerned or their membership in an IPS (see NOD 17). 
In Hungary, it was initially considered that the NOD could apply to the case of building 
societies, which have a low-risk business model. However, in the end it was not used 
for this case. In Ireland, in order for this option to come into effect, the Minister for 
Finance may designate by order those sectors considered to be low risk. To date no such 
order has been made. Similarly, in Slovenia, the NOD was at first considered as relevant 
but then discarded because of issues as to how to identify a low-risk sector. In turn, 
Germany and Hungary have various nationally regulated member institutions such as 
cooperative and savings banks. In Germany, member institutions contributing to an IPS 
would have been considered as low risk. However, the DGSs are organised by nationally 
regulated sectors (i.e. cooperative, savings and public banks). As each of these sectors 
have their own IPSs recognised as DGSs with the same target level of covered deposits 
at 0.8 %, there is no need to use the NOD.  
 
5.6.1.2 Calculation of the lower contributions 
National regulations transposing the NOD provide in a general way that institutions in 
low-risk sectors may pay lower contributions to the DGS than they would have otherwise 
been required to pay.  
Following the EBA guidelines for the calculation of contributions178, the risk-based 
component can take into account the presence of a low-risk sector. This is in line with 
the principle that the variable risk-based fee is an important part of the contribution, 
reflecting the degree of risk arising from the activities of member institutions. 
 
5.6.1.3 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
The NOD has not been used in practice.  
                                           
177 Hence, the national legislation is mostly very general with possible cross-references to secondary 
legislation, which, however, has not yet been adopted. For example, Ireland has provided in the Regulations 
the option deciding that credit institutions pay a minimum contribution, irrespective of the amount of their 
covered deposits. In order for this option to come into effect the Minister for Finance must designate the 
option by order. To date no such order has been made. The text of the Regulations reads ‘the Minister may 
designate by order those sectors regulated under the law of the State considered to be low risk that may pay 
a lower contribution than that which would otherwise be payable under this Part.’ 
178 EBA (2015), Guidelines on methods for calculating contributions to deposit guarantee schemes, September. 
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 Impact of the NOD  
The NOD has no to limited impact on the risk profile of the national DGS, level playing 
field and depositor confidence. Moreover, the NOD is not relevant for any Member State. 
 
5.6.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
Different aspects are relevant when assessing the potential impact of the NOD on the 
risk profile of DGS. Since the threshold for financial means of 0.8 % of covered deposits 
has to be met in any case, the lower contribution of certain member institutions must 
not affect the size of the fund available. This implies a redistribution effect among the 
members of the DGS but no impact on the risk profile of the DGS. 
 
5.6.2.2 Level playing field 
The NOD does not have negative impact on the level playing field because a different 
treatment for member institutions belonging to the low-risk sector is justified by a lower 
likelihood of pay-out. 
 
5.6.2.3 Depositor confidence  
The NOD has no impact on depositor confidence and their awareness about the 
effectiveness of depositor protection.  
 
5.6.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
In the absence of concrete experience in practice, the NOD does not seem relevant. This 
may be because it is difficult to identify such low-risk sectors or a specific business 
model among the bank business models that can be labelled as low risk, even if a specific 
restricting regulation exists. To a certain extent, this reflects the experience of the 
financial crisis. For instance, in Ireland, failures of many credit unions, typically 
considered low risk, demonstrated that in a systemic crisis no sector is shielded by the 
risk of default. 
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
Based on the motivations, which appear rather weak, and in the absence of practical 
experience of the NOD, the most sensible option would be to eliminate the NOD (Option 
2). From the perspective of the DGS, an alternative option could be envisaged where 
member institutions that are likely to be resolved could benefit from a lower contribution 
to EDIS because these institutions would be less likely to receive a pay-outs from the 
DGS, including in view of the limit of 50 % of the DGS’ contribution.  
However, from the perspective of EDIS and the Banking Union in general, this 
alternative (Option 3) could also have unintended negative effects in terms of lowering 
contributions to the EDIS from systemic banks at the expense of less systemically 
relevant banks.  
In the absence of any experience with the NOD, harmonisation (Option 4) should be 
discarded.  
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5.6.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form  
This policy option considers retaining the NOD in its current form, allowing for lower 
contribution for member institutions operating within sectors for which Member States 
have already imposed, through regulation, restrictions that substantially reduce the 
likelihood of failure. 
Effectiveness: Given the limited transposition and no instances of use, which are both 
linked to a rather weak motivation for the NOD, the effectiveness of this policy option 
is poor. The NOD could only be seen as effective in enhancing the application of the 
principle of proportionality of contributions to the fund, beyond the risk-based approach. 
In practice, this means taking into account the case of member institutions that already 
contribute to additional funds beyond the DGS. 
Efficiency: If this NOD were used in practice, national DGSs would have to monitor the 
member institutions that would benefit from such special treatment. No particular 
additional costs/benefits should materialise for EDIS. 
Coherence: This option has the potential to negatively impact coherence if there were 
fragmentation in the definition of the sectors. 
Subsidiarity: This option does not impact subsidiarity.  
 
5.6.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD. This means that financial institutions 
would not be distinguished based on the risk of their own sector in the calculation of 
contributions. This option would also be justified because the NOD has not been used in 
practice so far.  
Effectiveness: Given the weak motivation for the transposition of the NOD and in the 
absence of any experience, there seems to be no reason for maintaining the NOD. This 
option would have no impact on effectiveness.  
Efficiency: Same reasoning as for effectiveness  
Coherence: The system would be more coherent. 
Subsidiarity: In the absence of concrete experience, this option would not impact 
subsidiarity.  
 
5.6.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers applying lower contributions for member institutions that 
are likely to be resolved under the resolution mechanism and less likely to require the 
contribution from the DGS, also in view of the MREL build-up. This option would change 
the underlying objective of the NOD and its formulation. It would modify the concept of 
low risk currently used in the NOD and instead focus on institutions subject to resolution.  
In practice, this option would likely lead to lower contributions of a large share of the 
systemically important banks and should envisage that such lower contributions are 
rebalanced with higher contributions to the SRF. To this end, the funding of EDIS and 
SRF and their mutual synergies could be subject to further policy reflection. 
In such policy reflection the target level should also be considered, to avoid unintended 
consequences. Indeed, the large systemically relevant banks are currently responsible 
for the largest share of contributions to the DGSs, if their contributions are reduced it 
leads to large, in some case disproportionate contributions from smaller institutions. 
Taking the example of the SRF, for which public data are available, the largest 20 
banking groups contribute 67 %. If the contribution of this group of 20 banking groups 
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is reduced and the target level remains the same, the other banks have to contribute 
on average twice as much for every euro of covered deposits179. 
Effectiveness: From this perspective, this option would be more effective as relevant 
member institutions would be identifiable in all Member States and the methodology for 
the adjusted contribution known. 
Efficiency: This option would decrease efficiency, as the DGSs would have one more 
indicator to consider in determining the contributions from the member institutions. 
Coherence: The option would increase coherence across countries provided that it 
ensures that contributions of systemically important banks would be lower to the DGS 
but higher to the SRF.  
Subsidiarity: This option would reduce subsidiarity. 
 
5.6.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
Under this policy option, all Member States would need to apply lower contributions for 
low-risk sectors subject to the conditions. This option would be similar to retaining the 
NOD in its current form (Option 1) or elimination (Option 2) because the NOD is not 
used in practice. This option of full harmonisation can therefore be discarded. 
  
                                           
179 For example, in case the contribution of large banks were reduced by -10%, the contribution of smaller 
banks would have to increase +20% in order to retain the total contribution at the same level. Calculation: -
67% [share large banks] * -10% [reduction in contribution large banks] / +33% [share non-large banks] ≈ 
+20% [increase in contribution for smaller banks]. 
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5.7 NOD 17 – Lower contributions for members of IPSs 
Summary: NOD 17 – Lower contributions for members of IPSs 
DGSD [Article 13(1) 3rd subpara] 
Member States may decide that members of an IPS pay lower contributions to the DGS. 
Transposed into national law [5 Member States] 
Austria, Ireland, Germany, Hungary and Poland 
Practical experience so far [3 Member States] 
Austria, Hungary and Poland 
Importance 
Up to about 45 % of covered deposits180 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national DGS 
Level 
playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member States 
Overall + +/- + + 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current form 
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
[Recommended] 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation  
 
Effectiveness +/- +/- +/- +/- 
Efficiency - + + - 
Coherence + -- + + 
Subsidiarity + - - + 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
5 Member States181 transposed this NOD making it possible to reduce the contribution 
of the members of IPSs that are not recognised as DGSs. Only Austria, Hungary and 
Poland use the NOD in practice. Typically, in the latter Member States, the primary 
legislation contains only general provisions on the lower contributions to DGS paid by 
IPS members, while details are specified in secondary legislation. 
 
5.7.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The NOD aims, firstly, to recognise that the IPSs ensure a greater degree of protection 
for their member institutions in line with recital 12 DGSD (e.g. Poland), and secondly, 
                                           
180 The member institutions that are both member of an IPS and DGS, account for up to 45% of the total 
covered deposits under the DGSs in Austria, Hungary and Poland that are not already recognized as IPS. See 
Section 5.7.1.4 for more information regarding importance of the NOD. 
181 I.e. Austria, Germany, Ireland, Hungary and Poland. 
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to avoid that IPS (non-DGS) members pay more contributions (e.g. Hungary), 
acknowledging that they already pay for both the protection from the IPS and DGS. 
Member States without IPSs did not transpose the NOD.  
 
5.7.1.2 The role of an IPS 
An IPS has the objective of protecting its member institutions against bankruptcy by 
ensuring that they are solvent and liquid182. The competent authorities may, in 
accordance with the conditions laid down in the Capital Requirements Regulations 
(CRR), waive selected prudential requirements or allow certain derogations for IPS 
member institutions. In practice, IPSs generally provide liquidity and solvency support 
to their members in the form of guarantees (i.e. Hungary and Poland), sureties (i.e. 
Poland), capital injections (i.e. Hungary) and loans (i.e. Hungary and Poland). 
 
5.7.1.3 The level of lower contributions 
Member States that use the NOD regulate the calculation of lower contributions to the 
DGS paid by IPS members in considerable detail and their respective methods are 
different. Under the Polish secondary legislation, member institutions participating in an 
IPS benefit from a 50 % reduction in the total risk-weight, considered for the purpose 
of calculating the contribution to the national DGS.  
In Austria, the calculation method may take into account that members of an IPS have 
to pay lower contributions. The Austrian DGS (ESA) stated that its calculation method 
was approved by the Finance Market Authority in line with the EBA Guidelines on 
calculating contributions to DGSs183. The reduction in the aggregated risk-weight is 
implemented by including an additional risk indicator that reflects the additional 
solvency and liquidity protection provided by the IPS to its members. In order to 
recognise the IPS protection eligible for a reduction in the contribution, it should fulfil 
additional conditions related to the level of its ex ante funding. In practice, Austria 
applies the indicator proposed by EBA, i.e. a ratio between the available ex ante funds 
in the IPS and the total assets of the individual IPS members. The higher the level of 
the indicator, the lower the risk and hence the aggregate risk-weight to calculate the 
contribution. 
In Hungary, the contribution to the DGS is composed of two fees (a minimum 
contribution fee and a risk-based fee). The relevant legislation specifies that the amount 
paid as membership contributions to an IPS are taken into account in the determination 
of the minimum contribution payable to the DGS. In addition, the same law also provides 
that membership in an IPS may be taken into consideration in the calculation of the 
risk-based variable-rate fee. Accordingly, it seems that membership in an IPS can 
reduce a member institution’s fee payable to the DGS twice: by reducing the minimum 
contribution (where there seems to be no discretion) and at the same time by reducing 
the risk-based variable contribution (which is discretionary).  
By contrast, the legislation of Germany and Ireland only provides that lower 
contributions for IPS members may be established. 
 
5.7.1.4 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
Austria, Hungary and Poland have had practical experience with the NOD.  
                                           
182 Article 113(7) of the Capital Requirement Regulation (CRR). 
183 EBA (2015), Guidelines on methods for calculating contributions to deposit guarantee schemes, September. 
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Austria has 3 IPSs. Two of them, for the cooperative Raiffeisen banken184, are not 
recognised as DGSs and are therefore covered by the NOD. The Raiffeisen banks account 
for about one third of the Austrian banking sector as of June 2019185, and for about 
45 % of the covered deposits of the Austrian DGS (Einlagensicherung Austria) at the 
end of 2018. The third Austrian IPS (S-Haftung), for savings bank Erste Bank and the 
permanently affiliated saving banks, was recognised as a DGS on 1 January 2019, and 
is therefore not covered by this NOD. 
Hungary used to have 4 voluntary IPSs, which merged into the Cooperative Credit 
Institutions Integration Organisation (SZHISZ) in 2013186. The members of the IPSs in 
Hungary account for about 13 % of covered deposits in Hungary and they receive a 
reduction in the contribution equivalent to about 2.75 % of the total contributions.  
Poland has 2 IPSs not recognised as DGSs. SGB and BPS are the IPSs for 196 and 208 
cooperative member institutions respectively (January 2019). The members of these 
two IPSs account for about 10 % of the covered deposits in Poland and receive a 
reduction of about 5 % of the total contributions. 
In Germany, 2 existing IPSs are recognised as DGSs so the NOD is not applicable. 
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The NOD has in principle a positive impact on the risk profile of the DGS and on depositor 
confidence. The NOD is only relevant for Member States with IPSs that are not 
recognised as DGSs. This limits the Member States to whom this NOD is relevant 
considerably.  
 
5.7.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The risk profile of the DGS is likely to be reduced. On the one hand, the contribution of 
the member institutions to the DGS is likely to become more risk-sensitive because the 
nature of IPS should reduce incentives for member institutions to take on risk. 
Consequently, members of an IPS have less chance of requiring the repayment of their 
depositors from the DGS, compared to similar institutions that are not IPS members. 
On the other hand, as the target level remains the same, the contribution of the non-
IPS member institutions increases. As these contributions are risk-based, the riskier 
institutions are likely to need to contribute more. 
 
5.7.2.2 Level playing field 
The lower contributions for IPS members have a fairly marginal positive impact on the 
level playing field. In principle, the NOD should improve level playing field across 
member institutions. In the absence of the provision, members of IPSs would have 
contributed more regardless of their reduced risk to the DGS.  
The discounted contribution also contributes indirectly to the existing distortion of the 
level playing field between IPSs and DGSs. The IPS uses the funds to prevent failures 
and protect not only covered depositors but also other creditors (which effectively equals 
a higher coverage level), whereas the DGS contribution in most of the cases is only used 
for compensation of the covered depositors. In this respect, IPS members have a 
                                           
184 These two IPSs are for the lower state-level (Landes) and state-level (Bundes) member institutions, 
respectively. 
185 Total assets of Raiffeisen credit cooperatives as a share of the total assets of all banks are based on the 
bank balance sheets data from the Austrian national bank. 
186 The IPSs were OTIVA, HBA, TAKIVA and REPIVA. 
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competitive advantage compared to other member institutions. This distortion is not 
purely hypothetical. For example, the German DGS for commercial banks created a 
voluntary fund to also protect deposits above EUR 100 000 in order to be competitive 
with the IPSs for cooperative and savings banks that protect all their creditors.  
 
5.7.2.3 Depositor confidence  
This NOD does not affect depositor confidence because the IPSs represent an additional 
layer of protection for depositors. Moreover, depositors are likely to be unaware of the 
existence of the lower contributions available to IPS members.  
 
5.7.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
The NOD is relevant for a limited number of Member States with IPSs not recognised as 
DGSs. For the three Member States that use the NOD, the IPS members represent just 
a small part of the DGS members. They account for more than a third of the covered 
deposits in one Member State and much less in others (i.e. about 10 % in Poland). 
However, the reduction in contribution is substantially less than their share in covered 
deposits.  
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
The lower contribution for members of IPSs not recognised as a DGS appears sensible 
because it reflects the lesser risk of a potential pay-out. However, the Member States 
are currently applying different modalities of calculation for these lower contributions. 
In the context of EDIS, it would be recommended to maintain lower contributions for 
members of IPSs, but to set a common method to determine the reduction of the 
contribution (Option 3). This would fit well with the calculation of contributions under 
EDIS, noting that the reduction can only apply to members of IPSs that are not 
recognised as DGS. 
 
5.7.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers maintaining the NOD in its current form. 
Effectiveness: The reduced contributions for members of IPSs recognise the higher 
protection of deposits held by IPS members. Therefore, the NOD does not affect 
depositor confidence because depositors are unlikely to be aware of the calculation of 
DGS contributions. Additionally, the NOD does not affect the overall size of the DGS 
because the target level of the DGS remains 0.8 % of covered deposits. The NOD should 
not affect the financial stability of the system.  
Efficiency: The lower contribution for IPS members decreases the efficiency of the DGS 
because it makes the determination of contributions more complex.  
Coherence: The NOD in its current form is improving the risk-sensitiveness of the DGS 
contributions. It might lead to de-risking, which is also an important objective of most 
of the other prudential legislation (capital requirements, resolution, etc.). 
Subsidiarity: This NOD is only important for Member States with IPSs that are not also 
DGSs. However, the IPS and their members are highly important for these Member 
States as they account for between 10 % and 45 % of the covered deposits. 
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5.7.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD, which would imply no adjustment in 
the contribution of the members of an IPS. 
Effectiveness: This option implies that IPS members would likely pay higher 
contributions to the DGS. The level of protection would remain unchanged because non-
IPS members would pay lower contributions and the target level remains the same.  
If the IPSs were to decide to lower the contributions or even decide the IPS should 
compensate for the higher contributions of IPS members to the DGS, the chances of 
pay-outs of the DGS would increase. 
Efficiency: This would have a positive impact on efficiency in terms of reduced 
administrative burden for the DGS (i.e. no need to determine the reduction of the 
contributions).  
Coherence: This option would impact coherence by not acknowledging the additional 
layer of depositor protection ensured by the IPS and disproportionate contribution 
relative to their risk profile.  
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity in the Member States using the NOD. 
 
5.7.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers retaining the NOD (as Option 1) and combining it with a 
harmonised method to calculate the lower contributions for members of IPSs. This would 
fit well with the calculation of contributions under EDIS.  
Effectiveness: The reduced contributions for members of IPSs recognise the higher 
protection of deposits held by such institutions. Therefore, the NOD does not affect 
depositor confidence.  
Efficiency: This option would improve efficiency as compared to retaining the NOD in its 
current form (Option 1). If all members of IPSs not recognised as DSGs benefit from a 
lower contribution calculated with a common method, it would be easier for EDIS to 
determine the contributions.  
Coherence: This option would improve overall coherence by reflecting the improved risk-
sensitivity of the DGS contributions. The latter might lead to de-risking, which is also 
an important objective of most of the other prudential legislation (capital requirements, 
resolution etc.). Moreover, setting up a common method to calculate the lower 
contributions would improve the level playing field. 
Subsidiarity: This option would reduce subsidiarity as Member States would no longer 
be able to use their national method to calculate the lower contributions for IPS 
members. 
 
5.7.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
All Member States with IPSs not recognised as DGSs have already implemented the 
NOD. Therefore, full harmonisation would have the same impact as retaining the NOD 
in its current form with a national methodology for the calculation of the reduction in 
the contribution (Option 1) or retaining the NOD with a harmonised methodology to 
calculate the contribution (Option 3).M 
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5.8 NOD 18 – Use of a uniform risk-weights for banks affiliated to 
central bodies 
Summary: NOD 18 – Use of a uniform risk-weights for banks affiliated to central 
bodies 
DGSD [Article 13(1) 4th subpara] 
Member States may allow that the central body and all permanently affiliated institutions 
are treated as a single member institution when assessing the degree of risk incurred as a 
basis for calculating the contributions to DGSs. 
Transposed into national law [6 Member States] 
Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and Romania 
Practical experience so far [2 Member States] 
Finland and Luxembourg 
Importance 
Up to 80 % of covered deposits187 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national DGS 
Level 
playing field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member 
States 
Overall - + + +/- 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current form 
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
[Recommended] 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness + - ++ + 
Efficiency + - - + 
Coherence + - + + 
Subsidiarity + - + + 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
6 Member States188 have decided to transpose a uniform risk-weight for the affiliates of 
central bodies. Only Finland and Luxembourg use it in practice. 
 
5.8.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
This NOD accounts for mutual dependencies of member institutions and aims to reduce 
the administrative burden. Many of the networks of affiliated institutions such as 
                                           
187 The importance of the central bodies and permanent affiliates has been estimated based on publicly 
available information on the covered deposits and assets of the cooperative and savings banks networks and 
the total market in Finland and Luxembourg respectively. See Section 5.8.1.3 for more information. 
188 I.e. Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and Romania. 
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cooperative and savings banks networks give mutual support to each other in case of 
failure. This mutual support mostly takes the form of a cross-guarantee or joint liability. 
As the institutions are interconnected, the consolidated indicators might better reflect 
the riskiness of member institutions than the risk-indicators of the individual 
institutions189.  
This NOD is relevant for Member States that have networks of institutions with a central 
body. Most Member States that did not transpose the NOD have no such networks of 
institutions. 
 
5.8.1.2 No specific rules in national laws 
All Member States except France transposed the NOD verbatim. In France, the decision 
of the Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority specifies the rules for calculating 
and adjusting the degree of risk. The contributions to be paid to the French DGS (FGDR) 
could, under the implementing legislation, be calculated on a consolidated basis to the 
central bodies and their affiliated institutions190).  
Networks of member institutions can be considered as central bodies and permanently 
affiliated institutions when they meet at least the following three conditions laid down 
in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013: 
 The central body and affiliated institutions must be either jointly and severally 
liable (i.e. joint liability) or the commitments must be entirely guaranteed by 
the central body (i.e. cross-guarantee); 
 The central body and affiliated institutions are treated as single institutions for 
the monitoring of solvency and liquidity; and,  
 The central body can issue instructions to the affiliated institutions.  
 
5.8.1.3 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
The NOD is used in Finland and Luxembourg191. In the past, this NOD was also used in 
Cyprus. 
Finland has three central bodies with networks of cooperative and savings banks, which 
are treated as single credit institutions: the cooperative OP Group with about 150 
member institutions, cooperative POP Bank Group with 27 member institutions, and the 
Savings Banks Group with about 20 member institutions as of August 2019. These three 
networks collectively account for approximately 80 % of the covered deposits in Finland. 
In Luxembourg, the cooperative Bank Raiffeisen consists of one central body with 13 
affiliated Raiffeisen local banks. The covered deposits of the consolidated Bank 
Raiffeisen, including the affiliated institutions, account for less than 5 % of the covered 
deposits in Luxembourg as of 31 December 2018.  
In Cyprus, the Cyprus Cooperative Bank used to fall within the scope of the NOD but 
ceased to exist as of June 2018 when its operations were taken over by the Hellenic 
Bank. 
France, Ireland and Romania reported that they do not use the NOD.  
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The NOD could have a limited negative impact on the risk profile of the DGS and a 
positive impact on the level playing field. The impact on depositor confidence should be 
                                           
189 The interviews did not provide more specific motivations for this NOD. 
190 Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 
191 This was confirmed by both the surveys and interviews. 
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positive, assuming that its impact is understandable to depositors. The NOD is only 
relevant for Member States with integrated networks of affiliated institutions. 
 
5.8.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The treatment of central bodies and institutions permanently affiliated to these bodies 
as one single institution for the calculation might increase the risk profile of the national 
DGS. By treating the central bodies and affiliates as one single institution, the affiliates 
are arguably encouraged to take more risk. Moreover, the risk-taking of an individual 
institution has less impact on the ultimate contribution to the DGS. However, this is 
counterbalanced by the benefits for the national DGS. To mitigate the risk-taking of the 
individual institutions, the cross-guarantee or joint liability in principle reduces the 
likelihood of pay-outs by the national DGS, i.e. the institutions will first support each 
other before the national DGS might be called. To this end, these types of networks 
usually have stringent monitoring with additional requirements and disciplinary 
measures and/or risk-based reallocation contributions. 
 
5.8.2.2 Level playing field 
The NOD is likely to strengthen the level playing field between member institutions with 
different governance models. In fact, it allows the mostly decentralised cooperative and 
savings networks to receive similar treatment to centrally governed institutions. Within 
these cooperative and savings institutions networks, the affiliated institutions own the 
central body instead of the reverse, which applies to centrally governed institutions. Due 
to the cross-guarantees and joint liability, the mutual support between the institutions 
is similar. 
 
5.8.2.3 Depositor confidence  
The cross-guarantees and joint liability between the central bodies and the affiliate 
institutions in combination with the risk-mitigation measures reduce the likelihood of 
pay-outs. This NOD supports the use of these joint liability and cross-guarantee schemes 
and could thus contribute to depositor confidence. In practice, however, depositors may 
have little information about the impact of the NOD.  
 
5.8.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
This NOD is important for Member States with networks of closely integrated cooperative 
and savings bank networks. By contrast, the other banking networks are not eligible. In 
addition to Finland and Luxembourg, there are several other Member States with closely 
integrated cooperative and savings banks networks: (i) the fully integrated networks in 
the Netherlands and Spain with uniform risk-weights as all the local banks operate under 
a single licence and (ii) less integrated banking networks in Austria, Germany and Italy, 
which are either not sufficiently connected to be eligible for uniform risk-weights or have 
their own IPSs recognised as DGSs.  
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
For the purpose of improved functioning of the NOD under EDIS, the retention of the 
possibility to treat central bodies with permanently affiliated members as single 
institutions should be retained, but some conditions should be added to avoid additional 
risk-taking by affiliated institutions (Option 3). Option 1 retaining this NOD in its current 
form would be possible. Both eliminating the NOD and full harmonisation are considered 
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as suboptimal options because this treatment of strongly related institutions is sensible 
and the provision is only relevant for a few Member States. 
 
5.8.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form  
This option considers maintaining the current NOD regarding a uniform risk-weight for 
the affiliates of central bodies. 
Effectiveness: Retaining the NOD in its current form would have a positive impact on 
the effectiveness of the DGS as long as the involved member institutions do not increase 
their risk-taking. This requires that the networks with central bodies and permanent 
affiliates have risk-mitigation measures in place as required by law. 
Efficiency: The treatment of the networks as one single institution reduces the 
administrative burden for the involved DGSs. For example, the Finnish DGS has to deal 
with three networks instead of about 200 affiliated institutions. Moreover, these 
networks already have procedures for central monitoring of liquidity and solvency in 
place, which allow them to communicate more easily than with each of the institutions 
on individual basis. 
Coherence: The NOD in its current form encourages the formation of closely integrated 
networks which, in combination with risk-mitigation measures, also reduces the 
probability of failure of the member institutions. Hence, the NOD contributes to de-
risking alongside other existing prudential requirements (capital requirements, 
resolution etc.). Moreover, it contributes to establishing a level playing field between 
the member institutions with a centrally governed group structure and those with 
decentralised governing system. 
Subsidiarity: This NOD is only important for those Member States with networks of 
central bodies with affiliates that do not have specific DGSs/IPSs in place.  
 
5.8.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This option considers eliminating the NOD, i.e. affiliates of central bodies would thus 
have a different risk-weight than the central body. 
Effectiveness: This option would reduce the effectiveness of the DGS in the sense that 
the risk of the individual member institutions would not be properly reflected. Indeed, 
these institutions are permanently affiliated due to the cross-guarantee or joint liability 
relation, and the elimination of the NOD would no longer recognise this. 
Efficiency: This option would reduce efficiency as the treatment of the network members 
as both DGS and individual credit institutions would significantly increase their 
administrative burden.  
Coherence: This option would undermine coherence and the level playing field.  
Subsidiarity: The NOD is important in some Member States, notably Finland.  
 
5.8.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This option considers reviewing the current NOD in order to identify additional criteria 
for the risk-weight for the affiliates of central bodies to avoid moral hazard for the 
affiliated institutions.  
Importantly, such additional conditions could ensure that the management of the central 
body is not only empowered to issue instructions to the management of the affiliated 
institutions as specified under Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, but also to 
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have sufficient information for effective monitoring of the affiliated institutions and 
responsibility to intervene in case of enhanced risk-taking. Although the strengthened 
safeguards for the risk-mitigation would increase the administrative burden for the 
institutions involved, it would be beneficial for the risk profile of the DGS. Consequently, 
the NOD could continue to be used under EDIS.  
The impact of this option would in principle be similar as under the current practice 
(Option 1). 
 
5.8.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This option considers harmonising the NOD across all Member States. Under the current 
circumstances, there are not many cooperative and savings institutions networks to 
whom this provision could apply. For this reason, Option 1 and Option 3 should be 
preferred to harmonisation. This might change if EDIS fully integrated all the existing 
DGSs and if the less integrated networks of cooperatives and savings banks 
strengthened their cooperation. In such a scenario, several of the cooperative and 
savings institutions networks could be turned in networks that are treated as single 
member institutions under this NOD. M 
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5.9 NOD 19 – Minimum contribution 
Summary: NOD 19 – Minimum contribution 
DGSD [Article 13(1) 5th subpara] 
Member States may decide that credit institutions pay a minimum contribution to be paid 
by their members, irrespective of the amount of their covered deposits. 
Transposed into national law [9 Member States] 
Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and the United 
Kingdom 
Practical experience so far [5 Member States] 
Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece and Portugal 
Importance 
Up to 6 % of annual contributions192 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national DGS 
Level 
playing field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member 
States 
Overall +/- - - + 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current form 
Option 2: 
Eliminating  
Option 3: 
Alternative 
[Recommended] 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness - +/- + - 
Efficiency -/+ +/- + -/+ 
Coherence - - + +/- 
Subsidiarity + - - - 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
9 Member States193 transposed the NOD whereby member institutions pay a minimum 
contribution to their national DGS, irrespective of the amount of their covered deposits, 
                                           
192 The importance is calculated as the share of the minimum contributions in the total annual contributions. 
This maximum amount derived from a simulation exercise run for the German DGS for cooperative bank. The 
DGS has almost 900 member institutions (so a large number) that have to pay at least EUR 25 000 (a high 
contribution), for a total of EUR 22 million, which is equivalent to about 5.6% of the annual contributions. The 
latter is based on the difference in available financial means between the end of 2017 and 2018, assuming no 
pay-out event. This is not an unlikely assumption as the estimated annual contribution is fairly similar to the 
increase in available financial means in the two preceding years. 
193 Cyprus, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and UK. In Ireland, the order of the 
Minister for Finance, required to specify the calculation method for the NOD to come into effect, has not yet 
been adopted. 
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and 5 of them194 set such a minimum contribution. Nevertheless, the types of such 
minimum contributions vary considerably between Member States.  
 
5.9.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The main rationale of this NOD is to ensure that the DGSs are able to fulfil their 
obligations to achieve the target level (i.e. Germany and Portugal) and have the 
necessary financial assets to function properly (e.g. France). In Portugal, the objective 
of the minimum contribution is to reach the amount that the Bank of Portugal considers 
appropriate to ensure the ability of the DGS to fulfil its obligations (pay-outs and 
contributions to resolution tools). In Germany, the minimum contribution is integrated 
in the method for calculating the contributions of the member institutions, to ensure 
that even small member institutions in terms of covered deposits contribute to the DGS 
fund. 
Alternatively, another objective of minimum contributions is greater proportionality 
through a reduction of the administrative burden for small member institutions. In some 
cases, the member institutions that contribute the minimum contributions would not 
need to provide the information for the calculation of the risk-based contribution. 
For DGSs that have reached their target size or are about to reach it, there might be an 
additional motivation to charge a minimum contribution. More specifically, they can also 
use the minimum contribution to ensure that new member institutions that did not 
contribute to the build-up of the DGS fund, nevertheless contribute to the fund. 
 
5.9.1.2 Minimum contribution 
The concept of minimum contribution differs between the Member States that 
transposed the NOD. Some constructed it as a floor – a minimum contribution below 
which the annual contribution of each member institution cannot fall195. In others, the 
minimum contribution would apply only to new entrants as an entry fee (Cyprus and 
Greece).  
The minimum contribution relates either to the contribution to the fund or the operating 
costs of the DGS.  
 
5.9.1.3 Types of contribution 
In many Member States, the DGSs raise two types of contributions: (i) a contribution 
to the DGS fund for pay-out purposes calculated on the amount of deposits covered and 
the risk rating; and ii) a contribution to the operating costs of the DGS. 
Among the Member States that determine minimum annual contributions, France 
applies the minimum contribution to the operating costs but not in relation to the 
contribution to the fund. In Germany196 and Portugal, the minimum contribution applies 
to the contribution to the DGS fund. 
                                           
194 Cyprus, Germany, Greece, France and Portugal. 
195 This is the case for France, Germany (BVR, EdO and EdB) and Portugal. For BVR, another German DGS, 
the minimum contribution is understood as the basic contribution included in the calculation method, to which 
different weighting factors apply (contribution rate, overall risk-weighting of the CRR credit institution, covered 
deposits of the CRR credit institution, risk-weighted assets of the CRR credit institution and calibration factor). 
196 BVR, EdO and EdB. It is unclear if such an initial contribution is also required for EdO, as their ordinance 
on financing only says, regarding this one-off payment, that ‘annual contributions for accounting years ending 
before 30 September 2015 and one-off payments for accounting years ending before 30 September 2014 
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Other Member States apply a minimum contribution for new entrants to the DGS fund197.  
 
5.9.1.4 Minimum contribution calculation 
The EBA guidelines offer two possibilities for the calculation of the minimum 
contributions: either the minimum contribution is applied as a base rate to which the 
risk-based contribution is added (Method 1) or the minimum contribution represents the 
higher of the minimum contribution and the risk-based contribution (Method 2).  
 
Method 1: 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
Or 
Method 2: 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ;  𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  
 
Moreover, in Germany, specific rules for the calculation of the initial or provisional 
contribution are specified in each DGS’ financing rules. The DGS for cooperative banks 
in Germany (BVR) applies the first method and includes the minimum contribution in 
the calculation of the annual contribution198. For example, CRR credit institutions that 
joined the DGS in the current contribution year shall pay 80 % of the minimum 
contribution for the one-off payment199. The other German DGSs use the second 
method200. The minimum contribution for EdO and EdB members is a minimum amount 
under which the contribution cannot fall.  
In France and Portugal, the procedure is provided either in the primary legislation or in 
its implementing measures. The final decision regarding the level of the minimum 
contribution is left to the discretion of the administrative authority managing (Bank of 
Portugal) or supervising (ACPR in France) the DGS.  
In Cyprus, the initial contribution to join the DGS is fixed at EUR 50 000 per member 
institution by the national legislation. In Greece, the amount of the initial contribution 
shall be paid within 1 month after joining the DGS, and is calculated on the basis of the 
risk indicator specified for the regular annual contribution. The amount of the initial 
contribution shall not exceed 8 % of the equity of the new DGS member.  
 
5.9.1.5 Minimum contribution amount 
The minimum contribution varies across DGSs and ranges between EUR 235 and 
EUR 25 000 per year per institution. 
In Portugal, the minimum contribution rate is determined annually by the Bank of 
Portugal, together with the basic contributory rate201 and the limits on the use of 
                                           
shall be charged in accordance with the EdB Contribution Ordinance or the EdB Contribution Ordinance in the 
version applicable up to the end of 11 January 2016’. 
197 Cyprus, Greece and BVR and Germany. 
198 The Articles of Association of BVR (Art. 10) specify the calculation method for the annual contributions. 
199 This one-off payment applies for credit institutions which joined the DGS after May 6, 2015, as an initial 
contribution, in addition to the annual contribution for the current contribution year. This single payment, 
which shall be made at the same time as the annual contribution, shall be equal to three times the annual 
contribution, and of at least EUR 25 000. 
200 The ordinance on the financing of EdO (for both EdO and EdB) specifies the calculation method for the 
annual contributions. 
201 The basic contributory rate is set up at 0.0003% for the year 2019.  
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payment commitments202, in an instruction published on its website. For the year 2019, 
the minimum contribution rate is fixed at EUR 235 per year per institution203.  
In France, the calculation method for the contribution to operating costs sets the 
minimum contribution at EUR 1 000 per year per institution. 
In Germany the amount of the minimum contribution for EdO and EdB members shall 
be at least EUR 6 500 per year per institution and EUR 20 000 per year per institution, 
respectively. This minimum contribution is reduced to an amount of at least EUR 3 250 
per year for CRR credit institutions that benefit from a public institution guarantee 
(Anstaltslast204, Gewährträ-gerhaftung205 or refinancing guarantee). For BVR members, 
a minimum contribution is set at EUR 25 000 per year per institution.  
 
5.9.1.6 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece and Portugal apply minimum contributions in practice. 
Most of these Member States have integrated the minimum contribution in the general 
calculation method for the contribution to the DGS fund in line with the EBA 
guidelines206.  
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The NOD to require a minimum contribution from member institutions, irrespective of 
the amount of their covered deposits, is likely to have an ambiguous effect on the risk 
profile of the DGS and the level playing field. Depositor confidence may decrease 
somewhat and the relevance for the Member States is in general limited. The 
assessment below focuses on the minimum annual contributions and it does not take 
into account entry fees. 
 
5.9.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
A minimum contribution can both decrease or increase the risk profile of the national 
DGS. On one hand, the fixed minimum contribution is not risk-based, i.e. does not take 
into account the risk profile of the institution. Hence, while the total contribution to the 
DGS remains the same, the risk-taking of member institutions could potentially 
increase.  
On the other hand, the minimum contribution enlarges the basis of the contributions, 
by leading to a broader participation in the DGS by more credit institutions. Generally, 
DGSs depend on a few member institutions that are responsible for most of the 
contributions. This NOD makes the DGS somewhat less reliant on larger institutions, 
though the impact is likely to be marginal.  
 
                                           
202 Payment commitments are excluded for the year 2019. 
203 According to the most recent instruction of the Bank of Portugal, the minimum contribution is not applicable 
to Caixa Económica do Porto and Caixa Económica e Social, both members of the DGS, without further 
justification.  
204 Liability assumed by the public owners for the economic viability of the credit institution. 
205 Statutory guarantee of joint and several liability of the public owners to the creditors of the credit 
institution. 
206 EBA (2015), Guidelines on methods for calculating contributions to deposit guarantee schemes, 
September.  
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5.9.2.2 Level playing field 
The minimum contribution, as currently designed, may distort proportionality when 
comparing small and large member institutions. Under both calculation methods 
proposed by the EBA, the contributions for smaller institutions are likely to be relatively 
bigger than for larger institutions. Under the first method, the fixed minimum 
contribution is in relative terms more important for smaller member institutions than 
for larger member institutions as it forms a larger part of their contribution. Under the 
second method, very small institutions are likely to pay the minimum contribution 
(unless the amount is negligible) and larger institutions are more likely to pay the risk-
based contribution. Under both methods, smaller member institutions are likely to 
contribute more in relative terms for each euro of covered deposits than larger 
institutions with similar risk profile. 
Especially for smaller institutions, the impact of the minimum contribution might be 
large. In general, the smaller the member institution, the larger the impact. This 
conclusion is based on a simulation exercise run for the German BVR, which has the 
highest minimum contribution and is composed of many small member institutions. 
Assuming the same degree of risk for smaller and larger member institutions, the 
minimum contribution reduces the annual contributions of the 5 % largest member 
institutions by about 5 %, relative to risk-based calculations. In turn, the annual 
contribution of the 5 % smallest member institutions on average more than doubles. In 
this simulation, the smallest institutions contribute more than twice as much for each 
euro of covered deposits as compared to larger institutions.  
 
5.9.2.3 Depositor confidence  
The minimum contribution decreases the risk-based component in the contribution to 
the DGS. Assuming depositor awareness of the calculation of contributions, depositor 
confidence might decrease as the member institutions could be encouraged to take on 
more risk under this NOD and, as a result, make the DGS more vulnerable to failures.  
However, the overall effect would seem very limited. Even in the case of the German 
BVR which has many smaller member institutions and for which the annual contributions 
are relatively important, the minimum contributions account for only about 5.6 % of the 
total annual contributions in 2018207.  
 
5.9.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
On the one hand, the relevance of the NOD is limited due to the relatively limited impact 
of the minimum contributions in total contributions. The Member States implemented 
the NOD with a view to raising the required contributions. However, in practice, the 
required annual contributions could be achieved without the implementation of the NOD, 
through risk-based contributions. This might explain why the vast majority of Member 
States have not transposed the NOD or are not using the NOD in practice.  
On the other hand, the objective of minimum contributions was to provide for some 
proportionality for smaller member institutions. Balancing the need to raise 
contributions with the need to provide some relief for smaller institutions should be an 
important objective for Member States.  
 
                                           
207 The share of minimum contributions is calculated by dividing the total minimum contributions of all the 
approximately 900 member institutions at the end of 2018 by the total annual contribution in 2018 obtained 
from the Deposit Guarantee Schemes data of the EBA (2019).  
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 Options in the context of EDIS  
The NOD in its current form leads to fragmentation due to the divergent practices among 
Member States. In addition, it does not seem to have benefits for the functioning of the 
DGSs in view of the relatively small weight of minimum contributions in total 
contributions. The policy option under which this NOD would be eliminated (Option 2) 
would not seem appropriate because it would entail reverting to risk-based 
contributions, potentially detrimental to the proportionality for smaller banks.  
However, if revised, the NOD could be more proportional and efficient (Option 3), 
including for smaller institutions. In such a scenario, a tiered set of flat contributions 
could be applied to very small institutions, similar to the contributions to the Single 
Resolution Fund208. In addition, it would also be beneficial to include initial contributions 
(i.e. entry fees) for new member institutions, when the DGS fund has reached its target 
size. Accordingly, these adjustments could complement the NOD in its current form and 
would fit well within the system of risk-based contributions under EDIS. 
 
5.9.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers retaining the NOD by allowing Member States to establish 
a minimum contribution to be paid by their members, irrespective of the amount of their 
covered deposits. 
Effectiveness: This option would likely have a negative effect, albeit limited, on the 
effectiveness of DGSs. The minimum contributions, not being risk-sensitive, could 
encourage to some extent the risk-taking of member institutions and decrease the share 
of risk-based contributions in the overall contributions to the DGSs. If member 
institutions are indeed taking more risks, this could also trigger more pay-out events 
and put a strain on the level of available financial means of the DGS. 
Efficiency: In the current form, the minimum contributions have the potential to reduce 
the efficiency of the DGS. This is because the minimum contributions are divergent 
among Member States and because they add one additional indicator to the calculation 
of contributions. However, as the minimum contribution is in principle a fixed amount, 
the impact on the administrative burden is limited. 
Coherence: In principle, retaining the concept of minimum contributions would 
contribute to the coherence between the DGS and the resolution mechanism as well as 
to proportionality. However, in its current design the minimum contributions neither 
achieve alignment with the resolution mechanism nor with the principles of 
proportionality. 
Subsidiarity: This option would not impact subsidiarity but would maintain the divergent 
practices across Member States. 
 
5.9.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD. 
Effectiveness: This option would be beneficial for the effectiveness of the DGS. Risk-
based contributions, instead of fixed contributions, would better reflect the profile of 
                                           
208 According to Article 10 of the Commission delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63, the contributions to the 
Single Resolution Fund are between EUR 1 000 to EUR 50 000 for categories of small institutions split into six 
buckets according to the size of their operations (the smallest category includes banks with total liabilities 
less own funds and covered deposits up to EUR 50 million and total assets of up to EUR 1 billion and the 
largest up to EUR 300 million and total assets of up to EUR 1 billion). 
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member institutions, which would positively impact depositor protection. However, this 
design would not be effective in terms of achieving proportionality.  
Efficiency: This option would slightly improve the efficiency of the DGS. The removal of 
the minimum contribution does not require any additional data collection and the change 
to the calculation should be relatively straightforward. The overall impact would likely 
be limited. 
Coherence: This option would positively impact the coherence of the DGS as the 
contribution would be fully risk-based to force member institutions that take more risk 
to contribute more to the fund. Moreover, the potential distortion of the level playing 
field between smaller and larger institutions due to relatively higher (than in the risk-
based case) contributions for smaller institutions would be avoided. However, this option 
would also mean that there would be no proportionality or relief considerations for 
smaller banks, which would need to compute their contributions on a risk-based basis.  
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity by limiting the discretion that 
Member States and DGSs currently enjoy. It follows, however, from the feedback from 
DGSs and Member States that minimum contributions have nevertheless rather limited 
importance for the functioning of the DGSs. 
 
5.9.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers revising the minimum contribution by aligning its design to 
that for the Single Resolution Fund209, i.e. creating a tiered harmonised system of flat 
contributions for a number of categories of small institutions based on their size.  
Such a revised design could better reflect the policy objectives than the current ‘one 
size fits all’ approach under the NOD with divergent minimum contributions in the form 
of flat amounts, included in the overall formula for contributions. The modification would 
consist of a set of flat rates replacing risk-based contributions, which would be defined 
according to the size of operations of member institutions. The specific flat rates and 
categories of banks according to their size would be defined.  
In addition to the tiered system of flat rates per size of small institutions, any new 
institution would be required to pay a one-off entry fee when joining the DGS. This 
would be justifiable as a means for the DGS to continue collecting contributions after 
reaching the target level and assuming no pay-outs have occurred. Such a fee could be 
based on the median amount of covered deposits of member institutions, which could 
be a proxy for the expected covered deposits that a regular member institution will 
raise. 
This policy option would fit well within the system of risk-based contributions under 
EDIS. 
Effectiveness: This option would positively impact the effectiveness. A set of flat 
minimum contributions depending on the size of small institutions and replacing the 
risk-banks contributions would achieve the objective of ensuring broad participation in 
the DGS, while at the same time being more proportionate for smaller banks. This option 
would address the issue related to the disproportionate contribution by smaller banks 
relative to larger banks, as described above in the analysis of the current NOD. In 
addition, the entry fee would likely have a neutral impact on the effectiveness of the 
DGS because it is not common for many new institutions to join the DGS and particularly 
if they are small.  
                                           
209 See Article 10 of the Commission delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63. 
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Efficiency: This option would positively impact efficiency. A set of flat minimum 
contributions depending on the size of small institutions and replacing the risk-based 
contributions would simplify the calculation of contributions. An entry fee would have a 
neutral impact on the efficiency of the system, because it is relatively simple to calculate 
and it would not increase the total contributions. 
Coherence: This option would positively impact the level playing field by reducing the 
current fragmentation, contribute to the overall coherence under EDIS and alignment 
with the contribution to the Single Resolution Fund. 
Subsidiarity: This option would reduce subsidiarity but could envisage some degree of 
flexibility for Member States to account for differences in size of financial institutions 
and national economies.  
 
5.9.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers extending the NOD to all Member States by requiring all 
member institutions to pay at least a minimum amount in contributions. This option 
could also entail agreeing on one method for calculating contributions.  
Effectiveness: As indicated in Option 1, the minimum contribution is likely to have a 
negative effect (albeit limited) on the effectiveness of the DGS. Decreasing risk-based 
contributions and increasing minimum contributions could lead to an increase in risk-
taking, which could trigger pay-out events, weakening depositor protection. This option 
would imply maintaining such an effect with a wider impact.  
Efficiency: This option would slightly reduce efficiency as the minimum contribution is 
applied as a fixed amount and does not require any additional information from the 
member institution, making it relatively straightforward. 
Coherence: This option would contribute to a more coherent framework, in particular if 
it also harmonises the amounts of minimum contributions to reduce fragmentation. 
However, this option would maintain ‘one size fits all’ to the detriment of proportionality.  
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity (see Option 1).  
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5.10 NOD 20 – Participations by branches from outside the EU  
Summary: NOD 20 – Participations by branches from outside the EU 
DGSD [Article 15 (1)] 
Member States shall check that branches established in their territory by a bank which 
has its head office outside the EU have protection equivalent to that prescribed in the 
DGSD. 
If protection is not equivalent, Member States may require that third country branch 
to join a DGS in operation within their territories. 
When performing the prescribed check, Member States shall at least check that 
depositors benefit from the same coverage level and scope of protection as provided 
for in this Directive. 
Transposed into national law [24 Member States] 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK 
Practical experience so far [12 Member States] 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Spain and the UK 
Importance 
Up to 0.7 % of covered deposits210 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk 
profile 
national 
DGS 
Level 
playing field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective Member 
States 
Overall - + ++ +/- 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current 
form 
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
[Recommended] 
Effectiveness - - ++ ++ 
Efficiency - - + + 
Coherence +/- - + + 
Subsidiarity + + +/- +/- 
 
                                           
210 Based on estimations taking into account the number of third country branches in the Member States and 
available data on their covered deposits, third country branches take covered deposits in about half of the 
Member States and most of them account for a very small share of the covered deposits. On average, the 
covered deposits of third country branches account for only 0.05% of covered deposits, with a maximum of 
0.7% in Cyprus. 
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 Implementation across Member States 
The large majority of Member States has transposed this NOD. Most of them require 
third country branches to join the national DGS only if the protection is not deemed 
equivalent211. In a few Member States, joining the national DGS is automatic for third 
country branches, regardless of the equivalence of the protection. In those Member 
States, either membership is compulsory (Romania and Czechia) or third country 
branches have to request and be authorised by the competent authority not to join the 
national DGS (France). 
Austria, Finland, Latvia and Malta currently prohibit third country branches from joining 
their national DGS, with Malta being the only Member State with a presence of third 
country branches. 
 
5.10.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The main motivations to use this NOD are to ensure depositor protection and equal 
treatment in a domestic market212, international level playing field, financial stability 
and historic reasons (Italy and Lithuania).  
Some Member States view the need to ensure a level playing field between EU and non-
EU banks as even more important than depositor confidence because most clients of 
the third country branches are large corporations, rather than households.  
The integrity of the banking and financial market, and the solvency of the national 
guarantee fund was particularly stressed by the UK. Malta does not use the NOD because 
the guarantee of the covered deposits at the third country branch is considered a source 
of potential risk for the DGS itself. 
 
                                           
211 I.e. Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK. 
212 E.g. Cyprus, Czechia, Greece, Lithuania and Slovenia. 
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5.10.1.2 Membership in the DGS 
The modalities of third country branches participation in the national DGS vary 
considerably across Member States. In some Member States, third country branches do 
not exist or do not collect deposits (see Table 5.3). This also explains why in certain 
cases the details of the participation of non-EU branches in the national DGS are 
incomplete. 
Participation of third country branches in the national DGS can be mandatory, 
conditional on the assessment of the equivalence of the protection in the home 
country213 or voluntary.  
The extent of the membership can also differ. In some, the third country branches are 
required to fully join the national DGS if the home country does not provide any kind of 
deposit protection or if the protection is not deemed equivalent214. In other Member 
States, depending on the level of protection provided by the home country, full 
membership is required only if the home country provides no protection. Where the 
protection is not deemed equivalent, third country branches have to join the national 
                                           
213 I.e. Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the 
UK. 
214 I.e. Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. 
Box 7. DGS coverage of Icelandic branches in the Netherlands and United 
Kingdom 
For a better understanding of this NOD, it is useful to recall the case of Iceland during 
the global financial crisis in 2008. This was a major economic and political event for 
the country: all three major private banks defaulted. Compared to the size of the 
economy, the default was the largest in economic history. The financial system, like 
external debt, had become enormous relative to GDP. The central bank found itself 
unable to act as lender of last resort when the global financial crisis erupted and 
confidence in the economy started to fade. 
To restore order in the financial system, an emergency law was passed to enable the 
Financial Supervisory Authority to take control over financial institutions and to make 
domestic deposits in the banks priority claims. The banks were put into receivership 
and liquidation and this resulted in losses for their shareholders and foreign creditors. 
Importantly, outside Iceland, more than half a million depositors lost access to their 
accounts in foreign branches of Icelandic banks, after a run on deposits. This led to 
the Icesave dispute, that ended with an EFTA Court ruling that Iceland was not obliged 
to repay Dutch and British depositors guaranteed deposits. 
If the NOD had been applied in the Netherlands and the UK (i.e. Icelandic branches 
had been required to participate and contribute to the respective hosting DGS), the 
depositors would have been directly covered by the Dutch and UK DGSs and the 
international dispute would have been prevented. It is worth noting that the 
equivalence, i.e. the criterion under the DGSD decisive for requiring the membership 
in the DGS, would become ineffective in the case of a large crisis. If the deposit 
guarantee under the Icelandic system had been considered equivalent to that of the 
Netherlands and the UK, the dispute would not have taken place, but Dutch and British 
depositors would have lost their money in any case. 
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DGS and contribute only in respect of covered deposits held at the branch, which are 
not covered by a scheme in the third country215. 
 
In Belgium, 8 third country branches are currently members of the DGS. The Belgian 
central bank conducts the equivalence test with the minimum coverage level of 
EUR 100 000 (as the only criterion). In the Netherlands, third country branches are also 
members of the DGS because the coverage of their DGSs in the US and Taiwan does 
not include foreign deposits and is, therefore, not considered equivalent.  
In France, the participation in the DGS is automatic, unless third country branches 
request an exemption from the participation. The National Competent Authority 
assesses the equivalence of the protection and grants the exemption. So far, no third 
country branch has requested the exemption.  
In Hungary, third country branches can join the DGS on a voluntary basis. This seems 
based on one experience with a branch of a Chinese bank: at the time of equivalence 
assessment, there was no DGS in China and the branch asked to join the DGS in 
Hungary. In this sense, contributing has been considered voluntary.  
In Romania and Czechia216, participation in the national DGS is compulsory.  
 
5.10.1.3 Procedure for the membership 
The procedure for joining the national DGS varies across Member States (see Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2 Designated authorities responsible for equivalence test 
Duration Member States 
National central 
bank 
Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain 
National 
Competent 
Authority 
Denmark217, Estonia, France, Germany, Luxembourg, UK 
DGS Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden 
Source: CEPS-Milieu elaboration 
 
Time of the assessment 
The assessment of equivalence is most frequently done at the time of such request for 
authorisation to provide banking services218. Only Spain and Sweden have specific rules 
requiring third country branches to notify any change in the coverage level and scope 
of protection of the guarantee in the third country.  
In Slovakia, the assessment is performed after the authorisation is granted. In Czechia, 
the assessment shall be performed as soon as the branch starts operating.  
                                           
215 E.g. Bulgaria, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. 
216 In Czechia, the national bank grants the licence and by default, banks have to join and contribute to the 
national DGS. The DGS does not perform equivalence checks. 
217 The legislation gives the competence to the Danish Financial supervisory authority, but in practice, the 
assessment is carried out by the DGS. 
218 E.g. Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain and 
Sweden. 
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In the Netherlands, the Dutch central bank may carry out the assessment at its own 
initiative, at the request of the creditors of a member institution, at the request of the 
institution itself or based on a decision requiring the coordination at EU level.  
In Greece, the assessment is performed upon recommendation of the DGS.  
For Portugal, Hungary and Germany, the procedure is not clearly identified but would 
likely take place during the authorisation procedure.  
For Bulgaria, Cyprus, Italy, Poland and the UK, the moment of the assessment could 
not be identified. 
 
Criteria of equivalence test  
The equivalence test examines whether the third country DGS offers protection 
equivalent to that of the DGS in the Member State where the third country branch wants 
to operate. Mostly, such tests do not appear formalised. Member States typically 
mentioned the applicability of criteria such as coverage level and scope of the protection. 
Moreover, some also take into account the repayment period219, the deposits excluded 
from the coverage (e.g. Germany and Portugal), the opinion of the DGS (e.g. Hungary), 
the modalities of the financial contributions (e.g. Ireland), the capacity of the guarantee 
schemes to carry out repayment (e.g. Italy), and/or the type of depositors (e.g. Hungary 
and Poland). Some leave the full discretion to their competent authority (e.g. Estonia 
and Slovenia). 
 
5.10.1.4 Calculation of the contributions 
Two different methods for calculation of the contributions of third country branches are 
applied. Most DGSs apply the same calculation method as for the national member 
institutions, i.e. the amount of covered deposits weighted by the risk profile of the 
institution220. However, the risk-weight in this calculation is mostly pre-defined because 
the third country branches are integrated in the parent undertaking in the third country. 
Some of those Member States have specific rules for assessing the risk profile of third 
country branches, due to the difficulties in comparing their data with those of the 
national member institutions. In Greece, third country branches are ranked in the 
highest risk category. In the Netherlands, third country branches are automatically 
grouped in the second risk category (risk-weight of 100 %). In Spain, if the data 
necessary to determine the risk profile are not available, only the amount of the covered 
deposits will be considered (i.e. average risk-weight). In Belgium, the contributions of 
third country branches are based only on the amount of the covered deposits and are 
not risk-based (i.e. average risk-weight). Similarly, in the UK, the PRA rates all non-EEA 
branches as average risk.  
In the Member States that opted for providing an additional guarantee (to the coverage 
of the third country DGS), the contribution of the third country branches is calculated 
taking into account only the amount of covered deposits held by the branches. 
In some Member States, no details on the calculation method are available because of 
the absence of third country branches (also if the latter do not take deposits) on their 
domestic market (e.g. Estonia and Slovenia). The calculation method in Slovakia is not 
known probably because it applies a reciprocity condition regarding the possibility for 
third country branches to join the national DGS. In Ireland, the calculation method is 
currently under consideration.  
                                           
219 E.g. Croatia, Hungary, Ireland and Luxembourg. 
220 E.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
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Besides the calculation of the contribution, additional operational aspects were raised 
relating to the actual procedure of the pay-out. If the third country institution failed, 
some considered it unclear whether the DGS has to pay within the 7 working days, as 
it usually does for covered deposits, or if the deposits would be subject to the law of the 
home country of the branch. This seems even more complicated in the case of partial 
contributions. 
 
5.10.1.5 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
For the purposes of an assessment of the experience with the NOD, the study sets out 
an overview of the presence of third country branches in the EU. Table 1.1 shows the 
size of the deposits they collect, both in absolute terms and relative to total covered 
deposits.  
The majority of Member States host third country branches in their jurisdiction. As many 
of these branches do not hold deposits in their balance sheet, estimated deposits held 
at third country branches are limited and well below 0.1 % of total covered deposits, 
with the two exceptions of Cyprus and the UK. In the UK, the absolute amount is 
estimated to be substantial, above EUR 2 500 million (equivalent to 0.21 % of covered 
deposits). While most Member States have transposed the NOD, the transposition does 
not seem to match one to one the presence of deposits in non-EU branches (EFTA and 
third country branches). 
 
Table 5.3 Overview of third country branches and covered deposits 
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Austria 522 24 1 547 - 0.00% 
Belgium 32 48 8 88 68.4 0.02% 
Bulgaria 20 4 1 25 21.2 0.08% 
Croatia 25 1 0 26 - 0.00% 
Cyprus 12 6 15 33 177.2 0.68% 
Czechia 33 24 2 59 - 0.00% 
Denmark 80 23 1 104 - 0.00% 
Estonia 8 7 1 16 - 0.00% 
Finland 227 30 2 259 - 0.00% 
France 337 59 20 416 525.8 0.05% 
Germany 1,470 92 20 1,582 208.5 0.01% 
Greece 17 18 4 39 68.2 0.07% 
Hungary 48 8 1 57 0.5 0.00% 
Ireland 24 35 2 61 16.2 0.02% 
Italy 424 72 7 503 95.1 0.01% 
Latvia 14 6 0 20 - 0.00% 
Lithuania 9 9 0 18 - 0.00% 
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Luxembourg 89 32 14 135 31.4 0.10% 
Malta 21 1 2 24 9.2 0.08% 
The Netherlands 43 43 3 89 59.3 0.01% 
Poland 583 31 0 614 - 0.00% 
Portugal 128 27 0 155 - 0.00% 
Romania 69 7 0 76 - 0.00% 
Slovakia 12 15 0 27 - 0.00% 
Slovenia 14 2 0 16 - 0.00% 
Spain 116 81 3 200 156.7 0.02% 
Sweden 121 31 4 156 - 0.00% 
UK 229 83 83 395 2,668.3 0.21% 
Total 4,727 819 194 5,740 4,105.7 0.05% 
Note: Member States that did not transpose the NOD are marked in green. 
Source: Own elaboration based on EBA (2018 & 2019), ECB (2019) and survey among DGS. 
 
All in all, 11 Member States221 do not seem to use this NOD because they have no 
deposit taking third country branches present in their local market. In 7 Member 
States222, the deposit taking third country branches are covered by the DGS. In practice, 
Malta is the only Member State in which the third country branches take deposits that 
are not protected by the national DGS. For 5 Member States223, the information as to 
whether their third country branches are members of the DGS is not available. 
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The participation of third country branches in the DGS improves depositor confidence 
and maintains a level playing field for both depositors and member institutions. 
However, its impact on the risk profile of the DGS can be ambiguous. 
 
5.10.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The presence of third country branches authorised to take deposits gives rise to the risk 
of the financial stability and of substantial costs for the financial system if such deposits 
do not benefit from an adequate protection. The experience of Icelandic banks in the 
UK and the Netherland is a good example (see Box 7). National DGSs may be called to 
                                           
221 I.e. Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Sweden 
222 I.e. Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Hungary and the Netherlands. 
223 I.e. Germany, France, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg. 
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repay deposits held at a third country branches, which did not contribute to the DGS. 
This NOD was adopted to address such a risk.  
However, third country branch membership in the national DGS can also pose risks to 
the solvability of the fund because the reimbursement of the pay-out will be subject to 
the insolvency procedures and rules of the third country, which may be less favourable 
to the national DGS than domestic rules. 
Yet, in view of the estimates involving small amounts of deposits (with the exceptions 
for Cyprus and the UK), the negative impact on the risk profile of the DGS should be 
rather limited.  
 
5.10.2.2 Level playing field 
The participation of third country branches in the national DGSs is beneficial for the level 
playing field. The NOD prevents the third country branches from having a more 
favourable treatment than EU member institutions because the annual contributions of 
member institutions to their national DGS reduce their profits.  
Therefore, the NOD contributes to fairer competition between EU and non-EU credit 
institutions provided that the contributions to the DGS of third country branches are 
calculated in a similar way as for national member institutions.  
 
5.10.2.3 Depositor confidence  
Protecting and ensuring equal treatment of all depositors in a Member State should 
strengthen depositor confidence in the domestic banking market. This is particularly 
relevant for branches from third countries that do not provide any deposit guarantee. 
Previous failures in the Icelandic banks case have shown that depositors are not 
necessarily aware that a bank operating in their home country is actually a third country 
branch where deposits may not be adequately protected (see Box 7). 
 
5.10.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
Based on the data, this NOD is particularly relevant in the UK. However, in the specific 
case of the UK, the presence of many branches with parent banks in different non-EU 
countries can contribute to the diversification of the risk across countries, making it less 
likely that all these branches would fail simultaneously224. In addition, the exposure of 
the UK DGS is limited by the additional prudential provision of the PRA imposing the 
maximum threshold for deposits that each branch can collect, i.e. GBP 500 million of 
covered deposits (about EUR 550 million). For larger amounts, the authorisation to 
provide retail banking services may not be granted. 
Cyprus has also large amount of deposits from third country branches compared to other 
Member States, but still well below 1 % of total covered deposits. All third country 
branches contribute to the DGS.  
In Malta, the NOD has not been transposed. The DGS feared the risk of covering deposits 
held at banks that have not contributed to the DGS. The total amount of relevant 
deposits is not disclosed but estimated at about EUR 9.2 million, i.e. 0.1 % of covered 
deposits. This might well be higher in practice as the estimation is based on the average 
covered deposits held by branches in other Member States.  
 
                                           
224 Such benefit may be mitigated by having to deal with a different legal system. 
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 Options in the context of EDIS  
Given the existing fragmentation in the use of this NOD, which, in particular in some 
Member States, may directly impact the uniform level of depositor protection, a common 
approach adopted in all Member States would be recommended as the most sensible 
(Option 4 and possibly Option 3).  
Under Option 4, all third country branches would be required to join the national DGSs 
under a common set of criteria for the assessment of the equivalence test and the 
calculation of contributions. In this respect, the equivalence test could be conducted 
centrally (e.g. EBA) for all Member States in order to reduce the administrative burden 
for individual DGSs. The calculation of contributions of third country branches would 
also benefit from the common approach, which is risk-based in order to ensure a level 
playing field with EU banks and mitigate the risk to the DGSs. Both combined 
approaches would increase the depositor protection and confidence and would be largely 
consistent with the existing approaches in the majority of Member States, reducing the 
potential impact on subsidiarity. 
Under Option 3, a maximum threshold of EUR 500 million on covered deposits held by 
third country branches would be introduced as a preventive function to mitigate a 
potential risk to financial stability. Such an approach would also seem reasonable 
because apparently no third country branch currently has covered deposits above 
EUR 500 million. 
The deposit guarantee of third country branches225 normally increases the financial 
exposure of the DGS. With EDIS in place, potential pay-outs of such deposits could 
either be financed by EDIS under the full insurance scheme or, alternatively, depending 
on the form EDIS takes, also by national DGSs. In the former case, the above 
recommended policy options (maximum threshold, common methods for equivalence 
testing and calculation of criteria) would significantly mitigate the potential risk to the 
EDIS fund. The same would apply in the latter case with respect to the risk to national 
DGSs. 
 
5.10.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form  
This policy option considers retaining the NOD in its current form. However, it would 
leave unclear to what extent Member States have a discretion not to require the third 
country branch to join the DGS, if the protection is not considered equivalent. Member 
States would also continue to enjoy discretion regarding the operational aspects, such 
as the calculation of the contributions. 
Effectiveness: This option would impact the effectiveness under EDIS as some Member 
States seem to interpret it so that clients of third country branches operating within 
their territory can have a lower protection. In practice, all Member States (with one 
exception) require the third country branches to join the DGS and maintain the depositor 
protection because most third country DGSs either do not offer protection to foreign 
deposits or have lower thresholds. In any case, the additional risk related to the third 
country branches may also raise issues for the DGSs.  
Efficiency: This option would reduce the efficiency of the DGS. Currently, there are 
divergences between the equivalence tests in Member States and the method of 
calculation of the contributions, based on standard or average risk-weights, which eases 
the calculation of the contribution. 
                                           
225 Third country branches are regulated under Article 47 CRD and are supervised at national level.  
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Coherence: This option would not contribute to a coherent framework under EDIS, even 
though the widespread application of the NOD improved the pre-DGSD environment 
(e.g. the Icelandic bank case). The existing fragmentation would remain. 
Subsidiarity: This option would not impact subsidiarity.  
 
5.10.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD, putting the treatment of third country 
branches outside the scope of harmonisation of Union law. This would be equivalent to 
the state of play prior to the DGSD. 
Effectiveness: This option would negatively impact depositor protection and increase the 
risk to financial stability. The EU depositors of the third country branches would no 
longer be covered in case of a third country branch failure. This might lead to a reduction 
in depositor confidence as retail customers are not necessarily aware of whether they 
hold an account with a third country branch that does not guarantee their deposits.  
Efficiency: This option would increase the efficiency of the DGS in terms of reduced 
administrative burden (e.g. in relation to equivalence test, calculation and collection of 
contributions, pay-outs).  
Coherence: This option would impact the level playing field across Member States 
between the third country branches that are not required to join the DGS and EU banks 
that are required to join.  
Subsidiarity: This option does not impact subsidiarity. 
 
5.10.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers modifications to the current NOD. It would envisage a 
maximum threshold of EUR 500 million on covered deposits held by third country 
branches226. Such a threshold would have a preventive function to mitigate a potential 
risk to financial stability and also seems reasonable because apparently no third country 
branch currently has covered deposits above EUR 500 million. 
Effectiveness: This option would positively impact depositor confidence by guaranteeing 
the same protection to all depositors in the EU. The maximum threshold would limit the 
potential exposure of the DGS in the event of a pay-out. It would also be recommended 
to set common criteria for the equivalence test and the method of calculation of 
contributions.  
Efficiency: This option would not impact efficiency as currently no third country branches 
seem to have covered deposits above EUR 500 million.  
Coherence: This option would improve the coherence of the system under EDIS, by 
ensuring an equal treatment of third country branches across Member States and of 
depositors in the EU.  
Subsidiarity: This option would have the potential to impact subsidiarity. However, it 
has primarily a preventive function because this approach would currently be consistent 
with the state of play in the Member States, except for Malta227.  
 
                                           
226 This approach resembles the application of the NOD in the UK. 
227 If this approach were applied in Malta, no single third country branch would be authorised to take more 
than 5% of the covered deposits (based on the total covered deposits as of December 2018). 
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5.10.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
This policy option considers modifying the current NOD in order to require all third 
country branches to join the national DGSs and provide for one common set of criteria 
for the assessment of the equivalence test and the calculation of contributions.  
Effectiveness: This option would positively impact depositor confidence by ensuring the 
same guarantee for deposits at third country branches irrespective of whether the bank 
operates under an EU licence or the authorisation of a third country. However, third 
country branches could give rise to financial stability concerns and losses to the DGSs 
in the case of insolvency (e.g. Icelandic case - see Box 7). 
Efficiency: This option would increase efficiency, particularly where the equivalence test 
was conducted centrally (e.g. EBA) for all Member States, which would result in reduced 
administrative burden for the individual DGSs. Most Member States already perform 
equivalence testing and calculate contributions for third country branches and could 
benefit from the common approach, which is risk-based and possibly combined with 
pre-determined contributions228, also taking into consideration the risk profile of the 
third country.  
In the absence of the threshold for the size of the covered deposits of the third country 
branches, as envisaged under Option 3, these safeguards would mitigate the potential 
for destabilisation of the DGS as these institutions may have less incentive to contain 
their risk profile. 
Coherence: This option would positively impact the coherence of the EU framework by 
ensuring a similar treatment of third country branches and EU banks. Indeed, the 
treatment is not the same as the risk-weight for the contributions assumed for branches.  
Subsidiarity: This option would impact subsidiarity.   
                                           
228 The pre-determined contribution at least takes away some of the risk-sensitivity for third country branches. 
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6 Transitional provisions 
This section provides a comprehensive overview of each of the NODs related to 
transitional provisions. It does so by: i) assessing the implementation of the NOD across 
Member States; ii) estimating the impact of the NOD on the risk profile of the national 
DGS, impact on the level playing field, impact on depositor confidence and relevance 
for the Member States; and, iii) identifying options in the context of EDIS to assess 
whether the NOD should be retained, eliminated, fully harmonised or an alternative 
approach should be chosen. 
 
6.1 NOD 21 – Repayment periods longer than seven working days 
Summary: NOD 21 – Repayment periods longer than seven working days 
DGSD [Article 8(2)] 
DGSs shall ensure that the repayable amount is available within seven working days of the 
date on which a relevant administrative authority makes a determination [..]. However, 
Member States may, for a transitional period until 31 December 2023, establish the 
following repayment periods of up to:  
(a) 20 working days until 31 December 2018;  
(b) 15 working days from 1 January 2019 until 31 December 2020;  
(c) 10 working days from 1 January 2021 until 31 December 2023. 
Transposed into national law [16 Member States] 
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and the UK 
Used in practice [At least 4 Member States] 
Belgium, Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania 
Importance 
100 % of covered deposits 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national DGS 
Level 
playing field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member States 
Overall + - - -/+ 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current form  
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
[Recommended] 
Effectiveness - +/- + - 
Efficiency + - +/- +/- 
Coherence - + + +/- 
Subsidiarity + - + - 
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 Implementation across Member States 
16 Member States have transposed the NOD that allows a longer repayment period. 14 
of them also transposed the three longer transitional periods for repayment, i.e. 20, 15 
and 10 working days. Finland and Luxembourg have opted for a faster transition. Finland 
shortened the repayment period by using the provisions for 20 and 15 days only. 
Luxembourg applied the period of 20 days until 31 May 2016 instead of until 
31 December 2018. 
 
6.1.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
Most Member States chose longer repayment periods in order to ensure that the 
necessary procedures and mechanisms (e.g. IT systems) are in place at member 
institutions, DGSs and payment agents for identifying the eligible deposits and 
proceeding with the pay-out. 
Some indicated that they do not necessarily need the NOD, but prefer having the 
possibility as a safeguard (e.g. Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia), if the 7-day pay-out was 
not possible due to extraordinary circumstances. Others indicated that the longer 
repayment periods were not considered necessary, as they already had procedures to 
arrange for a 7-day pay-out (e.g. Greece).  
 
6.1.1.2 Additional safeguard clauses to protect depositors 
Under Article 8(2) DGSD (and recital 39), DGSs must ensure the payment of a minimum 
amount to cover the depositor’s cost of living within 5 working days of a request, if DGS 
are unable to make the repayable amount available within 7 working days. Accordingly, 
Member States must provide for an interim payment during the transitional period.  
Member States retain discretion in terms of determining the amount of cost of living, 
which takes into account the differences in living costs across the different Member 
States. The latter is expressed in absolute or relative amounts (see Table 6.1). For 
example, the estimated living costs in Belgium, Finland and Portugal ranges between 
EUR 1 000 and EUR 10 000. By contrast, in Lithuania (one month), Malta (three weeks), 
Slovenia (one month) and Slovakia (one month) the living costs are based on the 
minimum or average salary over a certain period. Accordingly, the amounts range 
between EUR 550 and EUR 1 025. The UK differentiates depending on whether the 
depositor is an individual or a small company/local authority, considering the cost of 
living and the coverage of necessary business expenses. 
Some Member States specify that the claim must be well founded and justified by the 
depositor on the basis of its personal financial situation (i.e. Austria, Finland and 
Slovenia). 
There is also at least one Member State that deviates from the NOD as specified in the 
DGSD. In Portugal, the DGS is required to pay living costs within a maximum of 7 
working days, rather than 5 working days as specified in the DGSD.  
 
Table 6.1 Cost of living 
Country Minimum amount 
Austria* N/A 
Belgium EUR 3 000 
Finland EUR 1 000 
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Country Minimum amount 
Croatia* Minimum monthly gross salary: EUR 505229 
Hungary* Minimum monthly gross salary: HUF 138 000 (approx. 
EUR 416)230 
Italy* N/A (minimum wage depends on the type of activity) 
Latvia* EU data: average gross income EUR 1 006 (3rd quarter 
2018)231 
Minimum wages: EUR 430 per month232 
Lithuania One month minimum wage (EUR 550) 
Luxembourg* Minimum monthly wages as of 1 January, 2018233: 
Skilled workers: EUR 2 485 
Unskilled worker: EUR 2 071 
  
Ireland Minimum wage from January 2019: € 9.80 per hour234 
Malta Three times the gross weekly salary (EUR 1 025) 
Portugal EUR 10,000 
The 
Netherlands* 
Minimum monthly wage for employee aged 23 or above: 
EUR 1 636235 
Slovakia Average monthly salary of an employee as determined by the 
Statistical Office (EUR 1 023) 
Slovenia One month minimum wage (EUR 886) 
UK Varied depending on whether the depositor is an individual or a small 
company/local authority and considering the cost of living and the 
coverage of necessary business expenses 
Notes: The amounts for Lithuania, Malta (combination of 2014 gross hourly earnings and 2016 weekly hours 
paid) and Slovenia have been based estimated based on information from Eurostat (2019)236. The average 
salary for Slovakia has been based on the information from the Slovakian Statistical Office for the first quarter 
of 2019. * Legislation does not specify the amount or which specific factors are taken into consideration. The 
amounts provide an indication of the living costs in the Member State. 
Source: CEPS-Milieu elaboration 
 
 
6.1.1.3 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
Most Member States that have transposed the NOD seem to use it as a safeguard if they 
were not able to pay out in 7 working days. Belgium, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and 
potentially other Member States have used more than 7 working days for the pay-out 
since the adoption of the DGSD. 
 
 Impact of the NOD 
Longer periods for repayment are generally not beneficial for depositor confidence. 
However, this NOD would only be applicable during the transitional period in order to 
                                           
229  EURES, The European Job Mobility Portal, Living and working conditions - Croatia (2019). 
230  EURES, The European Job Mobility Portal, Living and working conditions - Hungary (2019).  
231  EURES, The European Job Mobility Portal, Living and working conditions - Latvia (2018). 
232  EUROSTAT, Monthly minimum wages, bi-annual data (2019/S1). 
233  EURES, The European Job Mobility Portal, Living and working conditions - Luxembourg (2019) and 
EUROSTAT, Monthly minimum wages, bi-annual data (2019/S1). 
234  EURES, The European Job Mobility Portal, Living and working conditions - Ireland (2019).  
235  EURES, The European Job Mobility Portal, Living and working conditions - Netherlands (2019). 
236  Eurostat ‘Monthly minimum wages – bi-annual data’ (2019 S1). 
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enable Member States to put in place procedures for a faster pay-out within 7 working 
days. 
 
6.1.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
The longer repayment period would impact positively the risk profile of the national 
DGS, as it may ease the pressure for the DGS when making pay-outs, including verifying 
the validity of the claims of depositors and ensuring that the resources for the pay-out 
are readily available.  
Historically, deposit insurance was primarily used for smaller banks, requiring the pay-
out of smaller amounts of covered deposits237. Most DGSs have the resources needed 
to cover pay-outs for smaller members readily available. Nevertheless, for larger pay-
outs that exceed readily available funds the extra time to arrange for their availability 
is considered useful by the DGSs. Interestingly, the Member States that have transposed 
the NOD are not necessarily those that have inferior financial means. This would support 
the argument from most DGSs that the longer repayment period may be more important 
for operational reasons. 
For some DGSs the longer repayment period makes it possible to avoid financial 
penalties and judicial costs for claims in the event of late repayment. 
 
6.1.2.2 Level playing field 
Longer repayment periods may affect the level playing field both domestically and cross-
border.  
First, when comparing the access to deposits in insolvency and resolution, a longer pay-
out period in insolvency versus continued access to deposits in resolution may motivate 
depositors to move their deposits to larger institutions that are likely to be resolved 
under the resolution mechanism238. However, this assumes a level of awareness of 
insolvency and resolution regimes among depositors, which most are unlikely to have. 
Second, the differences in repayment periods among Member States might create 
arbitrage, assuming depositor mobility, if depositors prefer institutions in Member States 
with a shorter repayment period. This is one of the reasons why, by 2024, all Member 
States are expected to converge to a 7 working days pay-out period. The impact of 
differences in pay-out duration is expected to be non-significant given the temporary 
nature of these differences and a likely low level of awareness among depositors 
regarding the differences in pay-out duration between Member States. The early 
repayment of the cost of living would likely reduce the impact due to differences in pay-
out periods even further.  
 
6.1.2.3 Depositor confidence  
Longer repayment periods are relevant for depositor confidence. In general, the degree 
of access to deposits is directly proportional with depositor confidence. In the event of 
default of a member institution, longer repayment periods or delays in repayment could 
create contagion through a general loss of confidence in the DGS pay-out mechanism 
and trigger a run on other member institutions.  
                                           
237 De Groen, W.P. and D. Gros (2019 – Forthcoming), How to make the SRF contribution really risk-based?, 
CEPS Paperback. 
238 De Groen, W.P. and D. Gros (2019 – Forthcoming), How to make the SRF contribution really risk-based?, 
CEPS Paperback. 
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In addition, the lack of access to the covered deposits might also lead to immediate 
liquidity concerns, i.e. depositors becoming unable to meet their payment obligations. 
The importance of uninterrupted access to payment accounts is increasing as non-cash 
payments (card, bank transfers, etc.) are becoming more important for both online and 
offline payments239. Immediate liquidity concerns could be mitigated to a certain extent 
by the interim payment covering the short-term cost of living. 
 
6.1.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
Most DGSs currently work towards a pay-out within 7 working days. 
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
This NOD will cease to exist in 2024 and retaining this NOD in its current form would be 
sensible to provide a temporary safeguard while the pay-out mechanisms are being 
operationalised across Member States. Given the importance for depositor confidence 
and the general readiness in the Member States, it could also be envisaged to accelerate 
the transition towards the 7 working days pay-out (Option 3). However, as the political 
process to finalise EDIS or a potential new DGSD is likely to last quite some time, it is 
recommended to either harmonise the NOD (Option 4) or eliminate the NOD (Option 2). 
The latter could be considered if the new legislation is not adopted by 2023. 
 
6.1.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers that Member States can apply longer repayment periods 
until 2023. 
Effectiveness: The longer repayment period reduces depositor confidence in principle. 
However, if the DGS is still unable operationally to pay out within 7 working days, a 
longer payment period, known to depositors in advance, provides legal certainty and is 
generally better than an unannounced late payment, which could result in additional 
legal claims and loss of confidence.  
Efficiency: Retaining the NOD would contribute to a more efficient repayment procedure, 
by giving more time to operationalise the pay-out processes, procedures and IT 
infrastructure. The DGS is better able to obtain the necessary financial resources and 
reduce the risk of legal challenges by depositors for late repayments.  
Coherence: Differences in repayment periods in Member States may create an unlevel 
playing field. First by encouraging depositors to move their deposits to Member States 
with a shorter repayment period. Second, by resulting in a different treatment of 
depositors depending on whether the institution is placed in insolvency (which includes 
DGS pay-out) versus resolution. The access to covered deposits should be uninterrupted 
in resolution240, while it is restored in 7 working days under the deposit insurance and 
in up to 15 working days under the NOD. Considering that small institutions may be 
placed in insolvency while larger institutions may enter resolution, longer repayment 
periods could create some degree of arbitrage in depositor preferences for a given 
institution.  
                                           
239 Lalouette, L. and H. Esselink (2018), Trends and developments in the use of euro cash over the past ten 
years, ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 6/2018. 
240 Possibly except during a moratorium, if applied by the resolution authority, of a maximum 2 working days. 
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Subsidiarity: The current NOD addresses the concern that a large share of DGSs might 
not be ready at the time of the adoption for a 7 working days pay-out. However, the 
general readiness on the DGS side has increased in the meantime.  
 
6.1.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD so that Member States apply the 7 
working days pay-out. 
Effectiveness: Faster pay-outs are critical for effective depositor protection, as long as 
the DGSs are able to perform the payment within 7 working days. While the general 
readiness on the DGS side has increased, there is still a limited number of DGSs not yet 
prepared operationally for a shorter repayment period. This could fuel uncertainty 
among depositors.  
Efficiency: Eliminating the NOD would reduce the flexibility of the DGS, as argued above.  
Coherence: This option would be beneficial for the level playing field and reduce the 
difference in treatment of depositors in insolvency with DGS pay-out and resolution.  
Subsidiarity: The flexibility of Member States would be reduced and potentially cause 
difficult situations where the DGSs are not prepared operationally for 7 working days 
pay-outs.  
 
6.1.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This policy option considers revising the transitional provision of Article 8(2) DGSD, and 
move towards a faster convergence to 7 working days in the coming years. Concretely, 
this option considers moving 1 year earlier to a repayment period of 10 working days 
(in 2020 instead of 2021) and 2 years earlier to 7 working days (in January 2022 instead 
of January 2024). 
Effectiveness: The alternative option would be beneficial for deposit protection, 
reflecting the general readiness of DGS for a 7 working days pay-out. This modification 
would acknowledge the need for additional time for certain DGSs to change their 
operational systems to enable the 7 working days pay-out.  
Efficiency: This option would reflect the trend observed in most DGSs to front-run the 
deadlines with a view to shortening the repayment period. All DGSs would likely be able 
to comply with the 7 working days pay-out. 
Coherence: This option would reduce the distortion in the domestic and international 
level playing fields. The repayment period would shift more quickly towards the 7 
working days target across all Member States (i.e. in the transition period the difference 
in repayment period is shorter). Similarly, the shortening of the transitional period may 
reduce the difference in level of access to deposits during insolvency and resolution. 
Subsidiarity: The option would to some extent limit the discretion of Member States but 
would be justified by the readiness on the DGSs’ side.  
 
6.1.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
The full harmonisation policy option is in practice likely to have the same impact as 
retaining the NOD in its current form (see Option 1), except that the approaches of the 
Member States would be more similar on paper.   
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6.2 NOD 22 – Coverage of deposits until the maturity date 
Summary: NOD 22 – Coverage of deposits until the maturity date  
DGSD [Article 19 (1)] 
Member States may allow to cover wholly or partially certain deposits or categories 
of deposits or other instruments until their initial maturity date if they were paid in or 
issued before 2 July 2014. 
Transposed into national law [10 Member States] 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Romania  
Used in practice [3 Member States] 
Denmark, Hungary and Luxembourg 
Importance 
Up to 2.2 % of covered deposits241 
Impact of the NOD 
 Risk profile 
national 
DGS 
Level 
playing 
field 
Depositor 
confidence 
Relevance for 
respective 
Member States 
Overall - +/- + -/+ 
Policy options in the context of EDIS 
 Option 1: 
Retain in 
current 
form  
Option 2: 
Eliminating 
Option 3: 
Alternative 
[Recommended] 
Option 4: Full 
harmonisation 
Effectiveness -/+ + ++ - 
Efficiency - + + - 
Coherence - + - - 
Subsidiarity + - - - 
 
 Implementation across Member States 
10 Member States242 have implemented this NOD, but according to most national DGSs, 
there are no or very limited covered deposits remaining under this NOD. 
 
6.2.1.1 Motivations to transpose and use the NOD 
The main objective of the NOD is to protect depositors by fulfilling existing obligations 
until the original maturity and to ensure a smooth transition into the DGSD regime (e.g. 
Denmark and Luxembourg).  
                                           
241 The importance is based on the relative materiality of the various deposits covered under this NOD. The 
importance ranges between 0.0% and 2.2% of covered deposits across the Member States that have 
transposed the NOD. 
242 I.e. Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg and Romania. 
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In most other Member States in which the NOD was not transposed, the type of deposits 
and other instruments to which the NOD could be applied was deemed not relevant (e.g. 
Greece). 
 
6.2.1.2 Deposits and other instruments covered 
The types of deposits, categories of deposits or other instruments within the scope of 
Article 19(1) DGSD vary across the 10 Member States that transposed the NOD. Some 
Member States have adopted a blanket provision (i.e. Cyprus and Ireland) and used the 
same terminology as the DGSD, under the condition that deposits/instruments were 
paid in or issued before 2 July 2014 and provided they were covered by the DGS before 
the entry into force of the transposing legislation and that they are no longer covered 
under the regular standard coverage of the DGSD.  
In other Member States, the types of deposits or instruments are specified based on 
national circumstances (see Table 6.2). 
 
Table 6.2 Deposits or other instruments covered and importance 
Country Types of deposits or instruments Indicative size as of 
31 December 2017  
(% of covered 
deposits) 
Belgium All bonds and bank debt securities previously 
guaranteed by a scheme if they had an initial 
maturity date. 
0.0% 
Bulgaria Savings product (such as nominal deposit 
certificates) certified by a certificate of 
deposit issued to a named person.  
0.0% 
Czechia Legislation refers to deposits in general in 
line with the conditions set by Article 19(1). 
According to the explanatory memorandum 
to the law, it covers principally term deposits 
of some territorial self-governing units and 
of the State. 
0.0% 
Denmark Child savings accounts, education savings 
accounts, probate accounts concerning 
estates under public probate and escrow 
accounts, establishment accounts, entrusted 
means deposited on the client account of an 
attorney, and deposits managed by 
authorised management divisions in relation 
to guardianship or inheritance. 
1.0%-2.0% 
Estonia Certificates of deposits (certain securities 
issued by credit institutions or other financial 
institutions) if they were issued before 
2 July 2014, as well as instruments the 
principal amount is not repayable at par 
(including deposits with investment risk), 
and deposits the principal amount of which is 
only repayable under a guarantee or other 
0.0%* 
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Country Types of deposits or instruments Indicative size as of 
31 December 2017  
(% of covered 
deposits) 
such agreement provided by the credit 
institution or a third party until the expiry of 
a contract entered into with regard to this 
claim, but not longer than until 
31 December 2018.  
Hungary Debt securities and group accounts i.e. 
accounts of condominiums, housing 
cooperatives, school saving associations and 
building societies, placed before 2 July 2015. 
2.2% 
Luxembourg National legislation refers to deposits in 
general in line with the conditions set by 
Article 19(1), however the authority stated 
that only certificates of deposit issued before 
2 July 2014, are covered, until their initial 
maturity date. 
0.2%-0.6%** 
Romania Deposits and other instruments whose 
owners are house unions. 
0.0% 
Notes: The indicative size of the deposits covered under this NOD is based on the amounts indicated by DGSs 
and banks in the survey and the application of the provision. * As of 31 December 2018. ** For Luxembourg 
the figures have been based on the amounts of outstanding certificates of deposits of two large Luxembourg 
banks as of 31 December 2017. The amounts are presented as share of customer deposits. 
Source: CEPS-Milieu elaboration 
 
The deposits and other instruments can be classified in two broad categories. First, 
deposits and other instruments that were covered by the DGS before the DGSD was 
implemented such as housing cooperatives, building societies etc., without an explicit 
maturity date. These deposits and other instruments were mostly covered up to a 
certain date specified in the transposed legislation, such as 2 July 2015 in Hungary and 
31 December 2018 in Estonia. Second, instruments that were issued before the DGSD 
with coverage under the national DGS with a fixed maturity. These deposits and other 
instruments are in principle covered up to the expiry date.  
 
6.2.1.3 Practical experience with the NOD so far 
There is no available information as to whether the NOD has been used in a pay-out. 
However, most Member States have no or limited amounts of deposits and other 
instruments covered.  
 
 Impact of the NOD  
The NOD seems to be of limited relevance. From an analytical point of view, it may have 
a relevant impact on the risk profile of the national DGS, it has no or a limited impact 
on the level playing field and it may, to a limited extent, strengthen depositor 
confidence. 
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6.2.2.1 Risk profile of the national DGS 
In theory, the extension of the coverage to other deposits or other instruments could 
increase the risk profile of the DGS in two ways. First, the risk profile would be increased 
due to an increase in the amount covered, without a corresponding increase in 
contributions. Second, the deposits and other instruments covered under this NOD are 
likely to be riskier than other covered deposits. As most of the instruments and deposits 
are uncollateralised, they are likely to have a more junior credit status than traditional 
covered deposits that have a super-senior status. The DGS will have the first right on 
the receipts from the depletion of assets that are not pledged as collateral. The risk for 
the national DGS is increased as some of the instruments that would otherwise cover 
the first losses are, due to the NOD, covered under the DGS. 
In practice, the NOD’s impact on the DGS’s risk profile is limited and declining. Three 
Member States seem to still have deposits and other instruments covered under the 
NOD. In Denmark, Hungary and Luxembourg the covered deposits and other 
instruments under the NOD are equivalent to up to 2.2 % of covered deposits. In 
Hungary and Luxembourg, the amounts covered under the NOD are declining. The 
outstanding certificates of deposits of the two large Luxembourgish banks declined by 
almost 40 % in 2018 alone. In Hungary, the last instruments covered will mature by 
31 December 2024. The group accounts of special purpose institutions such as housing 
cooperatives schools and building societies are already no longer eligible as the coverage 
expired a few months after the implementation of the Directive on 2 July 2015. The 
Danish deposits and other instruments covered under this NOD are according to the 
Danish national competent authority likely to have a maturity date, but this could not 
be affirmed. 
 
6.2.2.2 Level playing field 
The deposits and other instruments with a fixed maturity have no or a limited impact 
on the level playing field. The instruments and deposits were already issued before the 
DGSD was adopted and the coverage will in principle automatically expire at the 
maturity date.  
In turn, the deposits and other instruments of depositors that do not have a fixed 
maturity could distort level playing field. More specifically, the coverage of these 
deposits could encourage the depositors to retain the deposits at the member 
institutions, as they are not covered by member institutions in other Member States or, 
in some cases, when transferred to another member institution in the same Member 
State. In practice, this effect is limited as most Member States have restricted the 
coverage of these deposits and other instruments to a pre-defined date. 
 
6.2.2.3 Depositor confidence  
This NOD strengthens depositor confidence in that the DGSD regime does not 
retroactively affect deposits with a long maturity date. For instruments and deposits 
issued before the adoption of the DGSD with a fixed maturity, the depositors are allowed 
to retain the coverage for the entire duration of the instruments and deposits. However, 
given the limited materiality of these deposits, the effect on depositor confidence is very 
limited.  
 
6.2.2.4 Relevance for respective Member States 
The NOD seems only still relevant in three Member States (Denmark, Hungary and 
Luxembourg) and they appear to attach importance to it, even though the amounts 
equivalent up to 2.2 % of covered deposits per Member State are relatively limited in 
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size. In any case, the amounts of such deposits and other instruments are gradually 
declining as more of them reach the expiry date.  
 
 Options in the context of EDIS  
This NOD will automatically lose its relevance as the remaining instruments and deposits 
issued under this provision reach their maturity date. For this it is important that all the 
deposits covered under this NOD have a clear maturity or the expiration date of the 
coverage is clearly specified in the legislation. Therefore, it is recommended to retain 
the NOD in its current form (Option 1) but add that in the absence of a maturity date 
the coverage is limited to, for instance, 12 months after transposition and including 
them in the calculations of the contributions to the DGS (Option 3). 
 
6.2.3.1 Option 1: Retain in current form 
This policy option considers that Member States can continue to cover deposits that 
were covered under this provision in the DGSD and of which the coverage did not yet 
expire. 
Effectiveness: Retaining the NOD would contribute to depositor confidence to some 
extent, so that a limited number of depositors are not confronted with a change in 
coverage that they could not anticipate. However, the NOD increases the financial 
exposure of the DGS without requiring an extra contribution, which may increase the 
risk to the DGS.  
Efficiency: This policy option would mean a limited extra operational burden for the 
DGS, which can relatively easily identify the deposits and other instruments in scope, 
as the number and types of deposits and other instruments are relatively limited. 
Coherence: The potential negative impact of additional coverage of such specific 
deposits and other instruments is marginal, in view of their limited relevance and fixed 
maturity. 
Subsidiarity: This policy option retains the flexibility of Member States.  
 
6.2.3.2 Option 2: Eliminating 
This policy option considers eliminating the NOD. In view of its limited relevance, the 
positive effects would likely be marginal.  
Effectiveness: Eliminating the NOD may reduce the confidence of a limited group of 
affected depositors. In view of its limited relevance, the effect on depositor confidence 
would likely be marginal.  
Efficiency: This policy option could improve the efficiency of the DGS and reduce the 
related administrative burden.  
Coherence: This option would contribute to reducing divergence in policy between 
Member States.  
Subsidiarity: The flexibility of Member States would be reduced in exchange for 
increased consistency. 
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6.2.3.3 Option 3: Alternative 
This option considers a modification to the current NOD by requiring the DGS to reflect 
these deposits in the contribution to the DGS and potentially also exclude those deposits 
without a fixed maturity date after a short transition period. 
Effectiveness: The option would complement Option 1 (retaining the NOD in its current 
form) in order to mitigate the increased risk for the DGS by requiring a contribution for 
the additional coverage as well as ensure that the level playing field is preserved by 
requiring an expiration date for all deposits under this option. 
Efficiency: This policy option would not impact efficiency because member institutions 
already hold relevant information on the deposits and other instruments covered under 
this NOD.  
Coherence: Coherence and the level playing field would improve under this option.  
Subsidiarity: The discretion of the Member States would be reduced. However, most of 
them in practice already apply or applied a limit to the coverage of the deposits and 
other instruments. The main difference would be to account for the additional coverage 
in the contribution, which is important when the DGSs are mutualised under EDIS. 
 
6.2.3.4 Option 4: Full harmonisation 
The NOD has a transitional nature, meaning that full harmonisation across all Member 
States is foreseen in the DGSD. This option is de facto the same as retaining the NOD 
in its current form (see assessment of Option 1).  
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7 Recommended policy mix 
Generally, national options and discretions (NODs) allow the EU legislator to 
demonstrate respect for national legal traditions and regulatory practices as well as to 
reduce implementation costs, especially in Member States with existing national 
frameworks and sometimes to help avoid political stalemate in the negotiations by 
facilitating compromises. The NODs also have, however, the potential to distort the level 
playing field and lead to fragmentation in the Single Market. In addition, they can create 
higher complexity, including higher compliance costs, and reduce transparency. 
The DGSD contains more than 22 NODs. Their relevance under EDIS was frequently 
addressed in the context of the negotiations in the European Parliament and the 
Council243. In this context, the purpose of the study is to provide a mapping of the 
current use of the NODs in the Member States and contribute to the discussion regarding 
their treatment under EDIS. More specifically, whether greater harmonisation would be 
necessary where, for instance, the common fund under EDIS were called on to finance 
the NODs.  
This chapter gives a brief overview of the NODs under the DGSD by outlining the policy 
recommendations, including in view of the impact of the NODs on EDIS in terms of 
financial exposure and administrative burden. The policy recommendations are based 
on the assumption that EDIS would take the form of a full insurance scheme.  
For the purpose of defining the recommendations, each of the four policy options (see 
Chapter 3) was considered against the following elements: effectiveness, efficiency, 
coherence and subsidiarity. In practice, this means that the recommended option aims 
to ensure the objective of an effective depositor protection, without requiring support 
from taxpayers and against limited operational costs, while ensuring the level playing 
field in line with the broader context of financial policies such as resolution, and the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
 
7.1 Coverage level and pay-out procedure 
Member States use a number of NODs that impact the standard coverage level, taking 
into account special and sometimes country-specific circumstances. Some of these 
NODs increase the coverage level by protecting so-called temporary high balances 
(THBs – NOD 4), deposits in pension schemes (NOD 1 and 5) or by extending deposit 
protection to small public authorities (NOD 2). Other NODs have the potential to either 
decrease or derogate from the standard protection. The former category includes one 
NOD that excludes deposits to pay off the loan on private immovable property from the 
standard coverage (NOD 3); and another NOD which allows the set-off of the deposit 
against due liabilities (NOD 7). The latter category includes one that treats certain 
deposits held by two or more persons as a single depositor (NOD 6) and another that 
excludes deposits fulfilling social purposes (NOD 8). The two remaining NODs relate to 
the pay-out procedure, making it possible to provide for a longer repayment period for 
certain deposits where the depositor is not the person entitled to the sums on the 
account, i.e. so-called beneficiary accounts (NOD 9) and to set a time limit for the 
validity of depositors’ claims for repayment (NOD 10).  
Among the NODs with the potential to increase the standard protection, NOD 4 for THBs, 
applicable in all Member States, is highly important for depositors because it temporarily 
protects funds originated due to or reserved for important, often one-time, life events 
                                           
243European Commission (2017), Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on completing 
the Banking Union, p. 11. 
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(real estate transactions, social purposes, and compensation for criminal injuries or 
wrongful convictions) – there is also a public interest in protecting these amounts that 
exceed the regular coverage level. It is recommended, therefore, to retain this NOD 
with modifications in the sense that depositors would be entitled to THB protection up 
to the limit of EUR 500 000 and for a period of up to 6 months244. The main benefit of 
this approach would be significantly reduced fragmentation across Member States 
relative to the currently different amounts of THBs.  
The two NODs covering pension savings, including personal pension schemes and 
occupational pension schemes of small and medium enterprises SMEs (NOD 1) and 
schemes protecting old-age provision products and pensions (NOD 5) are used in a small 
number of Member States245. These NODs primarily ensure a level playing field between 
different providers of pension products held by individuals and SMEs, consistent with 
the economic rationale for deposit insurance to protect households and SMEs that 
cannot be expected to monitor the financial strength of a member institution. It is 
recommended to retain these NODs with the modification that they are treated as 
covered deposits up to EUR 100 000 per depositor per institution and included in the 
calculation of contributions. 
While public authorities are not eligible for deposit protection, Member States may 
extend the protection to small local authorities with an annual budget of up to 
EUR 500 000 (NOD 2). As only a limited number of Member States transposed and used 
this NOD so far, the study recommends its elimination. The main benefit is reduced 
administrative burden because national DGSs would no longer be required to identify 
local authorities meeting the threshold of the EUR 500 000 budget. This approach would 
also weaken the sovereign-bank nexus as public authorities are an extension of 
governments.  
Among the NODs that decrease the standard coverage, NOD 6 treats certain types of 
deposits held by two or more persons, that are members of a business partnership or 
an association without legal personality, as if they were a single depositor246. It is 
recommended to retain this NOD with a restricted scope. Accordingly, to ensure a level 
playing field with SMEs, only profit-making businesses without legal personality would 
be treated as a single depositor. However, the NOD would no longer apply to non-
profitable associations or co-ownerships whose deposits would be considered as a joint 
account.  
The exclusion of deposits to pay off a loan on private immovable property (NOD 3) and 
deposits fulfilling a social purpose (NOD 8) each address circumstances specific to one 
Member State247. NOD 3 covers financial products designed to maximise fiscal benefits 
by delaying the repayment of the mortgage loan. These financial products, integrating 
a deposit and a mortgage loan, will be gradually phased out by 2030248. Because of the 
link with the mortgage loan, no deposits would be subject to repayment in the event of 
a pay-out unless their amount exceeds the actual loan. Similarly, NOD 8 covers certain 
types of deposits fulfilling a social purpose (e.g. the popular Livret A bank account) that 
are guaranteed by the state, rather than by the DGS. In both cases, it is recommended 
to retain the NODs because of their specific nature and because they neither increase 
risk for the DGS nor for the depositor. 
                                           
244 Based on the median implementation, assuming a coverage of EUR 500 000 in the UK with about 87% of 
the deposits covered, the recommended coverage level would cover basically all the deposits related to 
primary residential property transactions in the majority of Member States.  
245 The schemes under NOD 5 may be protected beyond the regular coverage level of EUR 100 000 per 
depositor per institution. 
246 Member States that do not apply the NOD, consider such deposits as joint accounts where each holder is 
eligible for protection of up to EUR 100 000. 
247 The NOD 3 is applicable in the Netherlands and NOD 8 is applicable in France. 
248 These products are no longer marketed because of the change in the tax regulations. 
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Under the DGSD, depositors normally have access to their aggregated deposits of up to 
EUR 100 000 without any set-off of their liabilities. By derogation to this general 
principle, Member States are allowed to take into account depositors’ due liabilities when 
calculating the repayable amount under the NOD 7. Although transposed in a relatively 
high number of Member States, the study demonstrates that such a set-off appears to 
have a very limited impact in practice. In this view, it is recommended to eliminate this 
NOD in order to reduce the administrative burden for DGSs. Accordingly, the 
responsibility to recover the due amounts would be shifted to a liquidator in the 
insolvency procedure.  
The two remaining NODs allowing a longer repayment period for the beneficiary 
accounts (NOD 9) and adjusting the deadline for the validity of repayment claims (NOD 
10) ease the operational processes of the DGSs. Therefore, the policy option of full 
harmonisation is recommended for NOD 9, also because the latter is already transposed 
in the majority of Member States249, while retaining the possibility for the DGSs to repay 
earlier than upon the expiry of the maximum time limit of three months provided they 
have verified the depositor claims. With respect to NOD 10, it is recommended to retain 
the NOD with a modification that depositors would be able to claim their deposits within 
the limitation period of 3 years since the determination of unavailable deposits. 
Generally, this NOD has a fairly limited impact on depositor protection because the vast 
majority of depositor claims is settled during the standard pay-out procedure. However, 
there is a small number of Member States with deadlines for the validity of claims that 
are too short. The recommended approach would allow the DGSs to close the 
outstanding repayment cases within a reasonable period while reducing the current 
fragmentation across Member States.  
With EDIS in place, NODs 1, 4, 5 and to some extent also 6250, have the potential to 
increase the financial exposure of the common fund. Therefore, it is proposed that all 
these deposits should be included in the calculation of the risk-based contributions in 
order to mitigate the impact on the financial exposure of EDIS. The study points out 
that the deposits under NODs 1, 4 and 5 are currently not consistently reflected in the 
contributions. With respect to THBs, the study acknowledges the difficulties of 
identifying THBs in advance251 and proposes that the latter could be accounted for in 
the calculation of the contributions based on estimations. In addition, in the event that 
the proposed policy recommendations are put into practice, the eliminating of NOD 7 
could also increase the financial exposure of EDIS. However, in view of its limited effects 
on the covered deposits, the study considers that the impact on financial exposure would 
not be material. 
In terms of administrative burden, neither of the above NODs would impact EDIS 
directly, because the settlement of depositor claims when determining the repayable 
amount or handling the pay-out procedure would remain as the competence of national 
DGSs.  
 
7.2 Available financial means and contributions  
Member States also use a number of NODs, which impact (i) the collection and the use 
of available financial means of the DGS and (ii) the calculation of contributions.  
The first category includes the possibility that available financial means include a certain 
share of payment commitments (NOD 11) or are raised through contributions into 
                                           
249 22 Member States have transposed the NOD 9. 
250 In the event that the policy recommendation regarding the NOD 6 is followed, i.e. the scope is restricted 
to profit-making business partnerships without legal personality, the deposits of non-profitable associations 
or co-ownership would be treated as a joint account and increase the financial exposure. 
251 Only 1 Member State has a positive experience in this sense. 
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existing schemes (NOD 12) and the possibility to use available financial means for 
preventive (NOD 13) or alternative measures (NOD 14) or for voluntary lending among 
DGSs (NOD 15). The second category includes the different possibilities to make 
targeted adjustments to contributions of member institutions in view of their specific 
features, i.e. lower contributions for low-risk sectors (NOD 16), use of a uniform risk-
weight for banks permanently affiliated to central bodies (NOD 18), and minimum 
contributions (NOD 19). Lastly, this section also covers the participation of third country 
branches (NOD 20).  
The main challenges seem to relate to the preventive and alternative measures, also in 
view of limited practical experience. The preventive measures (NOD 13) are particularly 
crucial for IPSs recognised as DGSs, which rely on this NOD to achieve their main goal, 
i.e. to prevent the failure of member institutions by intervening before the resolution 
phase. The intervention of the DGS under normal circumstances is only supposed to 
follow after the resolution decision. This study therefore recommends that preventive 
measures are only used by voluntary funds. IPSs recognised as DGSs might decide to 
become pure IPSs. The IPSs might benefit from lower contributions under NOD 17. 
Moreover, some DGSs are also interested in using such measures to lower the costs of 
intervention as compared to a pay-out. In this context, the most reasonable option is 
to only allow them to use alternative measures.  
The alternative measures (NOD 14) have demonstrated a high potential to preserve 
access to deposits and reduce the destruction of economic value resulting from an 
insolvency proceeding. It is recommended to maintain such measures with targeted 
modifications to address the fragmentation in the national transpositions affecting the 
level playing field across the EU and the protection of depositors. In particular, these 
modifications would ensure (i) an open competitive procedure to find a potential acquirer 
interested to take over either assets and liabilities or just the deposit book at a higher 
price than would have otherwise been materialised in insolvency (i.e. less destruction 
of value), (ii) that such a transaction constitutes the least cost252, possibly in line with 
the Valuation 3 used in the BRRD, and (iii) does not put the financial stability of the 
acquirer at risk. This modification could also entail possible changes to creditor 
hierarchy, by levelling the covered and uninsured deposits253.  
With EDIS in place, alternative measures could be financed by EDIS under the full 
insurance scheme or, alternatively, depending on the form EDIS takes, also by national 
DGSs. 
Currently, most third country branches in the vast majority of Member States participate 
in the national DGSs, but the approaches to the equivalence testing and calculation of 
contributions are diverse. In order to ensure an equal treatment of these branches 
across Member States, including the protection of depositors in the EU, the treatment 
of third country branches (NOD 20) should be harmonised. Therefore, it is recommended 
to require all third country branches to participate in the DGSs and define common 
criteria for the equivalence test254 and the calculation of contributions. Besides, as third 
country branches would increase the risk profile of EDIS, these common criteria would 
mitigate the risk to EDIS. In addition, as third country branches do not have their own 
capital and liquidity requirements, it could be difficult to determine their financial 
strength and the risk to financial stability255. Therefore, it is proposed that third country 
                                           
252 The costs of these measures may not exceed the net amount of compensating covered depositors of the 
failing member institution, but there are no detailed rules how to apply such the least-cost test.  
253 This is because the recent changes to the creditor hierarchy regarding the preferential ranking of covered 
deposits are likely to reduce the possibility of applying alternative measures. 
254 The equivalence test examines whether the third country DGS offers protection equivalent to that of the 
DGS in which the third country branch wants to operate. 
255 In addition, the reimbursement of the pay-out will be subject to the insolvency procedures and rules of the 
third country, which may be less favourable to EDIS than EU rules. 
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branches are subject to a maximum threshold of EUR 500 million on covered deposits 
as another risk-mitigation measure. 
A small number of Member States have used payment commitments (NOD 11) to ensure 
that the DGS would have sufficient financial means, without requiring the member 
institutions to actually transfer the funds. However, it is proposed to eliminate the NOD 
in view of its complexity in terms of the collection of the contributions and collateral 
management. Moreover, this NOD could potentially create uncertainty about the 
available financial means of EDIS if the materialisation of collateral is for any reason 
problematic. 
As concerns NOD 12 dealing with contributions from existing mandatory schemes, it is 
proposed to eliminate it because the NOD is only specific to one Member State256 and 
would not be relevant any longer. The lack of practical use so far of NOD 15 on voluntary 
lending between DGSs makes it questionable that it should continue to be part of the 
framework. However, because of the voluntary nature, the study suggests that retaining 
the possibility for voluntary lending between DGSs and, with EDIS in place, also between 
DGSs (both inside and outside the Banking Union) and EDIS, could constitute an 
additional tool in case of liquidity shortfalls or a systemic crisis.  
The remaining NODs deal with the contribution model. In the context of EDIS, it is 
recommended to revise the NODs dealing with the central body structure (NOD 18), the 
minimum contribution (NOD 19), and the lower contributions for IPS members (NOD 
17). 
Only 2 Member States use the same risk-weights for institutions permanently affiliated 
to a central body (NOD 18) in order for the contribution model to reflect the fact that 
these institutions are guaranteeing each other. However, the application of the same 
risk-weight could arguably encourage the affiliates to take more risk. Therefore, it is 
recommended to retain the NOD with targeted modifications. These would identify 
additional conditions in order to strengthen the internal governance within the networks 
and avoid the moral hazard for the affiliated institutions. 
A small number of Member States use the NOD on the minimum contribution for 
member institutions irrespective of their covered deposits (NOD 19). It is proposed to 
revise its design by aligning it to that of the Single Resolution Fund, i.e. creating a tiered 
harmonised system of flat contributions for a number of categories of small institutions 
based on their size. In addition, this NOD could be used to require any new institution 
to pay an entry fee when joining the DGS. This approach would reduce the 
fragmentation across Member States.  
In addition, it is recommended to keep the lower contributions for members of IPSs not 
recognised as DGSs (NOD 17) because this NOD takes into account the lesser risk of a 
potential pay-out for members of IPSs. As Member States are currently applying 
different modalities of calculation for such lower contributions, it is also recommended 
to set a common method for reflecting IPS membership in the calculation of 
contributions. 
Lastly, it is recommended to eliminate NOD 16 on lower contributions for low-risk 
sectors because it is not used in practice, often due to fact that the definition of a low-
risk sector is considered too complex. 
 
7.3 Transitional provisions 
The DGSD contains two transitional NODs.  
                                           
256 NOD 12 is applicable in the UK. 
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The majority of Member States use the first NOD that allows for a repayment period 
longer than 7 working days to repay the covered deposits during the several transitional 
periods by 31 December 2023 (NOD 21). This allows DGSs to prepare for the fast pay-
out procedures. In practice, many DGSs already confirmed their ability to pay out 
depositors within 7 working days or earlier. Because this NOD expires by 
31 December 2023, the study recommends its harmonisation. 
Only 3 Member States appear to still use the second NOD that wholly or partially covers 
certain deposits or other instruments until their initial maturity date if they were paid in 
or issued before 2 July 2014. The NOD seems to have limited impact in terms of covered 
deposits. Moreover, as this NOD will cease to have an effect as the remaining 
instruments and deposits within the scope of the NOD reach their maturity date, it is 
recommended to retain the NOD in its current form with the condition that only deposits 
with an explicit maturity date are maintained within its scope.  
 
7.4 Overview of recommended policy options 
The table below provides an overview of the recommended treatment of the NODs in 
the context of an EDIS that takes the form of a full insurance scheme. For the NODs 
when the difference between the options is small, both the recommended option are 
indicated as well as the option it relates most to. 
 
Table 7.1 Recommended options to address NODs in EDIS 
NOD Title 
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 Coverage level and pay-out 
procedure 
    
1 Coverage of pension schemes [Article 
5(2)a] 
  X x 
2 Deposits held by small local authorities 
[Article 5(2)b] 
 X   
3 Exclusion of deposits to pay off a loan 
on private immovable property [Article 
5(3)] 
x  X  
4 Temporary high balances relating to 
certain transactions [Article 6(2)] 
  X x 
5 Old-age provision products and 
pensions [Article 6(3)] 
X    
6 Treated as single depositor [Article 
7(2)] 
  X x 
7 Set-off of depositor liabilities [Article 
7(5)] 
 X  x 
8 Exclusion of deposits fulfilling a social 
purpose [Article 7(8)] 
X    
 Options and national discretions under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and their treatment in the 
context of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
208 
 
NOD Title 
O
p
ti
o
n
 1
: 
R
e
ta
in
 i
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t 
fo
r
m
 
O
p
ti
o
n
 2
: 
E
li
m
in
a
ti
n
g
 
O
p
ti
o
n
 3
: 
A
lt
e
r
n
a
ti
v
e
 
O
p
ti
o
n
 4
: 
F
u
ll
 
h
a
r
m
o
n
is
a
ti
o
n
 
9 Longer repayment period for certain 
deposits [Article 8(3)] 
x   X 
10 Deadline on validity of repayment 
claims [Article 9(3)] 
  X x 
 Contributions and available 
financial means 
    
11 Payment commitments [Article 10(3)]  X   
12 Contributions into existing mandatory 
schemes [Article 10(4)] 
 X   
13 Financing of failure prevention 
measures [Article 11(3)] 
 x X 
NOD 17 
 
14 Financing of measures to preserve 
access of covered deposits [Article 
11(6)] 
  X x 
15 Voluntary lending between DGSs 
[Article 12(1)] 
x   X 
16 Lower contributions for low-risk 
sectors [Article 13(1) 2nd subpara] 
 X   
17 Lower contributions for members of 
IPSs [Article 13(1) 3rd subpara] 
  X  
18 Use of a uniform risk-weights for banks 
affiliated to central bodies [Article 
13(1) 4th subpara] 
x  X  
19 Minimum contribution [Article 13(1) 
5th subpara] 
x  X  
20 Participations by branches from 
outside the EU [15(1) 2nd subpara] 
  X x 
 Transitional provisions     
21 Repayment periods longer than 7 
working days [Article 8(2)] 
x    X 
22 Coverage of deposits until the maturity 
date [Article 19(1)] 
x  X  
Note: The table above indicates for each of the NODs its recommended treatment under the DGSD and EDIS. 
The recommended option is marked with a large “X”, whereas a small “x” marks similar options. 
Source: CEPS elaboration 
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List of abbreviations 
Abbreviations 
Acronym Full form 
ACPR Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution 
AGDL Association pour la Garantie des Dépôts Luxembourg 
BaFin Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
BPS System Ochrony Zrzeszenia 
BRRD Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
BVR Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken 
CDC Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations 
CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies 
CRR Capital Requirements Regulation 
DG FISMA 
Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital 
Markets Union 
DGS Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
DGSD Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive 
DSGV Deutsche Sparkassen und Giroverband 
EBA European Banking Authority 
ECB European Central Bank 
EdB Entschädigungseinrichtung Deutscher Banken 
EDIS European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
EdO Entschädigungseinrichtung des Bundesverbandes öffentlicher Banken 
ESA Einlagensicherung Austria 
EU European Union 
EUR Euro 
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
FDICIA FDIC Improvement Act 
FGDR Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de Résolution 
FITD Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi 
FROB Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria 
FSCS Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
GBP British Pound 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IADI International Association of Deposit Insurers 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IPS Institutional Protection Scheme 
KNF Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego 
LDDS Livret de développement durable et solidaire 
LEP Livret d'épargne populaire 
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Acronym Full form 
LTV Loan to Value 
MFSA Malta Financial Services Authority 
MREL Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities 
NOD National Option and Discretion 
PRA UK Prudential Regulation Authority 
RBC Risk-based contribution 
RTS Regulatory Technical Standard 
SCV Single Customer View 
SDD Specific Deposit Default 
SGB Spółdzielczy System Ochrony 
SKOK Spółdzielcza kasa oszczędnościowo-kredytowa 
SMEs Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
SRB Single Resolution Board 
SRF Single Resolution Fund 
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism 
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism 
SZHISZ Szövetkezeti Hitelintézetek Integrációs Szervezetét 
THB Temporary High Balance 
VAT Value Added Tax 
 
Countries 
Country code Country names 
AT Austria 
BE Belgium 
BG Bulgaria 
CY Cyprus 
CZ Czechia 
DE Germany 
DK Denmark 
EE Estonia 
EL Greece 
ES Spain 
FI Finland 
FR France 
HR Croatia 
HU Hungary 
IE Ireland 
IT Italy 
LT Lithuania 
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Country code Country names 
LU Luxembourg 
LV Latvia 
MT Malta 
NL The Netherlands 
PL Poland 
PT Portugal 
RO Romania 
SE Sweden 
SI Slovenia 
SK Slovakia 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States 
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Annex I. Methodology for Temporary High Balances 
The table below summarises the methodology used to estimate the amount of 
temporary high balances (THBs). The model has been defined to estimate the THBs 
resulting from transactions relating to primary private residential properties (Article 6 
(2)(a) of the DGSD). The model has been defined to simulate the impact of the 
various legal provisions related to the coverage level, coverage duration and actors 
covered (buyers and/or sellers).  
The model has been defined for three types of actors, including i) first-time-buyers, ii) 
second or multiple-time buyers and iii) sellers. There are two types of purchases as 
previous research in Sweden has found that first-time buyers are much more likely to 
borrow money and thus have lower THBs (Grodecka, 2018).  
Formula for calculation of THBs 
(1) 𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑠 = 𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑠𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 + 𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑠𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 + 𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠 
 
For each of these actors the number of transactions, price of the residential property 
concerned, deposits generated and holding periods are estimated. All these four 
elements are multiplied and summed to determine the total THBs for each of the 
actors. In the presentation the THBs are expressed as share of covered deposits to 
allow for easier comparison across Member States and understanding of the 
importance for the DGSs. 
Formula for calculation of THBs per type of actor (simplified expression) 
(2) 𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑠𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∗  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 
 
As the THBs are in most Member States capped at amounts ranging between 
EUR 130 000 and unlimited, the model has the possibility to set a limit to the amount 
covered. The limit in the model is determined based on the deposits used for the 
purchase of the residential property and deposits received from sales. The formula 
does not consider the deposits above the limit that come under the coverage of the 
THB at the moment that the deposits are transferred. 
Formula for application of THB maximum coverage levels 
(3) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ≤ 𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 
 
Similarly, the holding period is limited by the legal provision, restricting the THBs to a 
duration between 3 months and 12 months.  
Formula for application of THB maximum coverage durations 
(4) 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ≤ 𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
The table below describes how each of the elements has been defined, including 
calculation, sources and assumptions. When an indicator or driver is applicable to 
several types of actors it is only explained the first time.
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Table A 1. Indicators, drivers, data sources and assumptions for THBs model 
Indicators Drivers Calculations Sources Assumptions 
Property price   Price per square 
metre * Region 
adjustment * 
Types of 
residential 
property 
adjustment * 
Number of 
square metres 
  
 Price per square 
metre 
Average of 
square metre 
price in (larger) 
cities  
The price per square metre 
to buy apartment in city 
centre in 2018 is obtained 
from Numbeo (2019) 
The average price per square 
metre in the larger cities is 
representative for all cities 
 Region adjustment  The model considers three 
types of regions (cities, 
towns and suburbs, and 
rural areas). The difference 
in price level between 
regions is determined based 
on the price levels across 
regions in the Netherlands 
in 2018 based on data from 
the Dutch statistical office 
(CBS, 2019). The type of 
region has been defined 
based on the classification 
of the European 
Commission. 
The average price per square 
metre in rural areas is 59 % and 
towns and suburbs is 70 % of the 
price in cities (100 %) like in the 
Netherlands.  
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Indicators Drivers Calculations Sources Assumptions 
 Types of residential 
property adjustment 
 The model considers three 
types of residential property 
(detached houses, semi-
detached houses and flats). 
The adjustment for the 
difference in price level 
between different types of 
residential property is 
determined based on the 
price per square metre 
across the different types in 
the Netherlands in 2018 
based on data from the 
main Dutch association of 
real estate agents (NVM, 
2019). To align the 
categories provided with the 
Eurostat classification (See 
Transactions) the square 
price of semi-detached 
houses is based on the 
average for townhouse, 
corner houses and 2 under 
1 roof houses, which are 
very similar. 
The average price per square 
metre of semi-detached houses is 
79 % and detached houses is 
90 % of the price of flats (100 %) 
like in the Netherlands. 
 Number of square 
metres 
 The number of square 
metres per type of 
residential property is 
determined based on the 
number of square metres 
across the different types in 
The average number of square 
metres of flats is 84 square 
metres, semi-detached houses 
123 square metres and detached 
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Indicators Drivers Calculations Sources Assumptions 
the Netherlands in 2018 
based on data from the 
main association of real 
estate agents (NVM, 2019). 
To align the categories 
provided with the Eurostat 
classification (See 
Transactions) the size of 
semi-detached houses is 
based on the average for 
townhouse, corner houses 
and 2 under 1 roof houses, 
which are quite similar. 
houses 171 square metres like in 
the Netherlands. 
Transactions (first-
time and multiple-
time buyers) 
 Total number 
transactions * 
Type of actor 
share 
  
 Total number of 
transactions 
Transactions 
involving existing 
residential 
property + 
(Transactions 
involving newly 
completed 
residential 
property * Share 
of households 
that own their 
property) 
The total number of 
transactions for buyers 
consists of purchases of 
both existing and new 
residential property. 
Total number of 
transactions with existing 
residential property are 
based on statistics for 2017 
from ECB (2018) completed 
with web searches. 
When the number of transactions 
is not reported the median share 
of transactions was used for both 
existing and new residential 
properties, 3.7 % and 0.7 % of 
households owning residential 
property respectively 
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Indicators Drivers Calculations Sources Assumptions 
Total number of newly 
completed residential 
property are based on 
statistics for 2017 from 
national statistics offices 
completed with web 
searches. 
Share of households that 
own their residential 
property is based on 
statistics for 2017 or latest 
year before available from 
Eurostat (2018) 
 Type of actor share 1/(Share of 
residential 
property 
transactions * 
Property 
ownership years) 
The share of first-time 
buyers is determined based 
on the total times that 
residential properties are 
traded over the time that an 
average owner is expected 
to hold property. The 
second or multiple-time 
buyer is defined as 100 % 
minus the share of first-time 
buyers. 
Share of residential property 
is calculated by the total 
number of transactions (see 
above) as share of total 
households that owns a 
An average first-time buyer is 
assumed to be 30 years old. The 
maximum share of first-time 
buyers is set at 75 % 
 Options and national discretions under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive and their treatment in the context of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
219 
 
Indicators Drivers Calculations Sources Assumptions 
residential property. The 
number of residential 
property owning 
householders in 2017 is 
based on Eurostat (2018). 
Property ownership years is 
based on the average life-
expectancy in 2017 from 
Eurostat (2019) minus the 
age of an average first-time 
buyer 
Transactions 
(seller) 
 Total number 
transactions  
  
 Total number of 
transactions 
Transactions 
involving existing 
residential 
property 
The total number of 
transactions for sellers 
consist of sales of existing 
residential property. 
Total number of 
transactions with existing 
residential property are 
based on statistics for 2017 
from ECB (2018) completed 
with web searches 
All new residential property is 
developed by commercial 
operators 
 Type of residential 
property 
 The total number of 
transactions are distributed 
across the three types of 
residential property 
(detached houses, semi-
The share of transactions is 
similar to the distribution of types 
of residential property. 
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Indicators Drivers Calculations Sources Assumptions 
detached houses and flats) 
and types of regions (cities, 
towns and suburbs, and 
rural areas) respectively.  
The share of residential 
property by type of 
residential property and 
region are based on data on 
the share of population 
across types of residential 
properties and regions in 
2017 or latest year available 
is obtained from Eurostat 
(2019).  
Deposit share 
(first-time buyer) 
 (1 + Residential 
property costs) – 
Mortgage loan 
  
 Mortgage loan Share of LTV 
ratio 
For the mortgage loan as 
share of residential property 
price two types of first-time 
buyers are considered. 
Those that are purchasing 
the residential property 
against the maximum share 
of the property price they 
can reasonably borrow and 
those that borrow less.  
The maximum amount that 
can be borrowed is based on 
Half of the first-time buyers are 
borrowing the maximum amount 
based on the LTV and the other 
half of the first-time buyers 
borrow about half of the LTV. 
These shares are roughly based 
on the distribution for Sweden in 
Grodecka (2017). 
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Indicators Drivers Calculations Sources Assumptions 
the loan-to-value ratio 
(LTV). The LTV is based on 
the legal requirement or 
common practice obtained 
via web searches. 
 Residential property 
costs (as share of 
house price) 
Tax + Purchase 
related costs 
The residential property 
costs are based on the 
residential property 
transaction related tax 
(excl. capital gains) based 
on web searches plus 
additional costs related to 
the purchase (real estate 
agent, notary, etc.) 
The additional purchase related 
costs are assumed around 2 % 
Deposit share 
(second or 
multiple-time 
buyer) 
 (1 + House 
purchase costs) 
+ – Mortgage 
loan 
See above. A quarter of the second or 
multiple-time buyers are 
borrowing the maximum amount 
based on the LTV and the other 
three quarters borrow about half 
of the LTV. These shares are 
roughly based on the distribution 
for Sweden in Grodecka (2017). 
Deposit share 
(sellers) 
 (Residential 
property price 
index – 
Remaining 
mortgage loan) 
/(Residential 
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Indicators Drivers Calculations Sources Assumptions 
property price 
index) 
 Residential property 
price index 
(1 + residential 
property price 
increase)^ 
Average holding 
period 
The residential property 
price index captures the 
price increase since the 
residential property was 
bought.  
Residential property price 
increase is based on the 
average annual price 
increase in the 15-years 
period between 2002 and 
2017 from Eurostat (2019). 
Average holding period is 
calculated by dividing one 
by the share of primary 
residential properties traded 
annually in 2017 or the 
latest year available based 
on Eurostat (2019), ECB 
(2019) and web searches 
The average holding period is 
maximum 40 years 
 Remaining mortgage 
loan 
1 – (Average 
holding period / 
Average maturity 
of mortgage 
loans) 
The remaining share of the 
mortgage loan is 
determined based on the 
average holding period as 
share of the average 
maturity of mortgage loans 
at issuance. 
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Indicators Drivers Calculations Sources Assumptions 
Average holding period (see 
above). 
Average maturity of 
mortgage loans in 2017 is 
based on web searches 
Holding period 
(first-time buyers) 
 Holding period 
(first-time 
buyers) * 
Adjustment for 
purchase 
agreement 
  
 Holding period (first-
time buyers) 
 For the holding period of 
first-time buyers it is 
considered that the first-
time buyers save a 
substantial part for a longer 
period running up to the 
purchase, while they receive 
the remaining part they 
contribute with deposits just 
a few days in advance of the 
transaction (loans from 
family and friends, 
consumer loans, etc.). 
The first-time buyers are 
assumed to save about half of 
their personal contribution. 
 
A holding period of 7 days is 
assumed for the remaining part 
they receive just in advance of 
the transaction. 
 Adjustment for 
purchase agreement 
((((1-Monthly 
reduction in 
purchase 
agreements 
signed)^ 
The buyers are only covered 
at the moment that they are 
involved in a purchase 
agreement, which is not 
necessarily already signed 
The share of signatures of the 
purchase agreements is assumed 
to drop by 20 % each additional 
month. 
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Indicators Drivers Calculations Sources Assumptions 
Maximum 
covered 
duration)-1)/- 
Monthly 
reduction in 
purchase 
agreements 
signed) 
at the moment that the 
potential coverage under 
the THB provision would 
start 
Monthly reduction in 
purchase agreements signed 
is based on an assumption. 
Maximum covered duration 
depends on the legislative 
requirement. 
The maximum covered duration 
ranges between 3 months and 12 
months. 
Holding period 
(second and 
multiple-time 
buyers) 
    
 Holding period 
(second and 
multiple-time 
buyers) 
 For the holding period of 
second and multiple-time 
buyers it is considered that 
the buyers save a 
substantial part for a longer 
period running up to the 
purchase, while they receive 
the remaining part they 
contribute with deposits just 
a few days in advance of the 
transaction from a sales 
transaction. 
The second and multiple-time 
buyers are assumed to save 
about a quarter of their 
contributions with deposits 
themselves.  
 
A holding period of 7 days is 
assumed for the remaining part 
they receive just in advance from 
a sales transaction. 
Holding period 
(sellers) 
 (Share of last 
time sellers * 
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Indicators Drivers Calculations Sources Assumptions 
Holding period 
last time sellers) 
+ (Share of 
other sellers * 
Holding period 
other sellers) 
 Share of last time 
sellers 
1/(Share of 
existing 
residential 
property 
transactions * 
Property 
ownership years) 
The share of last time 
buyers is determined based 
on the total times that 
residential properties are 
traded over the time that an 
average owner is expected 
to hold property (see 
Transactions first-time 
buyers and Type of actor 
share).  
The maximum share of last time 
buyers is set at 75 %. 
 Holding period last 
time sellers 
((((1-Share of 
monthly 
outflows)^ 
Maximum 
coverage 
duration)-1)/-
Share of monthly 
outflows) 
The sellers are only covered 
as long as they leave the 
deposits on their account, at 
the moment that they use it 
for other purposes 
(investments, transfer to 
accounts at multiple banks, 
etc.) they are no longer 
covered. 
Share of monthly outflows is 
based on an assumption. 
The share of outflows is assumed 
to be around 20 % per month on 
average.  
The maximum coverage duration 
ranges between 3 and 12 
months. 
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Indicators Drivers Calculations Sources Assumptions 
Maximum coverage duration 
depends on the legislative 
requirement. 
 Share of other 
sellers 
1 – Share of last 
time sellers 
See above.  
 Holding period other 
sellers 
 The holding period of other 
sellers is assumed the same 
as of second or multiple-
time buyers.  
The holding period for sellers that 
are intended to purchase a new 
residential property is assumed 7 
days. 
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